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# THE EDUCATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS IN SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS

A Dissertation Presented

By

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## ABSTRACT

The place or status afforded black people in a community is determined primarily by political, social, and economic factors. The social changes that are inherent in the growth of an urban population have various effects on the education, housing, and employment of that community.

The governance of communities is by those members of the community who seize the opportunity to become leaders. The methods used by those men and the community to make them leaders vary. The purpose of this dissertation will be to explore minority leadership development in a major New England community in relationship to local political socialization processes.

This analysis of black leadership will identify issues that are related to the black community as well as the apparent powerlessness of the black community to affect the decisions as to the outcome of those issues. City governance and its functioning in relationship to the black

population will be analyzed. The internal and external forces that have led to Plan "A", which is a strong-mayor form of government, will be explored. This particular form of government was instituted at a time when the black population was sufficient to predict the election of an increased number of black city councilmen and school committeemen. The capacity of the black community to identify its own leaders becomes significant when economic and social power are non-existant. The politics of power in the black community and the form of city government then remains the only avenue open to a subcommunity for the "poor," along with the capacity to influence changes and decisions affecting their lives. This process as to one's capacity to govern one's life style is often referred to as political socialization by social scientists and behavioral scientists.

Therefore, if we are to recognize education as a means by which one develops character, self-image, and the skills to function in a society, it is necessary that those decisions which affect education have the concerns of all the sub-groups of that community. As stated previously, the factors that influence leadership are economic, social, and political. Therefore, it becomes more and more evident that political leadership is the most probable avenue for black leadership identification. However, the education of potential leaders must start at an early age and be reinforced through the leadership models that have emanated from a system of government that makes it a reality.

This dissertation will explore the growth, development, and life style of Springfield's black population with the purpose of determining what kind of plan for political socialization and consequent development of leadership potential may be employed in Springfield.

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The place or status afforded black people in a community is determined primarily by political, social, and economic factors. The social changes that are inherent in the growth of an urban population have various effects on the education, housing, and employment of that community.

The governance of communities is by those members of the community who seize the opportunity to become leaders. The methods used by those men and the community to make them leaders vary. The purpose of this dissertation will be to explore minority leadership development in a major New England community in relationship to local political socialization processes in order that insights into useful educational process may be obtained.

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will be explored. This particular form of government was instituted at a time when the black population was sufficient to predict the election of an increased number of black city councilmen and school committeemen. The incapacity for the black community to identify its own leaders becomes significant when economic and social power are non-existent. The politics of power in the black community and the form of city government then remains the only avenue open to a sub-community for the "poor," along with the capacity to influence changes and decisions affecting their lives. This process as to one's capacity to govern one's life style is often referred to as political socialization by social scientists and behavioral scientists.

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This dissertation will explore the growth, development, and life style of Springfield, Massachusetts' black population as a basis for conceptual development. This city was chosen because of its availability and familiarity to the writer.

The United States was founded upon the principle of political democracy, which guarantees all of its citizens freedom, equality of opportunity, and equal protection by the law. Inherent in the very nature of democracy is the commitment to change or to progress toward these goals. The inveterate inequalities experienced by blacks in American society have constituted this nation's most abiding and embarassing failure.

The apparent magnitude of failures is relevant dependent on the geographic area of the observer. Southern blacks no doubt feel that they are subjected to the problem of "racism" more harshly than northerners and vice versa. The question to be dealt with is not who is or who is not to blame but rather how and when did it begin; and ultimately, what continued it and what procces is invoked to reduce it. The approaches to the answer are ones that must be arrived at by individual communities in the South and the North, since these dilemmas seem to be peculiar to each area. Northern communities have been characterized as open and free society.

This dissertation will confine itself to an aspect of the northern community, primarily because the subtleties of the denial of political socialization are more succinctly hidden in the guises of an open and free society. Here, by and large, blacks, regardless of achievement, are relegated to an inferior social status and prevented from enjoying many of the rights and privileges accorded other citizens.

The fact that blacks, as a social group, have never actually enjoyed the political or social equality of the "American Creed" causes black people to challenge the perpetrators of the inequities and to seek equality in government community participation, and social change.

Many sociologists theorize in the hope of providing a framework for the analysis of social change. Auguste Comte, in his book The Future of Sociology, divided the study of society into two main parts--statics and dynamics. He stated that statics dealt with the establishment of social order, the focus made by concentrating on forces that bring about stability, solidarity, and imitability of social systems. Dynamics he described as the changes that take place in social systems and attempts to trace the forces that make for flexibility, disorganization, and improvement in social relationships. Through this emphasis on various approaches, an effort has been made to understand the nature of social structure and social interaction. Thus, in order to fulfill the "American dream," each citizen should be expected to move toward the achievement of a society in which blacks, like other Americans, would have equal opportunity to exercise the full measure of their citizenship.

In the North, contrary to many people's beliefs, blacks and whites may be operating under a system very similar to a caste system in regard to black people. A caste system is a static system in which social relationships are not expected to change from one generation to the next. The North, in its "pseudo openness" and its supposed "free and open society," seems to have refused to deal with the problem of race until

the Selma, Alabama confrontation of 1954 and has given way to minimal concessions, thereby perpetuating a system of caste. No doubt, there will be those who will indicate that some black people have changed roles over the years, but caste systems rarely change even though some individuals within the caste system occasionally do not suffer as much as others. Similarly, the few migrating black people from the South, who enjoying the social class mobility, were unaware of the possibility of "entrapment" in such a covertly inherent caste system as that in the North. However, at no time were the vast majority of blacks living within the laws and directly subjected to the caste system content. One result of this discontent may be conservatism within the black community as to which goals should be sought first, "status" or class position, or "welfare." A status goal may be defined as one which will improve one's interpersonal position in relationship to a higher class as opposed to a welfare goal which would deal with one's personal position.

This salient issue concerning sought-after goals has appeared to be a dividing factor in the North's growing black communities. The dynamics of this quandary have been one prime reason why black-white relations in the North, being varied, never dealt with the fundamental element of an imposed system of caste.[1]

Social change might mean that some rearrangement in patterns of race relations had taken place. Thus, being black may result in one's being placed in a higher or lower position in the social system relative to some other group. We may evaluate the changing status of blacks in

relation to the status of white people; consequently, when the social distance (degree of intimacy) between blacks and whites is appreciably smaller or larger than at some previous time, another dimension of change in the system of race relations is evidenced.

Specifically, any evaluation of changing status of blacks in the North must concern itself with the total citizenship role. This role implies the right to equal participation in every aspect of community life. Therefore, when we discuss the changing status of blacks, we must do so with reference to the social position accorded blacks in such sensitive and fundamental areas as citizenship and racial imbalance issues. In this study we will assess the role of leadership as a major factor in social change within each of these areas. In developing a comprehensive analysis of the influences of change in race relations in the North, it is necessary to distinguish between those causes that are predisposing and those causes that are precipitating.

The predisposing causes are mainly of two kinds, manifest and latent. Among the most obvious manifest causes of social change are those that are demographic, such as size, proportion, and distribution of the black population. Economic changes brought about through the introduction of new technology were prosperity, depression, and federal regulation. Malfunctioning social agencies (such as those concerned with health, welfare, protection, and city planning) may be due to antiquated political practices, governmental policies, and outmoded laws.

Among the most persistent latent barriers to change in race relations are those that pertain to a desire for freedom, enfranchisement, recognition, respect, equality, security, and political power on the part of black people. Often this psychic state may prevail because of fear of economic reprisal, loss of upward social mobility as a result of being "counted out." The area of self-determination of the black man must be determined by black leadership that has a direction and the establishment of new laws for the black community's majority. It would seem that without the support of the black community, any director established either by self appointment or by a "middle class oriented" group would be subjected to criticism by the majority of blacks for the "power structure" would exploit that appointment.

The black people of the North have demanded a share of the economic, social, and educational wealth of the country. The means through which these goals may be obtained are not totally agreed upon by all blacks, nor have ways of achieving them, either through existing education or politics, been established. The idea of sharing is not new in American politics--the Madisonian system is based upon that very concept. However, the extent of demand and level of potential disruption of the "status quo" seem to be the concern of the white community. Consequently, the questions that have to be asked are whether there is a viable political system for black people, based on the concept of bargaining and compromise, or does there exist social, economic, or political "commodities" in the black community necessitating the need

for the white community to enter into negotiations with the black community. If the conclusion is affirmative, then there will exist the possibility for strengthening a free democratic society in this city. However, if the conclusion is negative, it would have to be recognized that there exists there would seem to be a "totalitarian society" for the black people of this city.

This dissertation will examine a series of confrontations between a number of black citizens and their local government, in order to obtain an overview that will be useful in perceiving the scope of the problem.

The history of a city and its people is an appropriate beginning in the analysis of social change. Within the context of an open society, a trend toward interdependence of its constituents should be evolving. However, in a community where there exists a feeling of estrangement experienced by many blacks, manifested by a variety of protest-perplexing problems demanding resolutions, there is a need for the antagonistic groups to communicate with some measure of mutual understanding and good faith. Further, there should be a concensus of the goals by the citizenry of that community so that there can be an adaptable change through a democratic process.

During the past few years, the citizens of Springfield have experienced increased racial tension. The issues that have brought about this tension are housing, employment, and racial imbalance. The lack of proper and equal representation and a distortion of the black people's contribution to community growth by the white community have

narrowed and excluded a number of alternatives to the solution to causes of racial tension.

During the first half of the twentieth century, a sense of innocence seemed to prevail in the liberal thinking about the race situation. This innocence rooted in the belief that the problem of racial discrimination was essentially a moral one and that the answer lay in appealing to man's better nature. Gunnar Myrdal exposed this thought in 1944 when he wrote:

> What is important in the Negro problem is what is in the minds of white people, and changes for good or evil in the Negro problem depend primarily on changes in people's belief and values. We have also seen that there is a great struggle in white people's minds--the struggle between the democratic ideals of equality in the American Creed and the obvious lack of equality in the treatment of the American Negro. This struggle we called "An American Dilemma."[2]

Evaluating the problem of race relations, Myrdal addresses the moral and psychological issues of the reawakening of the white conscience to its democratic heritage. He felt once this was done, the racial problem would disappear. In the year 1966, this enthusiasm and hope generated by the Supreme Court desegregation decisions and the Civil Rights Act was replaced by increased frustration on the part of civil rights supporters and a "realistic" approach based upon the acquisitional use of power was adopted. Fred Powledge referred to this position when he wrote:

> What the nation learned or should have learned in the first dozen years since Brown, was that white society has a point beyond which it would not go, and that point was defined not so much in the number of Negro children in a white classroom or the percentage of black people in a neighborhood or an assembly line; but it was a point that could be defined in terms of power.[3]

The development and implementation of research theories and techniques utilizing the concepts of power and conflict, which perceive majority-minority relations as an aspect of power relations, have been paralleled in the Civil Rights movement.[4] The racial patterns in the United States are not so much a product of impressive and repetitive social and cultural norms, but a product of the relative power positions of the two races.

These power relationships determine the strategies of the two competing racial groups, with the dominant group, whites, reinforced by their ethnocentric beliefs, attempting to suppress any and all efforts on the part of the minorities, blacks, to asserting themselves or to accumulating power; and minorities, struggling to make these attempts felt in society, challenge and weaken the position of dominance attained by the group with special privileges.[5] In a city where the conscious level in the black community exists and race relations have moved from a moralistic, legalistic level to a "political" level, power becomes the key to change. However, a city which has no avenue for political dominance for the black community, remains at a moralistic and legalistic level.

Because of the nation-wide movement of populations, Charles Silberman suggests that there will be a reawakening and perspective change in city and local communities throughout the country. The prospect of accruement and exercise of power through increased centralization of municipal government could be made possible by an increase in the black population.[6]

Between 1960 and 1965, the black population of each of the ten largest cities in the nation increased on an average of five percent, reflecting not only the large gain in black residents, but a proportional loss of white residents. The population of whites living in central cities dropped four percent compared to other locations, while the suburban proportion increased by five percent.[7] Black people not only became a significant part of the population of large cities, but middle sized cities as well.

Although the largest cities have generally registered the largest numerical gains, the largest proportional gains have been experienced by medium-sized cities in the 100,000-500,000 range. Syracuse, Rochester, New Haven, San Diego, and Fort Wayne as well as Springfield, Massachusetts all saw their black population approximately double in the past decade.

At this point, it must be understood that a change from national to local emphasis parallels the change in the character of black demands and the relavance of those national strategies in satisfying national demands as they compare to local black demands.

The study will reveal that Springfield reacted when blacks attempted to achieve status goals as opposed to welfare goals. The study will review the action taken by local branches of the national organizations in their attempt to use similar strategies of their parent organization to achieve demands on a local level.

A good deal of literature analyzing leadership in the black community indicates power structures similar to those found in the larger community. Hunter, for example, found a pattern of leadership similar to that of the larger community of Atlanta. Using his "reputational approach," he discovered that: "The black leaders tended to pick the same persons within their own community on policy matters, and there was high rate of committee interaction among the top leaders."[8] Barth and Abu-Laban also discovered a discernible "leadership clique" called the "Top Seven" in Pacific City, who interacted frequently with each other socially and chose each other as top leaders on a socio-metric scale.[9]

In the Providence study, Pfantz, using a similar research method, found complete unanimity regarding the top three leaders in the black community, which he says indicates "the clarity with which the power structure of the black sub-community is perceived."[10] Burgess, a student of Hunter's also found "an identifiable structure of leadership."[11]

On the other hand, James Q. Wilson, in his study of Chicago, could not find a discernible unified black leadership group. Instead, he discovered a plethora of organizations and groups responding to a host of different issues.

Another factor might be the size of the community. Pfantz, Barth, and Abu-Laban all used settings with relatively small black populations. The small size of the city may have allowed neither a diversity of leadership to exist, nor the development of a multitude of black organizations in these areas. Chicago and Winston-Salem have large black populations involved with many different issues, some related to race.

Changes in patterns of black leadership is a third explanation, for the differences in leadership structures could be related to the impact of the changing pattern of majority-minority relations upon the structure of black leadership. Traditional race relation patterns relegated the black leader to the role of accommodationist which generally meant acceptance of the status quo.[12] Although not satisfied with the rigid southern segregation patterns of the early fifties, the Atlanta sub-community leadership groups had "accommodated" themselves to their existence. Pfantz found a similar situation in Providence where black leaders wanted to become part of the establishment.[13]

Hunter and Pfantz described a relatively static leadership structure which may have been reflective of the static nature of the situation when their works were published. But soon after, new conditions began to impinge upon the traditional black leadership groups resulting in more differentiated sub-community leadership patterns.

Ten years after the publication of Hunter's Community Power Structure, a new study of black leadership in Atlanta was published. It

dealt with the political attitudes and goals of black leaders specifically to sit-in demonstrations that were currently taking place in Atlanta.[14] What emerged from this crisis was an array of opinion concerning the proper methods and styles that should be employed in advancing black demands.

In Chicago, the old leadership, represented by the ministers and the paternalistic Dawson political "machine" was being challenged by a more militant "status goals" oriented group contributing to the disarray and disunity of black leadership in Chicago.

Most of the studies indicate an emergence of different types of styles of black leadership competing with each other for support within the sub-community and in conflict with each other over the proper methods and strategies to be employed in dealing with the large community. Hunter found the black community of Atlanta isolated from most sources of power and its leadership unable even to influence decisions affecting the affairs of its own sub-community.[15]

In revealing the literature concerning black leadership it became evident that the identified black leadership group had power neither in the large community nor in the black sub-community. The impoverished economic conditions of the black population plus the small black voting base inevitably reduced its political thrust to insignificance and was responsible for the conditions of impotency. The black leaders were concerned about being "counted in" as part of the larger community decision-making process. This resulted in influence being constricted

to protest within the status quo.[16]

For whatever the reason, whether the small size of the black population, the pattern of race relations, the vagueness of goals, or the economic level of the sub-community, black leadership did not seem to have much influence within the larger white power structure in the cities studies. To pursue a line of study that patterns itself and identified leaders in a similar manner would have the same result. Consequently, the question of the status afforded black people must be considered.

## CHAPTER II

## DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN SPRINGFIELD

### Antecedent

Springfield, like countless cities throughout the nation, had its beginnings as a trading post in the vast northland in 1636. As many northern communities, it had few black people; the earliest records show that in 1790 there were 27 slaves in a population of 1,574. By 1870, the population had increased to 26,703 and the black population to 539. Over the years, as a result of the Industrial Revolution, Springfield became a major juncture in the development of New England. It also became a significant factor in the strive for freedom for the black man. In 1851, John Brown, the fame abolitionist, formed in Springfield a group of 44 blacks to establish an organization called the United States League of Gileadites.[17] They became the conductors along the "Underground Railroad" to Canada. So by 1900, Springfield's black population had reached 1,021, possibly through the Industrial Revolution, but most probably through the indication that it was a city that concerned itself with the "Blackman's Plight."

The black community's growth began along the waterfront of the city, the South End; and very shortly, the need for spiritual guidance brought about the establishment of the Third Baptist Church in 1871. However, as

the black population increased, a need for housing and employment became a major issue. Blacks moved toward the business district, the factories, railroads, and cheaper housing of the North End, and those who had some financial means and skills moved to the Hill section to start businesses and purchase land and homes.

From this migration, two new churches came to the forefront of Springfield's black community: in the North End, Mount Calvary, pastored by Rev. Silas Dupree, and in the Hill section, St. John's Congregational Church. Mount Calvary, established in 1896, was considered for a long time to be the center of the black population because of the large concentration of black people in that area. Later, during World War I, the lure of high wages which prevailed during the war period and better living conditions than the South attracted many Blacks to Springfield. Rev. Dupree, a man with a great concern for the basic needs for survival, established a home for men and worked tirelessly in an attempt to deal with the less educated and skilled black people of Springfield. Rev. Dupree, himself not bestowed with educational credentials which would give him an entree to the affluent circle, white or black, took up the cause of the common man such as "social acceptance." One of his most notable feats of the time was the organization of a boycott in 1909, of a major grocery store in the North End area when it refused to employ blacks. Through the depression years, Mount Calvary served as a welfare mission for men, securing and dispensing information about the few jobs that became available. With the "Great Depression" coming to an end, Rev.

Dupree and Mount Calvary became actively involved in establishing a center through the Department of Public Welfare, under the "New Deal" of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.[18] However, the opportunity for black leadership to emerge from this area was virtually impossible because of distaste for the low economic status of the area.

The second major black church that resulted from the outgrowth of the black community of the South End was St. John's Church in 1890. There has been much controversy over which church was established first; St. John's or Third Baptist. The union of the old Sanford Street Church and the Quincy Street mission was the beginning of the St. John's Congregational Church.[19] There were a number of ministers who pastored St. John's through its formative years, but few persons to take that ministry had the impact of the Rev. William N. DeBerry. Rev. DeBerry was an educated man. He had been educated at Fisk University, Nashville, Tennessee and received his Bachelor of Divinity Degree from Oberlin Divinity School. His parents had been slaves, and Rev. DeBerry had struggled to achieve his education.[20] Upon taking leadership in 1896 of St. John's, Rev. DeBerry also established community leadership that would recognize him as a "Voice of Springfield's black population." Under the leadership of Rev. DeBerry, the St. John's church that still stands on the corner of Hancock and Union Streets was built, even though it had been difficult to purchase the land because of discriminatory housing and building practices in the city. Nevertheless, Rev. DeBerry maintained that black people should first gain the respect of the white community before seeking the

admission into the large community. Therefore, the major interest of St. John's became preparing black people for employment in the areas which were considered respectable "Negro employee" such as cooks and servants. The establishment of programs in these areas was conducted in St. John's new church. In addition to employment, a continuation and reinforcement of a maternalistic society was advanced by the church through the establishment of a house for "worthy young black women."

Citing the difference in philosophy of the leadership of these two churches and the obvious backing of their parishioners, creates a means of setting the tone that would be continued.

Although some whites periodically demonstrated concern for the plight of city blacks, interracial problems were apparent in Springfield from the colonial period through the early forties. While Puritan bias against the Indian was evident, very little is known about the history of early black residents, aside from their slave status. After State prohibition of slavery in 1790, it was to the credit of the whites that segregation apparently was not practiced within the local churches. However, a segregated housing pattern appears to have existed in the early nineteenth century.

Immediately prior to the Civil War, city blacks figured prominently in John Brown's United League of Gileadites and worked in the underground railroad. During the war, a number of local blacks initiated petitions for service in the Army, and many eventually saw action. By the close of hostilities, the greater part of the black community was concentrated

in neighborhoods in the North and South End areas of the city.

A new era in local black history began with the 1899 installation of William N. DeBerry as pastor of St. John's Church. Although DeBerry appreciated the adverse consequences of racially segregated institutions, he believed that self-preparation was the key to greater opportunity for local blacks. Concomitant with his philosophy, he organized the St. John's Institutional Activities Program, in which religious training was supplemented by extensive educational, social, social service, and recreational activities. The plight of the black community and its activities were explained to the community through lectures, the periodic publication of sociological surveys, and a church paper called The Record. The attraction of considerable philanthropic support for DeBerry's cause ultimately led to the establishment of a summer camp called Atwater. By the early thirties the program had become so complex that it was divorced from the church, renamed the Dunbar Community League, and placed under a bi-racial Board of Directors, with DeBerry serving as Executive Secretary. As a result, the Springfield Community Chest recognized the League as the central social service agency for the black community.

DeBerry's efforts to earn the support of the white community for his programs did not prevent his publicizing a variety of complaints concerning prejudice toward blacks. The Dunbar Record was an early source of information to the black community for more than thirty years, until it closed in 1948. During that time, Rev. DeBerry was its Editor-in-Chief[21] as the Director of the Dunbar League, a race improvement organiza-

tion in Springfield. As spokesman for the black community, DeBerry was appointed to numerous city boards--in 1935 to the Springfield Welfare Board,[22] and the Governor's Permanent Committee on Religion and Inter-Racial Understanding.[23] Under the New Deal, Rev. DeBerry seized upon the national movement of the time, although the movement did very little for black people. DeBerry's closest contact with the white community and the evidence of very little gain by the black community led to doubts by the community as to the sincerity of Rev. DeBerry's efforts concerning the advancement of the black population. In 1947, the Springfield Chapter of the NAACP accused Rev. DeBerry of encouraging and perpetuating "Jim Crows" in the city. Through the efforts of Rev. Albert B. Cleague, the pastor of St. John's Church, attention was brought to the fact that the Dunbar League was a commercial venture disguised as a social agency. Rev. Cleague further recommended that the Community Chest discontinue their support of Dunbar and the League was abolished.[24]

The combination of these facts concerning Rev. DeBerry dissipated his strength in the black community and emphasized that he was not the elected nor appointed leader of the black community, but acclaimed so by the white community.

At the same time, the tenor of most of the reports emphasized progress towards interracial harmony in the city. Although DeBerry recognized the value of divergent opinions, he condemned dissension and divisiveness within the black movement. While local units of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Urban

League were established in Springfield during the thirties, neither organization appears to have engaged in more tactics than those of DeBerry. In a city plagued by nationality and particularly religious tensions, the unobtrusive character of black demands and the apparent unity of black leadership were welcomed by many white. By the late thirties, some members of the black community voiced their dissatisfaction with the old guard's alleged containment of younger and more active leadership.

The non-existence of any one organization that the black community as a whole identified as being representative of their religious views precludes any one church or church leader coming forth as a leader. As personalities of the individual religious leaders changed with the desires and insistence of their parishes, control and community leadership from the black ministry diminished.

Floyd Hunter's account in Regional City identified the majority of the black leadership emerging from the ministry of the black community. The diversity and the absence of economic stability in the Northeast's black population makes it impossible to establish one church with which the "social elite" identify. As a consequence, the church is not an indicator to be used to identify either the social elite or a religious "hero" for the black population to follow.

National emphasis, which once were the thrust of the black population, has now given way to the local level. Black communities can no longer look to their national black leaders for direction to secure local satisfaction of their demands. In their move to secure these gains, they many times seek to employ the traditional methods to identify leaders

and to acquire civil progress. The 1960's was a time when the world and the country were under the critical view of millions within and without the country. As the decade drew to an end and those national leaders, black and white, who had rallied to the cause of the oppressed became fewer, either through assassination or implied doubt of their sincerity, many local leaders still labored under the delusion that blackness and blackness alone was the only criteria for leadership. As a consequence of their political seats, elected officials, regardless of their means of being elected or the system of government under which they served, became self-proclaimed leaders over night. Poverty programs became the means to identify leadership through the positional and the reputational approach.

Position, reputation, and decision making have been the methods usually employed to establish community leadership.

## Current Situation: Demographic Overview

The population decreases during the period from 1960 to 1970 has been attributed to two reasons--a decline in the birthrate of Springfield and the out-migration. Statistics have indicated that the birthrate of the city has fallen over the past ten years, which is consistent with the national trend. The "natural increase" (birth minus deaths) for the city has dropped.

The difference between the dotted line and the solid line indicated the impact that out-migration has had on the city. The leveling off of

Graph I: Total Population Change,
City of Springfield, 1910-1970, (000)




Source: U. S. Census of Population

the dotted line as it approaches 1970 reflects the anticipated drop in births. New residents moving into the city did not affect the decline due to the greater number moving out. The net effect was Springfield lost approximately 24,000 residents over a ten-year period.

The majority of the out-migration went to the suburbs of Springfield. This is reflected in the increase of the suburban population of about 20-25 percent during that same ten-year period. There have been population declines in all of the major cities of Massachusetts during this period.

| | |
|---|---|
| Boston | 8.1% |
| Springfield | 6.1% |
| Worcester | 5.4% |
| Fall River | 3.0% |
| Holyoke | 4.9%[25] |

The reason for this exodus has often been attributed to a number of reasons, such as increasing taxes, congestion, inadequate schools, racial tensions, and a desire for better living conditions in general. However, the current recession has had a particularly adverse effect on Western Massachusetts.[26] With factories closing and defense spending cut backs, the unemployment figure reached 8 percent. Over the last thirty years, public school enrollment has changed. However, this change is parallel with the population change over the same period. Therefore, it is imperative that when planning, population trends be studied such as housing, birthrate, and deathrate.

The ethnic character of Springfield's population has changed as can be seen on Graph III. You will note that there was a decrease in the number of whites and a significant increase in the number of blacks and Puerto Ricans. A shift from 95 percent to 81 percent (14 percent) in the white population from 1950 to 1970 and an increase from 5 percent to 13 percent (8 percent) during the same period reflects itself in the school population and the individual classroom.

The information from the graphs and the demographic information concerning the growth of the black community would lead one to predict the magnitude of the future increase of minority group enrollment in Springfield public schools. The in-migration did not decrease but increased at the very time that the white population decreased, giving some indication that there will be no tapering off of the number of minority group members enrolled in the public school in the coming decade. The unemployment picture, though bleak, was thought to be far more promising in the New England cities than in the South. In addition to this, the natural increase in births alone would sustain a fairly high level of population growth in the black community regardless of in-migration of Blacks.

## Current Situation: A Description of the Hill

Springfield's black population is on a lower socio-economic level than the white segment of the city, a condition not peculiar to Springfield. However, Springfield's black citizens compare quite favorably

Graph II: Racial Character of the City of Springfield, 1950-1970, (000)




Source: U. S. Census of Population and Massachusetts Department of Employment Security

in standard of living with most black communities in the North. No sprawling, hard-core ghettos exist like those in Bedford-Stuyvesant. No areas of poverty and decay are evident outside of the Riverview section of the North End where the bulk of the city's public housing is located. In fact, one of the difficulties in dealing with the problem is its invisible nature. The housing is similar to the Watts area in Los Angeles, where mostly one and two-family houses, some deteriorating, others occupied by middle-class residents, spread out over a large area.

Although the inferior physical conditions are unapparent to the outsider, the residents of the black subcommunity located in the Old Hill sector have been observing the slow process of decay for the past two decades.

The Old Hill lies on high ground between downtown and Winchester Square on the south side of State Street and includes two census tracts, 18 and 19. Its boundaries are made distinct both by changing topography and land use patterns, including the Mill River to the south, the Maple Street ledge to the west, a railroad track to the east, and State Street with its vast array of public institutions and commercial establishments, to the north.[27]

The Old Hill, one of the more historic sectors of the city (the Springfield Armory was established there in 1794), attracted many residents seeking to build safer housing above the flood plain of the downtown section. Around 1870, a considerable colony of blacks were already living on the Hill. Since that time the sector has served as a

permanent residential area for black families. The area between Walnut Street and Winchester Square is the center of the black community in Springfield,[28] although expansion at the edge of the concentration during the past two decades has taken black families into the bordering Upper Hill and McKnight-Bay section. White families still live on the Hill, many of them remaining from the time when a large Italian community lived in the area around Six Corners; but for most white persons who live there, it is temporary living space. Young couples with their first child find the location and apartments convenient, and elderly persons, often living alone, prefer to live near downtown.[29]

Compared to the rest of the city, the population of the entire Old Hill now has a low social and family status.[30] Both tracts 18 and 19 lost population in the decade ending in 1960. Approximately 3,000 white persons left tract 18, while the black population increased by 1,400--for a net change of 4,400. Tract 19's loss of whites was 2,000 and gain of black, 600. Overall, the two tracts were among the least stable in the city from 1955 to 1960. The tracts include many atypical households, that is, many households headed by only one parent or consisting of unrelated persons living together; and the proportion of families out of all the households is low, compared to other parts of the city. Also, the Hill has a high proportion of separated, widowed, and divorced persons.[31]

A difference in the characteristics of the two tracts is visible when one considers the education, income, and managerial capacity levels. Tract 19 is similar to the city average in both educational level and

managerial capacity, although the income level is low. However, tract 18 is low in all three categories.

A significant difference can be seen between black and white populations of the Hill. The blacks are a younger population with a high proportion of young children and persons in their twenties, an average proportion of persons aged thirty to forty-four and a low proportion of older adults and the elderly. The educational level of the black population in tract 18 is higher than the income level is lower. The white population, generally older with a low proportion of persons aged under eighteen and between thirty and forty-four, has a higher income level and a greater number of workers in a managerial capacity than does the black population. The largest loss in the white population during 1950-1960 was of adults in their thirties and forties, about the same age of parents whose children could be expected to enter school and whose income would be reaching towards its highest level. Overall, the area has lost a number of white families, but the number of children has not declined, reflecting the large increase in children and adolescents among the black population.

The proportion of families living at a poverty level is large, and relief rates for all categories of assistance are well above the city average. The juvenile delinquency rate is high. In tract 18, among the black population, the unemployment rate, illiteracy rate, the proportion of school-age children out of school (an indication of school drop-outs), and the proportion of mentally retarded persons are all high.

The black population on the Hill differs from that in the North End. On the Hill, a considerable proportion--about 32 percent--of the black households own their dwellings, providing a favorable situation for rehabilitation of the structures, even if the black concentration in the sector continued to increase. The proportion of owner-occupied units in tract 18, however, is lower than in the city as a whole, and the median housing value for single-family houses is lower than the city median. The higher rent rate reflects the make-up of the households in the tract. The proportion of the households headed by married couples is lower than in the city as a whole, and the median income of the families is one of the lowest in the city.

Compared to the city as a whole, there is a smaller proportion of single family dwellings, a large proportion of dwelling units in structures containing two, three, or four units. Among these structures, according to the U.S. Census, the proportion of the sub-standard units in tract 18 is higher than in the city generally. Actually tract 18 has the next-to-the-highest proportion of sub-standard structures of any census tract in the city. The condition of housing seems to decline as one proceeds from the Six Corners section towards State Street, with the worst conditions in the vicinity in Oak Street.[32] This area could be classified as a ghetto on a par with those in larger cities. The condition of housing in tract 19 is worse than in the city generally, but not as deteriorated as in tract 18. In both tracts, the proportion of black households living ina sub-standard dwellings is far greater than that of whites.

Actually, the Hill, as a complete unit, contains the largest amount of substandard housing in the city. According to the Community Renewal Program, there are 275 dilapidated structures and 457 buildings with major deterioation. The low value of housing discourages owners from investing in improvements of their properties because they can not expect to regain the expenditures in selling or renting the dwellings. The average sales prices of housing in the Old Hill as compared to the rest of the city between 1959 and 1964 reflects the difficulty.[33] Despite the low value, many households on the Hill have excessive rent-income ratios; that is, they spend so much of their incomes on rent that it deprives them of other necessities. This necessitates, in most cases, the black's confinement, either by personal choice or discrimination, to these areas, thus creating a market demand that has pushed up the rent prices.[34]

Estimates are that the future population of the Hill will decline in number, but increase in the number of black households. The number of blacks in the city is expected to increase, and much of this increase will be on the Hill. Since a study of the movement of persons from the North End urban renewal shows that about one-fifth of the displaced persons moved to the Hill, the displacement of hundreds of others by other urban renewal projects and highway construction in the lower levels of the city can be expected to push more people (especially large black families) onto the Hill. However, the high mobility of the younger black families can be expected to follow the trend of the rest of the city towards the

suburbs, meaning in the case of the blacks, contiguous areas in the Upper Hill and McKnight-Bay sections.[35]

# CHAPTER III

# DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN SPRINGFIELD

## A. Overview

### Antecedent

Like other institutions, the development of the Springfield Public School System was greatly affected by the changing demands of the evolving society. Through the colonial period, education in the city was intimately connected with the spiritual mission of the Puritan Church. In 1641, a year before a state requirement, Springfield authorities mandated catechetical instruction for all children in the settlement. Cumbersome supervision through town meetings, irregular attendance by pupils, and inadequate financial support led to a 1717 decision to divide the town into two educational precincts with separate school committees controlling two grammar schools.

While decentralization aided the accommodation of religious pluralism on the primary level, regional rivalries affected general support of a central, secondary school established in 1828. Like other institutions, the first high school reflected the prevailing community attitudes. Boys who were selected by examination undertook a curriculum which included studies in moral philosophy, Biblical history, prayer, advanced grammar, Latin, Greek, French, and history. Religious orthodoxy was demanded of candidates for the principalship.[36]

During the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, a number of significant changes occurred in the Springfield Public School System. The development of more centralized control of public education on the state level, as well as Springfield's growth from a town into an industrialized city, affected many aspects of school operation. As pupils with more varied backgrounds arrived in the community, enrollments swelled and educational facilities were expanded. In 1855, the district system was abolished, and ten years later a Superintendent of Schools was appointed. After the advent of unified control, medical and dental inspection, school nursing services, centralized supervision of cafeterias, psychological services, special classes or home instruction for children with physical impairments, permanent kindergarten, evening school programs on all levels, and a Junior College were established. In response to the needs of the changing community manual training, sewing, cooking, and physical education were introduced into the elementary schools' curricula.

Enrollment pressures in the senior high schools led to the introduction of the junior high school pattern in 1917. The curricula of the new schools was greatly influenced by the demands of industry. Upon entrance into the seventh grade, students were required to choose between a general and a practical arts course. In the former, academics were emphasized with participation in manual training limited to two periods a week during the first year. General students could then select Latin and algebra in the eighth grade and a college preparatory or commercial course

in the ninth grade. In 1919, the inflexibility in a seventh grader's movement from one track to another was modified by allowance for program changes at the half year. Thereafter, pupils pursued a college preparatory general (no foreign language requirement), or practical arts track with appropriate course work in English, drawing, home economics, or manual training, mathematics, music, and physical education required of all. In the ninth grade, commercial offerings were continued.[37]

Educational adaptations to meet the community's needs were also reflected through the development of specialized high schools. In 1898, the Mechanic Arts High School, later called Technical High School, was erected. In response to local demands for adequately trained clerical and secretarial personnel, Commerce High School was completed in 1915. As academic as well as mechanical training was required of all students who attended Technical High School, a separate facility was added for a Trade School in 1927. Here, course work with a work experience program in auto mechanics, cabinet making, drafting, electrical work, machine shop, pattern making, painting, and sheet metal was offered. In 1921, the tendency of the high schools to overlap each others' offerings was counteracted through a statement which more clearly delineated the role of each institution. Central High School, later called Classical, prepared students for entrance into liberal arts colleges; Technical High School, for engineering and industrial occupations; and Commercial High School, for business related vocations.[38]

The future of the Springfield Public School System was profoundly affected by the 1924 issuance of the Strayer Report. Postwar criticisms

concerning fiscal irresponsibility in conjunction with frills in the curriculum and teachers' salaries led to a general survey of the system by Dr. George D. Strayer of Teachers College, Columbia University. In response to particular recommendations in the report, a general curriculum committee under the direction of the Assistant Superintendent of Schools, with appropriate grad level or subject field sub-committees, was organized. By 1927, a number of elementary classes were experimenting with a project approach in which children related academic knowledge and skills to a cooperative study of a particular subject. Some pupils at Elias Brookings Elementary, for example, combined learning experiences in arithmetic, composition, drawing, grammar, map making, printing, reading, social studies, and writing into the production of a booklet on the history of the city.[39] The elementary school course of study which appeared in 1929 and 1931 called for pupil understanding and respect for different ethnic groups by living, working, and playing together. Teachers were cautioned to utilize the special interests of children of particular nationality backgrounds in order to promote personal self-esteem.[40] As a result, some teachers encouraged display of articles from students' homes depicting various national customs. In one school where a great many pupils of Italian extraction exhibited a keen interest in art, that subject was emphasized. With parental permission, another school dramatized the Christmas story with children of many faiths participating. Joint planning of a Memorial Day exercise by officials of a parochial and a public elementary school led to an annual celebration involving pupils of both institutions on the public school's playground.[41]

In conjunction with the Strayer Report the 1924 statement of goals for the junior high schools stressed the need to perfect elementary school learnings and skills, develop characteristics conducive to good citizenship and offer exploratory and prevocational experiences. By the forties, common educational experiences for all pupils had nearly replaced the track system. Although a regional system of comprehensive high schools recommended by Strayer was not adopted on the high school level, a statement of some common curricular goals was issued in 1927. Similarities among offerings in the three high schools facilitated tenth grade student transfers. However, after the freshman year, transfers to another school were fraught with difficulties. Furthermore, the varied time schedules of the three institutions minimized possibilities for enrollment in courses at more than one institution.[42]

A number of other recommendations in the Strayer Report were also implemented. Immediately after the appearance of the report, the Bureau of Research and Guidance was established, and within eight years counselors had been assigned to all secondary schools.[43] In 1930, instructional employees were granted fifteen days with pay for illness, and the Superintendent was given discretionary power to grant leaves of absence without pay. Fifteen semester hours in education and two years of teaching experience were required for all teaching candidates. Graduation from a two-year normal school was required for elementary positions, a bachelor's degree from an approved college for secondary teachers, and three years of post high school training for employment in the Trade Schools.[44] A central

filing system for applicants was created. Eighteen facts concerning any candidate were coded in such a manner that suitable applicants for a particular position could be quickly identified.[45]

On the other hand, not all of Strayer's recommendations were implemented, and the economic situation of the thirties produced many problems for the system. The state did not mandate a system of separate tax levies for schools. Despite Strayer's suggestion that all school board candidates be elected at large, the system of ward elections for eight of the nine candidates continued. Furthermore, the School Committee remained dependent on the city government for the approval of budget appropriations, the construction and maintenance of educational facilities, and health services. In addition, demands for financial retrenchment resulting from the depression ultimately affected practically every aspect of the educational enterprise. Custodial and maintenance appropriations were cut. The purchase of supplies and equipment was sharply curtailed. Some high school and post-graduate courses were suspended; junior college classes were abolished and guidance services eliminated. Restrictions imposed upon the employment of new teachers and reductions in the number of staff did not remove the eventual need for voluntary salary rebates on the part of school personnel.[46]

Alterations in population also brought profound changes in the development of private education and public services. The establishment of Sacred Heart Elementary School ushered in an era of Roman Catholic school proliferation. By 1940, a complex parochial educational system had been

developed with nearly five and one half thousand children attending nine elementary schools and two high schools in the city. Our Lady of the Elms, a college for women, was proximate to the city limits with two institutions for men, Assumption College and Holy Cross College, within reach of city residents. In addition, Springfield contained three institutions of higher learning, two of which were historically affiliated with groups of Protestant persuasion. In 1885, the pastor of Hope Congregational Church, some city residents, and members of the International Committee of the Y.M.C.A. established the International Young Men's Christian Association Training School. As the original purpose of the institution was to train leaders for the Association, ministers or Y.M.C.A. secretaries were selected to the presidency of the school. Although the title, "Springfield College" was not officially adopted until 1953, studies in education and physical education gradually became part of the institution's curricula. Admissions policies were eventually liberalized to include more than candidates of Protestant persuasion but through the forties undergraduates were required to take a course on Protestant viewpoints toward the Bible.

In 1888, the French Protestant College of Lowell, a liberal arts training school for missionaries, was relocated in Springfield. As indicated by changes in title to the French American College in 1894 and American International College in 1904, enrollment policies were broadened to include students from all nationality backgrounds and, finally, native Americans. Although special offerings for immigrants were terminated in the late thirties, four ministers and a Y.M.C.A. secretary successively

served as presidents for the institution until 1946.[47] The 1919 establishment of Northeastern University eventually led to the organization of evening school programs in business, engineering, and law. By 1940, a number of colleges, a normal school, and a business school were within commuting distance of the city, and the Springfield Commercial and Civil Service School offered courses in business and secretarial subjects. However, as the general overall population changed, so did the public school enrollment change over the past fifty years.

## Current Situation: Overview of Social Change

One of the most critical areas of socio-economic development is considered to be that of education. Better jobs, better houses, and a better life is by and large predicted on the attainment of a good education; of such a degree that the recipient is able to compete in the various levels of social and economic encounters.

The city of Springfield is practically an oasis of educational institutes, considering the size of the city both geographically and from the standpoint of population. There are 163,905 residents in Springfield. Some 47,117 residents (ages 3 to 34) are enrolled in schools (as of 1970 census report date). These 47,117 residents are enrolled in 53 public grammar schools, junior high, and high schools: 14 parochial schools, 7 private schools, 4 colleges, and 21 day care centers. The total possibilities of such a plethora of schools have not been fully utilized, not only in Springfield but in most urban areas with comparable profiles.

The age old concerns regarding underachievement and general lack of preparedness and proficiency prevails when the education system is discussed. In the city of Springfield, there is a broad range of ages covered in the analysis of school enrollment. The emphasis on being able to accomplish and adjust scholastically and socially is even more important when there is a realization that the vast majority of students attending ghetto schools are underachievers.

Initial preparation for the education cycle should be done at the pre-school and nursery school level and further assistance should be afforded by virtue of tutorial assistance programs and projects.

Within the city, there are 16,285 residents five years of age and under. Of this total, 8,294 are in the age group of three to five years of age. This group is considered to be the pre-school or nursery school group. Within the five census tracts which comprise the black community (Tracts 13, 14, 17, 18, and 19), there are approximately 35,968 residents. (It must be noted here that consideration of the entire five tracts represents an enlargement of the designated MNA). The above mentioned five census tracts contain approximately 11,381 residents between the ages of three and 34 years attending schools. The nursery school group consists of approximately 1,962 residents aged three to five years. The indicated enrollment of three to five year olds in nursery or pre-school centers both private and public is 226.

The plight of the pupils of the black community area is made apparent when test scores (Iowa Test) indicate that black community pupils

are far behind the rest of the city in terms of the development of learning skills (see Appendix A).

The level of educational attainment (on a years completed level) is high for a city the size of Springfield, The median school years completed is twelve years, and 50 percent of the population age 25 and over have completed high school. For the MNA, 8,292 of the 18,148 residents 25 years old and over have completed high school. This is a representative 45.7 percent of residents in the above age group.

The 53 public schools have an enrollment of 30,497 students attending grammar, junior high, high school, and special schools. The enrollment is 15,603, 6,092, 5,890, and 2,911 for grammar, junior high, high school, and special schools respectively. Thirty one percent of the total school population is being bussed to school at taxpayers' expense. The current efforts of community-based groups are directed towards redistricting of schools so as to eliminate or cut down the high percentage of bussing. It is interesting to note here that 32.2 percent of the school population are Blacks and Puerto Ricans. However, from the U.S. Census Report, a few things are evident. If the dotted line is a conservative estimate and the straight line is based on school population trends (Graph I), (1) there will be a constant increase in minority student enrollment, and (2) by 1980 over fifty percent of the total public school enrollment should be black, making racial balancing of inter-city schools virtually impossible without some form of bussing.

The major change in education over the past fifty years could be directly related to the increased control of the Irish population in city

governmental agencies. This ethnic increase closely affiliated with the Catholic Church played a major part in the direction of education and politics. In politics, as in religion, the Irish brought many traits from the Old Country. The machine governments that they established in New York (as in many northern cities) show a number of features characteristic of nineteenth century Ireland. The exact nature of the relationship is not clear; much that follows is speculative. But the coincidence is clear enough to warrant the position that the machine governments resulted from a merger of rural Irish custom with urban American politics. As Charles Frankel suggests, "Politics is a substitute for custom; it becomes conspicuous whenever custom recedes or breaks down."[48]

The impact that Irish population growth had on Springfield is similar to the social change reflected in education, housing, employment, and the overall political governance of Springfield. While Irish "social change through population increase" was received positively by the majority of the city, black population increase, not only because of racial prejudice, was negatively received by the large white community. The magnitude of the black population's increase awakened a dormant racist attitude within the white population. These attitudes reflected themselves in housing, employment, and education, and ultimately moved the city toward a form of government that safeguarded the cherished tranquility of Springfield. In the following pages and chapters only these areas will be discussed.

## B. Racial Imbalance

### Antecedent

Social change reflecting itself in education was, in part, the result of black population increase. Heretofore, the city had boasted of its absence of racial problems, but the black increase forced the white community to recognize a population that they had taken for granted and ignored. Racial imbalance was to be the price that Springfield would pay for its refusal to adapt to social change.

The racial imbalance conditions in Springfield are analogous to the educational commitment of cities throughout the country, in that the education of our children is placed last on the list of priorities of city improvement. Tracing back to the charters of most of our cities, there is evidence that education was a community function credited to prepare citizens to improve government. However, as social dominance emerged, education became a product and replica of middle class values and ideologies which were imposed on the poor in the guise of compulsory education.

Education in Massachusetts was founded and based on the idea that as we improved the reasoning capacity of people, we better prepare them to improve community life and government; and as John Dewey put it, somewhat naively, "The schools could be a community somewhat better than society and serve as a lever for social change." The coming of the Industrial Revolution and urbanization of our country three or four decades after the Civil War produced a period of mass immigration, and the emphasis changed to a more mundane curriculum that would meet the needs of

an expanding economy. Yet, here the incompatibility of individual development and national needs was never questioned. Schooling became the yardstick for moral excellence and the vehicle for getting ahead. Immigrants saw educational success as a human value for their children, and accepted the system unquestionably.

People gave way to the notion that attitudes, if changed toward the poor, would bring about an acceptance and tolerance that would permit the poor to share in the prosperity of this country. However, attitudes in America toward cultures, classes, and country are changeable only if it is expedient and in the best national interest, as evidenced by our various changes in attitude toward Russia over the past three decades.

An example that a program can be instituted at the whim of the power structure occurred in Springfield in 1939; it is called the Springfield Plan. Dr. John Ghanrud, Superintendent of Springfield's Public Schools at the time, addressed himself to some of the interracial religious, and cultural problems of the community. The program attracted national and international attention through newspapers, magazines, radio dramatization, a Warner Brothers film, and an issue of the March of Time; it seemed this was a panacea for all the ills of racial tension. The schools were the focal point for the attack, and the hope was that through the innocent acceptance and understanding of the young, an unquestionable commitment to the sovereignty of the school would be made. The program was organized to teach democratic citizenship by practicing democracy in all levels of the school system. It had further hoped to do more than foster attitudes

of tolerance. However, as mentioned before, the total lack of commitment by the policy-making bodies of the city doomed the program before its inception; for to talk about attacking the problems is frivolous if the policy-making models of the community are not committed to change and develop a systematic course of action that first identifies the inequities and their hidden agendas and then moves in a conscientious effort to take those steps necessary for change. An example of the objective of the Springfield Plan is as follows:

> To bring about understanding of the historical background of the city's population and their contribution to American life; to stress the weaknesses in the democratic processes and point out the ways to eliminate them through realistic discussion; to teach pupils to think clearly so that they could avoid the pitfalls of biases and prejudices; and finally, recognizing that prejudices were developed outside the school. They devised a plan of democracy which was to be developed solely for the children, but would reach the adults who influenced the child's thoughts.

These idealistic dreams of creating a community for a total war against prejudice began to drift away as soon as the fascist threat of the Second World War ended, and so Springfield returned to "normalcy," for the philosophy established by Dr. Ghanrud of learning, working, and thinking together was no longer needed to hold a frightened people together. Poor publicity, religious conflict of ideology, and political pressures may be reasons for the program's demise.

## Current Situation

Now, thirty three years later, we are faced with a similar situation. The names have been changed to protect the innocent, but is racial imbalance

so different than words such as bigotry, prejudice, and social tolerance? Just as the Springfield Plan had a beginning, so did the racial imbalance of Springfield schools. In 1963, the Springfield School Committee voted to take action concerning racial imbalance. However, a "Blue Ribbon" advisory committee to the Massachusetts State Department of Education recognized that after three years, the condition still existed and made recommendations toward the solution. Nevertheless, the Springfield School Committee found it difficult to devise a plan that would satisfy the State's requirements. In December of 1966, the Massachusetts State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights reported that the housing market of Springfield was prejudiced. The report further stated that these prejudices extended into employment, education, recreational, and private clubs. The previous December, 1965, the inter-group relations specialists of the city resigned after first declaring that the attitude of many of the city's residents was one of refusing to face facts, a confusion of issues with personalities, and a resistance to accept change as a way of life. Springfield saw any outside assistance as an agitator. Because the non-white community lacked sufficient numerical strength, they were unable to develop the necessary political strength to deal with political power stuructures within the city. The structure had once been a Yankee and Protestant structure, often referred to as WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant); however, the strength was now strongly Roman Catholic. Nevertheless, the preservation of the Protestant conservatism remained and was prevalent; however, it manifest itself as

Catholic conservatism. To further confuse the issues of racial imbalance, in 1966, the Community Council declared that upon investigating the city's human services, it found that a lack of interracial communication existed, and concluded that this was the basis for most of the city's problems.

In April of 1966, a plan to reduce racial imbalance in the public schools[12] of Springfield was submitted to the State Board of Education. However, the plan was not sufficient in its attempt to deal with the problem of racial imbalance, but did reduce the number of racially imbalanced schools from seven to six. This was done by closing down the only junior high school in the black area, Buckingham Junior High School. The students were transferred to various junior high schools throughout the city, which involved a total of 259 junior high students being bussed. Of this total, 256 were non-white and three were white. At the same time, an open enrollment program was initiated at the elementary level involving 163 pupils; fourteen of this total were white. In both cases, students were bussed, and in both cases the ones dealing with the racial imbalance problems were the black community. However, the open enrollment program was not considered to be a success by the School Department because various community groups conducted campaigns urging parents not to sign up for open enrollment.

To supplement these attempts to alleviate the racial imbalance problem, numerous federally funded programs were instituted such as in-service training for staff, teachers aid programs, and the National Teacher Corps. These programs, although they gave appearances of addressing the

symptoms, never were designed to deal with the problem of relieving the racial imbalance situation in the six schools: DeBerry, Tapley, Brookings, Homer, Ellis, and Carew Street. However, Carew Street School became a racially balanced school when the School Department decided that Puerto Rican pupils were to be classified as white, leaving five schools in Springfield racially imbalanced.

The changing of district lines offered another possibility to reduce the number of racially imbalanced schools. However, the school committee felt that the success or failure of any plan depended on the community's understanding and acceptance of it; and because there were less than two calendar months left before school began, identification of students for participation in this program would be confusing. The excuse used by the School Committee was that the confusion of students decides the implementation of a program does not hold true, for in October of 1966, one hundred elementary pupils from Homer Street School were transferred from their school district to relieve overcrowding, in spite of the fact that throughout the report the School Committee does take the position that it is confusing and unrealistic to move or disturb white students.

In establishing the location of new school sites, the School Committee posed that the Willis-Harrington report to eliminate old school buildings be a guide to the identification of school sites. However, to insure that these schools not be in the ghetto area, the committee stated specifically that the location of new schools must be strategically between the target area and the periphery of the city. This could be considered

as conscientious city school planning if it had not been for the fact that the only three schools closed in the last ten years had been in the black area of the city. The School Committee further recommended that school building programs should be mindful of the city's capacity to support anticipated cost, and they must be related to other capitol improvements.

Other programs such as modified open enrollment programs of integration, an experimental school concept, and a metropolitan plan for integration were proposed to assure the committee that these suggestions would be pursued; they created a position of Director of School-Community Relations to coordinate them.

The School Committee concluded its report by stating that this plan demonstrated reasonably that progress toward the goals of racial imbalance in Springfield schools was being made and, thereby, fulfilled the city's statutory obligation on this matter. There were countless revisions of this plan, all unacceptable by the State Board of Education. However, there are other forces that created the racial imbalance problem in Springfield, such as the North End Urban Renewal Project, which displaced countless numbers of black families, and the instrument that predicted the population, employment, and housing trends, the Community Renewal Plan.

Springfield, like many other cities of its size, has been the victim of urban renewal and social upheaval; the phrases are interchangeable depending on how the movement of families is viewed by the reader. Society is built through improvements and upgrading of living conditions. Never-

theless, urban planners who usually address themselves only to physical rehabilitation are not cognizant of the traumatic psychological damage they cause families. The parents' self-concept as a stable or "rooted" part of that society is shaken by these moves.

When Clemment Evontress stated that criticism of black parents toward education and the public schools is demoralizing to blacks, he may be one of the very few urban planners who understands that educational priorities are last on the list of considerations of most urban renewal projects. Springfield parents, like countless numbers of parents throughout the country, are faced with the major problem of economic survival and often feel they have little, if any, time to address themselves to the issue of education. Also, many black parents are subject to the same stereotyped thinking as most people in that they think the public educational system is providing the best possible education for their child, and therefore they will entrust this part of their children's lives to it. This is evidenced by the reluctance during the 1970-71 school disturbance when the majority of black parents allowed the School Department to determine how the disturbance was to be dealt with. This reaction could be interpreted as an acknowledgement to the feeling of "powerlessness" which prevented them from becoming conscious of the problem facing them. Had they been problem conscious, they would have dealt with "powerlessness." However, the "conscious level" is not restricted to only black parents. White parents of Springfield also allowed the School Department to determine approaches to the school problem.

Many of our poverty programs today address issues that are established not by the community but by the nation. As a result, there is very little benefit to the minorities. The priorities established national hardly ever address interests of those against whom racism is practiced. However, as mentioned before, two consequences of racism are: the polarization of white against black, and the confusion of the major problems of the impoverished. Employment, housing, and recreation are important goals. But establishing them as goals and then eliminating or restricting the attainment of these goals may produce frustration and a feeling of powerlessness. Once the feeling of powerlessness is reinforced sufficiently, either through non-directed, poorly-oriented, or improperly funded proverty programs, those responsible feel they can predict the responses and therefore have a feeling of control.

In choosing to deal with the shortcomings of education in the urban schools the position is often taken that home and unstructured family relationships are the causes of not only our educational ills, but our social ills as well. This cannot be totally discounted, but may present difficulty in accepting the cause and effect relationship. In terms of survival, every parent prepares a way for his young culturally. Therefore, to accept the idea that home life is the cause of educational and social problems is to accept the criticism that parents from urban areas do not care about the future of their young.

## CHAPTER IV

## DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY

The prosperous years of the 1940's had raised the economic level far beyond the dreams of many European immigrants and many blacks. Assimilation became the major concern as opposed previously in the 30's survival. Better homes, a better way of life, a better neighborhood and a more sophisiticated criteria for selection of friends became important. Maslow's hierarchy of prepotency of human needs states that once we have moved from the basic level of physiological need, we seek to conquer our safety needs, such as security, protection, and freedom from danger.[49] This may have some bearing on the fact as to why, after the war years, many blacks and immigrant whites moved from the North End of the city. Some said they wanted to provide a better way of life for their children; and others, realizing that the high wages earned from the armory were nearing an end, invested in property. For whatever the reason the third level of Maslow's hierarchy emerged for whites, it manifested itself primarily in the desire to identify with a group, "ethnocentrism." The desire for family companions and friends became strongly identifiable with middle-class values. The same white families who had once shared food and lodging with black people in Springfield rejected this relationship for those of more identifiably middle-class "white America."

The black population had a variety of choices. They could either build stronger family ties and develop racial pride, or they could attempt to assimilate into the total society. They could attempt to become strongly identified with the reform movement in the city which concerned itself with the total city population. From this point on, the development of black leadership in Springfield, through either the reputational approach or the positional approach, becomes evident.

The reputational approach identifies those persons in the community that are identified as "spokesman and community organizers, by the subgroup. The positional approach to identifying leadership analysis the subcommunity organization and identifies those persons in leadership position in these organizations as community leaders.

## Description of the Development of Political Socialization of the Black Community

### A. Springfield Forms of Government

1. The Older Form.

The ~~bicarmeral~~ BICAMERAL form of government had made possible black representation in the city government. From 1937 to 1962, Ward 4, the Hill area, was represented first by Clifford Clarkson, a lawyer whose family had settled in Springfield in 1880. Attorney Clarkson, in 1944, resigned from the Council to become an examiner for the local office of Price Administration. He was replaced by James Higgins, another black man whose family lived in Springfield for many, many years.[50] This seat was later won by Paul Mason, another Hill resident and descendent of one of Springfield's

long-established black families. The record shows that Ward 4 was predominantly black, and the other people from this ward were predominantly members of St. John's Church under the guidance of Rev. William N. DeBerry. As a result, much of the thinking and attitude toward "status goals" as opposed to welfare goals were nourished through the leadership of St. John's Church. Usually, neither Attorney Clarkson nor Mr. Higgins would oppose the positions taken by Rev. DeBerry. The Gittel and Krupp Model of Discrimination and Tension describes a situation in which blacks have little or no political power. It is their feeling that the black community is unorganized, and "black leadership" is passive to white control and is truly representative of white choice.[51] Therefore, the political passiveness of DeBerry was reflected by the elected officials he supported.

As Springfield's black population increased, race patterns changed resulting in new power relationships and new leadership structures. The use of pressure politics by formal organizations replaced accommodationist politics used by single individuals.

The Citizen's Action Commission was formed as the legal corporate body for citizen participation in the renewal process. At this point, it is necessary to reflect back to the governmental structure of Springfield during 1967 in an attempt to see whether this form of government could have the input necessary for the involvement of all its citizens.

2. Plan A.

Plan A form of government virtually closed the door for any person concerned with the problems of the black community being elected to city

government, (to be discussed in a later chapter). The Plan itself called for a "strong mayor," one who had the power to appoint all city department heads except the Superintendent of Schools and gave to the City Council the power of approval and management of funds coming into the city, whether they were federal or state. The School Committee had similar power concerning School Department funds; however, the mayor was chairman of this committee, as he was of all city committees. Through his office, he could scrutinize the funding of educational programs and elicit veto mandates to the City Council on matters that were contrary to his political future or the political future of the City Council.

The mayor, City Council, and School Committee were elected "at large." It is conceivable that legislation which might threaten one's political longevity often became bogged down in either the School Committee or the City Council. The racial imbalance issue left the public dismayed in determining who was the true culprit.

Plan A of city government became a reality of 1961,[52] perpetuated by Council Charles Ryan who became the first mayor under this form of government. Prior to this governmental reform, the city had labored under a bicarmil municipal structure which may have had a number of problems associated with urban growth. However, the effect that this reform government had upon the black population of Springfield was tremendous. First, it denied the black population the probability of electing a man of their choice even though the black population had increased from 6,000 to 13,000. The odds were still overwhelming in a total city population of 172,000. Evidence to this fact is that the two black councilmen previously

serving on the City Council were defeated in the first "Plan A" election. This system of government was the invitation for reputational city leaders from the majority of the population to seek office through the backing of large majority concern.

The Citizen's Action Commission was formed as the legal corporate body for citizen participation in the renewal process.[53] At this point, it is necessary to reflect back to the governmental structure of Springfield during 1967 in an attempt to see whether this form of government could have the type of input necessary for the involvement of all its citizens. However the War on Poverty of 1966 became another frustrating hope for powerless blacks of Springfield, not through its stated function, but rather through the internal functioning. The program was viewed as an effort to mobilize community resources, both human and financial, and to develop a planned attack on social problems confronting the citizens of Springfield. Through the use of organized groups, established through such identifiable problems of the poor, community concern groups developed throughout the city's areas of poverty, i.e., Northern Educational Service. The Northern Educational Service (to be discussed in a later chapter) became not only a meeting place for young people to improve their educational skills, but a meeting place for concerned parents to discuss their common problems. Through this educational vehicle, many college students from middle class backgrounds grasped the opportunity to "pitch in" in a humanistic effort. (If you recall, this was the era of college unrest.) The magnitude of the program's involvement with liberal white middle class

suburbanites must have insured the program's integrity for it was funded that first year for $141,000. However, each subsequent year desired interest in the program diminished, and governmental priorities waned; the funding level dropped, nevertheless, political strength was developing within the black community.

The first major attempt by a consolidated black group for political recognition through the democratic process came during the mid sixties when Rev. Charles Cobb, Minister of St. John's Congregational Church, ran for mayor of Springfield. Two other black men ran for public office: Andrew Griffin for City Council, and Chester Gibbs for School Committee.

All three lost even though they were supported by the Council of Organization for Civil Rights (COCR). This group had formed after the publicized Octagon Lounge incident, which was the first major racial confrontation in Springfield in many years. The group (COCR) was made up of liberal whites and "newly concerned blacks."

All three men ran racial campaigns involved with desegregation of schools and a voice for the black community.[54] Some felt that the defeat of these men was due to the lack of support of Paul Mason's Negro Independent Political Association. Others felt that the defeat came as a result of the lack of support in the city at the time for black demands and the political structure itself.[55] However, statements by Mason such as: "I find it impossible to support a man for office of mayor whose ideas are apparently extremely opposite from mine, regardless of the fact that he is a Negro,"[56] do give some evidence that there was a definite split in the

philosophy, status goals, and welfare goals.

### B. Plan A's Effects on the Black Community and Black Politicians

At this point an analysis of political life of Paul Mason may be useful. Mr. Mason first came to politics in 1953 and remained on the City Council until the adoption of Plan A, where he suffered defeat. The lesson of that defeat has been well-learned by Mr. Mason, which is evidenced by his statement during the Octagon Loung incident, which involved alleged police brutality, and his stand on poverty programs and model cities "Black Programs." However, if one understands that American political structures have hampered the progress of those who represent black demands at all levels, it will become easier to understand why Mr. Mason is an incumbent each election and why those blacks who are elected to office on an at-large basis will always reflect the feeling of the white community.

Another public figure who appears to take a different stand, but clearly follows this pattern is Dr. English. Recognizing that in order for a candidate under Plan A to win office, he had to adhere to most of the qualifications acceptable to the white community as referred to by Banfield and Wilson as being light-skinned, Harvard-educated, and reasonable on racial questions.[57] Although Dr. English's first political venture was appointive, it ended in his resignation from the post of intergroup relations specialist. One has to question why Mayor Ryan might have appointed him, for during the Octagon Lounge incident the newly-awakened black community sought the support of men such as Dr. English. However, on two such

occasions, one in response to the sit-in and arrest of black protestors at City Hall, Dr. English responded he had "no comment at this time;"[56] and secondly, during the Octagon Lounge incident, where he dealt with the problem by condemning police brutality but did not actively involve his office of intergroup relations in the matter.

These two persons, appointed or elected, have been covered in this discussion primarily to show their action in crisis situations and then to indicate that both have since been the only two black people elected to public office under Plan A at-large elections: Mr. Mason re-elected to the City Council and Dr. English to the School Committee.

However, if one looks at the history of black political leadership, a pattern emerges, a pattern that suggests that black leadership has no true power base. This is not surprising, but the fact that many blacks feel that those who are elected to political office are truly representative to black people is a delusion. It appears he becomes and remains a leader only if he is desired to be that by the white voting population and as long as he can be controlled by the white establishment. This position of guardian of the status quo insures him of another term in office. Chuck Stone feels that black leaders come under two categories; "Uncle Toms" and ceremonial "Negro Leaders." He makes the following comparisons;

1. Neither is feared by the white power structure. They are invited to sit on committees because they willingly "go along with the program."

2. Both are totally predictable.

3. Neither is prepared to disturb the basic infrastructure of our society, retaining their position as "Negro Leaders" at the white man's whim.

4. Both bargain and negotiate on the white man's terms at his calling, on his home ground, and on his time table.

5. Neither is capable of energizing an entire community into a frontal assault on racial segregation in the community, nor are they prepared to utilize any latent possible power they may possess to do so.

6. Both prefer talk to action.

7. Both are the prime beneficiaries of the more militant posture of other civil rights groups.[59]

He further went on to say that the Uncle Tom leader and the ceremonial black leader have more similarities than differences. Whenever he is taken to task by the white community on issues, he turns to the black community for help. Once the point is gained, he returns to his previous position of establishing his image within the white community as a "moderate" or a responsible leader.[60]

Plan A's effects on black politicians were as follows. Under the old system, the city's small black population (less than 5 percent) had been able to elect members of its race to several seats in the bicameral legislature and to the School Committee. The most notable example of these was Paul Mason, who served ten years in the Common Council and was its president in 1958. Although he represented a fairly narrow section of the black community, consisting of the "middle-class," older residents of the Hill area, he was an active leader who accomplished many changes. Despite his narrow base of support, or because of it, he was accepted within the

white community as the black's spokesman and thus provided a channel for the expression of grievances publicly and within the officialdom of the city government. He also represented some consensus on the goals and actions to which the black community could relate.

When the Plan A form of government was instituted, it created a situation similar to the one in Los Angeles with black candidates facing a predominantly white electorate without party levels. That the nature of black politics was radically affected by this is reflected in the inability of blacks to elect a member of their race to office for over five years during a period when the black population had greatly expanded. Ironically, before its inception, the Plan had support within the black sub-community But once its effects were known, this support quickly changed to opposition. Councilman Mason was consistently opposed to the measure, knowing full well what its impact would have on his future political life. At one point, he tried to rally support by claiming the Plan would mean Irish-American control of the city, as in Boston, and that other ethnic groups would be unable to get seats on the at-large Council. His attacks had little effect on the outcome.

1. Paul Mason, A Black Politician in Springfield

Paul Mason was a master politician who possibly has found a key to open the doors for blacks to the City Council and perhaps higher office. But how important to the black community is a black like Mason on the City Council? He was elected because he was acceptable to whites and tolerated by blacks. To remain acceptable, he must use restraint in making demands

upon the political system; he must conform as he did during his earlier years in office, to the acceptable pattern of behavior by white standards. As sub-community tensions and demands accelerate as they have done in Springfield, the level of tolerance by blacks begins to deteriorate. Most of the reputed leaders and "knowledgables" interviewed voiced a strong distaste for Mason's behavior since he assumed a seat. Many consider the sub-community "double crossed" or "sold out" by Mason. Jim White's appointment as director of Model Cities solidified much of the feeling because Mason's support of White came into direct conflict with the Black Coalition's opposition. Mason's behavior in the Model Cities issues is similar to his behavior after the Octagon Lounge incident. In both instances he severely criticized other black leaders or refused to support their demands, going so far as refusing to endorse the black candidate for mayor. Perhaps Mason's behavior is related to his desire to become the black leader in Springfield by neutralizing all opposition.

The election of Mason to the City Council cannot be used as an indication of black leadership. First, he was not elected because of the effort and support received from other black leaders; second, support by the white mass media and white leadership may have been the key factor in his victory; and third, the influence of the black sub-community in the city of Springfield has not been advanced by his victory. Thus Paul Mason's election may well illustrate the impotence of black leadership, since the promises that they claimed were made to them were never kept. Mason has almost deliberately ignored them during his tenure in office.

Black leadership was unified, if in a very disjointed fashion, in regard to the election. Yet their importance is unrelated to internal problems in contrast to the school issue and in the Model Cities issue; rather it is rooted in the institution of a reform government that inhibits true representation of black people as a minority group, as well as the small and apathetic character of the black electorate. Unfortunately, the problem of apathy is related to the behavior of black political leaders. Until the black community increases in population, it will have to be satisfied with blacks in office who must respond to and be concerned about the sensitivity of the white citizenry. Many blacks interviewed swore they would never vote for Mason again, preferring to see a white man occupy his seat; but that was said a year before the next election.

### C. Social Agencies

Robert Dahl's Who Governs? explores major social agencies and their scope in New Haven, Connecticut.[61] This section will attempt to make a similar exploration for Springfield, Massachusetts. The few issues deemed important to the black community in Springfield to be examined are: The Octagon Lounge incident involving police, Model Cities director's appointment, and racial imbalance. They were selected by analysis of newspaper coverage of the black community and through interviews with community "knowledgables." As was the case with Who Governs?, the purpose of this exploration is to examine the behavior of the community and individuals, as well as to determine the extent of their influence.

The black community is a sub-population of a larger social entities. These other entities play an important part in all of the issues to be discussed, and consequently attempts to measure the impact and effectiveness of black leadership in the Springfield community must be affected by the larger context empinging on them.[62]

James Q. Wilson's study of black leadership in Chicago found no discernible unified black leadership group. However, he did find a number of organizations and groups that responded to issues.[63]

Ladd could not find much "overlapping" between black leadership in various areas of community life. The comparative analysis of Greenville and Winston-Salem indicated a similar result to Wilson.

Although the NAACP and the Urban League have dominated the organizational scene, a recurrent rise and fall of othe race organizations with political goals has occurred.

1. Minor Black Organizations

a. CORE--The only other group with national affiliations in Springfield was the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), but its impact on the city of Springfield lasted no more than two years (1965 to 1966); and the chapter has now completely disappeared from the scene. In contrast to the Urban League and the NAACP, CORE can be classified as a "one-issue" organization, coming to the fore during the height of the school controversy, reaching the peak of its influence during the Octagon Lounge demonstrations, and quickly declining after the Oscar Bright scandal.

CORE's importance to the development of race relations in Springfield was connected to its aggressive behavior toward the city government and white establishment. Its program was purely political, resting on the tactics of non-violent confrontation through the use of sit-ins, picketing, and boycotts, in sharp contrast to the styles and programs of the NAACP and the Urban League. They were able to carry the issue of "police brutality" to such a degree that the focus of national civil rights activity for a moment fell on Springfield. But even before the Octagon Lounge incident, CORE had been pushing hard on the school issue. It continuously sent pickets to the School Department, demanding implementation of a workable imbalance plan and criticizing the "go slow" approach of the School Committee. At one point, Bright threatened to flood the city with CORE members from all over the country if the Committee did not comply with CORE's demands. In conjunction with the Council of Organizations for Civil Rights, it created most of the publicity and notoriety in that phase of the issue. Unfortunately for CORE, its style and purpose severely limited its potential growth. Its strength was in its specialized, streamlined character fitting a particular purpose at a particular time. Once this time passed, local CORE could not adapt. The other major deficiency of the organization was its dependence on a very small number of leaders, two in particular: Benjamin Swan, brother of Talbot Swan, and most importantly, Oscar Bright.

The overdependence on persons rather than on the structure of the organization proved fatal for CORE. Oscar Bright, CORE's leading activist,

was charged prior to one of the largest "police brutality" marches with possession of drugs (allegedly found on him when he was arrested during a sit-in). Many observers raised questions about the legitimacy of the complaint since Bright obviously planned to be arrested and presumably would not have carried drugs at such a time. Regardless, the result was to taint Bright's ability as a leader and to damage the image of the entire protest effort and CORE in particular in the eyes of both the black and white communities. CORE never recovered nor has Bright yet been able to regain his position of prominence in Springfield.

b. Coordinating Groups - School Crisis--During the racial imbalance controversy, other groups besides CORE came into existence and then along with CORE quickly disappeared. Some of these "one issue" organizations include the Council or Organizations for Civil Rights (COCR), Citizens for Racially Integrated Schools (CRISIS), the Committee for Equality, and the Council of Negro Organizations. Most of them were created to coordinate activities of all the pro-civil rights groups in order to present a united front in making demands on the School Committee, but none ever succeeded in that purpose. Most were nothing more than paper organizations containing only a handful of members. The coordinating groups found it hard to coordinate, primarily because of the uncooperative attitude and competitiveness of the member organizations. When the school issue began to fade, so did these groups.

c. Uplift, Inc.--Uplift, Incorporated remains in some prominence. It focuses its efforts on organizing the sub-community residents to develop major political power. Although in a moribund state for two years, Uplift

seems to have been reactivated during the Model Cities conflict in an effort to organize support for community control. The Rev. Talbert Swan was recently elected its chairman, and its board members include Andrew Griffin and Oscar Bright, two of the most aggressive spokesmen in the sub-community.

d. Black Coalition--The Black Coalition is another political action group created out of the Model Cities controversy, but its purpose was closer to the school issue coordinating groups--to create a united front of sub-community spokesmen to deal with the city government and to strengthen the bargaining position of the sub-community.

Since the Depression, and to a limited degree before 1932, the federal, state, and local governments have been involved in the welfare of the sub-community residents; but the Johnson Administration accelerated and expanded this effort. In Springfield, this has meant a proliferation of governmental programs such as Head Start, Concentrated Employment Program, Neighborhood Legal Services, Northern Educational Services, and the Model Cities Program.

e. Springfield Action Commission--To coordinate and supervise the operations of these programs, the Springfield Action Commission (SAC) was created. Besides distributing the funds and overseeing operations, SAC acts as an intermediary or "bridge" agency between the city government and the client groups. This role is reflected in the make-up of the Board of Directors which includes government officials, business leaders, clients,

and community action representatives. To insure a constituency voice, the bylaws call for a minimum of 50 percent representation from the target areas on the Board of Directors. Daily operations of the Commission are handled by the executive director, usually a professional administrator. The most recent director, Louis Frayser, came from the Southeastern Tidewater Opportunities Project in Norfolk, Virginia, where he was a planning official. The president of SAC is elected by the members of the Board and is essentially an honorific post.

During the early years of its existence, SAC's concern was mainly administrative and passive. It was not involved in the school controversy nor did it apply any considerable amount of pressure on the city government in the form of constituency demands. If anything, it seemed to be over-weighted in favor of governmental needs.

In 1967, this pattern of behavior began to change. The Model Cities controversy, the hiring of Jim White, and most important, the possibility of a cut-back in program funds, fostered the more aggressive attitude of the Commission. Although representation was varied and included a multiplicity of interests, the Board, and especially Frayser, became more supportive of community demands and more critical of governmental actions. In an analysis of the "War on Poverty," which was sent to OEO, Frayser recommended that "controls of local anti-poverty agencies be returned, unencumbered, to the people to be selected--the poor or their elected representatives." He also favored the repeal of the Greene Amendment and more direct federal funding, eliminating the need for approval from parent agencies. This plea for more organizational autonomy as a response to

growing financial and political pressures was translated into a demand for more community control. The Commission seems to rely on, to a greater extent, support for its program from client constituency groups rather than cooperation from governmental authorities.

Although Mr. Frayser took no public position on the Jim White controversy, nor would he make his opinions known in an interview, it was apparent from discussions with knowledgables and other reputed leaders that Frayser was unhappy with White's appointment and the mayor's actions. He applied considerable "behind-the-scenes" pressure to have White removed. It was Frayser who was chosen by the mayor to rescue the Model Cities Program in early 1969 when its proposals were rejected by HUD and the operation seemed to be floundering.

The Springfield Action Commission is still a "bridge" agency, but its sympathies have become more closely tied to the needs of its sub-community constituents rather than to the desires of the municipal and federal authorities.

f. Northern Educational Services--Under SAC's jurisdiction, the Northern Educational Services (NES) has been successful in providing remedial and supplementary education for disadvantaged youth. Begun by Robert M. Hughes, its first director, and continued and expanded by Andrew Griffin, its second director, NES grew in its first 25 months of operation from one to seven tutorial centers, each based in one of the target areas of Greater Springfield. In recent months the program has expanded further, reaching beyond the boundaries of Springfield to set up its eighth tutorial center in neighboring Chicopee.

The long-range objectives of the NES, according to its 1966 Annual Report, were to help elementary and secondary school students from low-income families overcome these academic deficiencies in classroom performance. It has relied on support in the form of hundreds of volunteers from the area's several colleges and the University of Massachusetts. The college student volunteers help with homework, furnishes counseling and guidance services, and provides a series of cultural enrichment experiences for both the children and their parents.

The importance of the NES for the purpose of this research lies in its relatively great success, especially when compared to other government programs focused on up-grading the conditions of the black sub-community. The accomplishments have the added advantage of being highly visible. NES enjoys a great deal of popularity among Springfield's black population and consequently makes NES an important base of influence in the sub-community. Observers explain Andrew Griffin's growing influence in the sub-community as a function of his position as director of NES, a somewhat ironic situation considering the non-political nature of the organization. But for a community desperate for visible improvements in its condition, any accomplishments, even in the area of education, must have political consequences.

g. Comprehensive Employment Program--In contrast to the relative success and almost total unanimity of support for NES, the Comprehensive Employment Program (CEP), another SAC-sponsored anti-poverty effort, has met with both limited success and a great deal of criticism. CEP received a $2,087,000 grant from the United States Department of Labor in June,

1968, for the training and placement of former unemployables--that is, persons who have either never been employed or who work infrequently. It is aimed specifically at the hard-core poor, especially males, who find it impossible to hold permanent jobs. Besides traditional screening and placement, CEP offers supportive programs, such as classes in remedial reading, arithmetic, etiquette, speech, and personal care, along with extensive counseling to reorient the individual's life style to make him employable. It is hoped that in the long-run, the program will pay for itself by removing large numbers of people from the welfare roles. In fact, after a visit to the program in late 1968, Mayor Freedman declared that the city would save $300,000 in welfare costs in 1968 because of the program.

In April, 1969, criticism began to develop over the results of the CEP effort. City Councilor Theodore Bamforth, a member of SAC, accused the program of spending millions of dollars and accomplishing little. He said that to his knowledge only 70 percent had been trained for jobs thus far and estimated the cost of training at $20,000 a person.

The charges were immediately denied by Louis Frayser and Roger Williams, CEP Director, who along with 14 of the 21 SAC Board members voted to demand that Mayor Freedman remove Bamforth from the Board if investigators revealed that his allegations were unfounded. City Councilor Philip Walsh spoke in behalf of CEP saying, "I cannot for the life of me understand these charges. CEP has been used as an example to other communities of what can be done."

Andrew Griffin questioned the business community for not speaking up in support of SAC and CEP when they were under attack. He accused some businesses of "reaping the harvest of black people" and being involved only for their own financial gain. He suggested that those business firms be "kicked out" of CEP participation.

When Bamforth came before the SAC Board, he was asked the source of his information. He claimed it was from "persons of stature" but refused to divulge anything more explicit. Roger Williams then went into a detailed refutation of the charges which he claimed were "asinine," claiming thatBamforth had never visited CEP for a lengthy enough period to be able to evaluate the results. Other defenders questioned Bamforth's figure of a cost of $2,000 a graduate and said CEP had placed 243 graduates in employment at an average wage of $84.25, thereby reducing welfare payments by about $400,000.

Unfortunately, no mention was made of the number of trainees who were still employed or the number of employed who were women. But since Bamforth would not or could not produce anything more than vague charges from "informed sources," the issue was closed except for repeated demands for Bamforth's resignation from the SAC Board. But the conflict, indicating opposition to at least the operation of some of the anti-poverty programs, may grow if hard results are not forthcoming.

h. Human Relations Commission--The Human Relations Commission (HRC), created in 1961 by former Mayor O'Connor, was to provide a link to City Hall

for minority groups traditionally without a voice in government. HRC programs have included holding Job Opportunities Day for blacks and Puerto Ricans without jobs or seeking more lucrative employment, neighborhood complaint sessions, investigations of ways to reduce discrimination in housing and employment, and, most importantly, intervention in cases of racial tensions.

2. Urban Renewal

Every city that has an urban renewal program must have as part of their urban renewal program a section which is called "The Workable Program." There are seven parts to this program:

1. Codes and Ordinances,
2. Comprehensive Community Plan,
3. Neighborhood Analysis,
4. Administrative Organization,
5. Financing,
6. Housing for Displaced Families, and
7. Citizen Participation.

The one part which is most significant to this dissertation is citizen participation. The government states that all programs involving federal monies must be presented or viewed by a representative group of people from the community which that program is intended to serve. From this notion came to the commission the Community Council which served as a conduit to be used in the development of the Springfield Action Commission and the Human Relations Commission, which would serve as the conduit for the legitimation of citizen participation for urban renewal (Springfield Redevelopment Authority).

Normally, municipal governments have this input through ward representation. However, Plan A form of government theoretically deals with the premise that that which is good for the majority is good for the minority.

Springfield, like many emerging cities of the North, was experiencing the growing pains of urbanization. The government that had solved the needs of a total population of 3,000 in 1900 was no longer equipped nor capable of dealing with the specific problems of 174,000 by 1960.

The North End of the city, although the poorest area prior to urban renewal, was the most compatible in life style. The common denominator, poverty, was the cohesive factor that made the North End a community of people concerned for one another's welfare. It is commonly understood that poor people strive less for social acceptance that middle class people do to maintain their status of middle class. Peer acceptance and cultural awareness are important moderators for conditioning of behavior modifications. So it is not surprising that it can be seen that the greatest reaction to social change coming from those who have most recently moved up the social scale, socially improve whites and economically improved blacks.

When looking at the socially improved whites, it can be noted that their social improvement can be attributed to population increase of specific classes and their political dominance in local government. The economically improved blacks can attribute their improved economic picture to government-sponsored programs.

Both groups, blacks and whites, in all probability are insecure and manifest their insecurity in a number of ways. The white group, recognizing that if blacks are sharing social benefits through economic means which come directly from poverty programs which are federally funded and approved by local government, must deal.with the sources which provide this sharing. Often they will over-react to the statement that they are "foot-dragging" and refusing to allow blacks to plan and manage their lives, i.e., racist; but how else can they feel with the realization that they have not moved that far up the social scale nor out of the reaches of an advancing black community.

The "Nouveau Riche" blacks are in a similar dilemma. In striving to a plateau of "sustained survival," they are aspired to "White Man's goals." To imply that the good things in life are just for white people; however, it does mean that one must be aware that there is a difference between "acting" and "obtaining" is truly aspiring toward "White Man's goals." To clarify the two terms "acting" and "obtaining," "acting" means those blacks placed in positions in poverty programs and appointed to public office who do nothing but act out their roles either as overseer of programs and dispensers of bureaucratic jargon and then collect their pay and acquire no new skills to sustain their existence. However, those blacks who are fully cognizant as to the realities of the situation and seize the opportunity to become more functional through the acquiring of skills or positions of power that cannot be so easily taken away are "obtaining." Paulo Freire makes mention of the oppressed and the oppressor and warns that we must guard against becoming an oppressor when removing the yoke of oppression. [64]

He further maintains that for white people to bring themselves to a level of consciousness where they understand that they too are oppressed, is threatening. For, if they were to understand, they would have to accept the fact that they are equally oppressed as the black man and are consequently equal. This realization for one who has striven hard for peer acceptance into middle classdom is frightening. Therefore, he says the reaction to this fear is over-compensation and ultra-conservatism or outright racism.

Freire states that this insecurity is further reinforced by the dominating elite who, through exploiting directly and indirectly the weak points of the oppressed's insecurity, reinforce this link to their enslavement.

When looking at the black community of Springfield, one would be impressed at the relatively few hard-core ghettos as compared to New York or Chicago. Even the Riverview Housing Project, which has gained national acclaim as the state's worst housing project, does not compare with the traditional hovels of poverty of large cities. The North End has always had the worst living conditions, for it is the oldest part of town and suffered from social castigation before racial segregation came into existence. The Irish, Polish, and Russians settled there first, seeking a place to live close to the railroads and factories. Blacks with few skills and little money moved into the vacated dwellings of these first immigrants. Consequently, the entire North End was viewed as the bottom of the economic and intellectual heap, and those coming from there had very little to offer a growing community but the service of their physical strength.[65]

Faced with the reality that limited upward mobility could be gained through "Plan A" form of government, a group of black people from the North End formed a coalition with young Democrats. The Young Democrats were a reform group which were banded together under the leadership of Charles Ryan. It was their desire to work in behalf of the business interests of the city. However, the new political group recognized that to continue to deal with old line black politicians would weaken their reform movement and, therefore, collaborated with a black group made up primarily of people who strongly identified with the North End black population. It would seem that there were various reasons for this coalition, however, the most obvious from the point of view of the white power structure was that this group had no social or political ties to the old political machine. From the point of view of the newly formed black group, there was the opportunity to gain individual gains and political strength for a few. The combination made this group the most sought after by each mayor, state representative, and aspiring politicians, for they wielded the power to grant political favors for their political support.

Urban renewal moved this newly formed group into the Hill area, and, as before, the social clannishness that had separated the two black communities by distance continued to separate them through their designed goals.

The second group, or Hill group, appeared to be more socially and economically able to deal with the problems of a growing black population.

Nevertheless, years of status goals as their primary objective had prepared the black community of the Hill to bargain for control of the various poverty programs and social agencies.

If one looks closely at the group who became the most vocal during the 1964 NAACP's attack on the School Department and pushed for a more realistic approach to housing, one would note that these individuals were much younger than the old political regime of Clarkson and Higgins. Nevertheless, their concern for status goals led them along the similar path and approach to obtain their status similar to the approaches of the national parent organization which they identified themselves with. Legal recourse and political power though a Democratic process, appeared to them as the most "acceptable" approach to recognition. Therefore, it is not surprising that Rev. Cobb, the pastor of St. John's Church during the 1940's through the 1960's, became one of the most vocal supporters of Plan A government. His support of Mayor O'Connor in the previous election had gained for him a position similar to the reign of Rev. DeBerry. The possibilities that Plan A offered through the support of the winning candidate would be overwhelming in the hands of one black minister. However, the defeat of Mayor O'Connor in 1961 destroyed the emerging political empire of the status goal oriented group.

The 1965 election saw Rev. Cobb running for mayor of Springfield, his platform geared toward racial issues, which in the North were status issues, that did not threaten the general day to day existence of Springfields black population. The defeat of Rev. Cobb was obvious and resulted in his withdrawing from the mayoral race early.

The results of the 1965 election set the political tone for the black community for the "North End black group" had backed the winner of the 1961 election, Charles Ryan. His gratitude for this support became evident by his appointment of a few black people to commissions and positions of very little power, such as Intergroup Relations Specialist, Parks Commissioner, and the Housing Commission to name a few.

The major benefits of this "political relationship" were the establishment of a black political sub-group that could be called upon to deliver a predictable black vote. The establishment of the ability to deliver this black vote made the "North End black group" the most sought after group in Springfield. This is especially true for the state election of representatives, with the State Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee coming from wards that have a large percentage of the black population.

No public enterprise in the United States, with the possible exception of the War on Poverty, is monitored today by a more vociferous band of advocates and critics than the federal urban renewal program. Launched in 1949 with the blessings of Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, big labor and big business,[66] the program is today attacked from the political left as legalized exploitation of the poor for the benefit of the middle classes[67] and from the political right as an unconstitutional application of the government's prerogative to seize private property for public use.[68]

Renewal's supporters, like Charles Abrams,[69] chasten critics for "high-lighting its faults more often than its virtues" and for ignoring its "contributions and potentials."

Some critics, such as Martin Anderson, recommend doing away with urban renewal entirely.[70] For James Wilson, "the housing problem. . . is . . . a fiction or very nearly so (while) the benefits or urban renewal . . . are for the most part symbolic, intangible, and deferred."[71] Others, who are more restrained, advocate, with Herbert Gans, a transformation of renewal "from a program of slum clearance and rehabilitiation into a program of urban rehousing."[72]

While it is true, as Scott Greer says, that urban renewal "is so widespread, so varied, and so complex that few people have more than a skewed random image of it,"[73] those few that do have made their opinion resound in political science, sociological, economic, and physical planning circles. Urban renewal is a process that neatly cuts across many formal lines of academic discipline to pose what has been rightly called the "Dilemma of Democratic Intervention."

The program that has provided fuel for white-hot public debate and grist for a variety of academic mills emerged in the 1949 Housing Act, a comprehensive bill that not only established the national housing policy of "a decent home and suitable living conditions for every American family," but also initiated a program that allows a Local Public Agency (LPA) to take privately owned urban land by right of eminent domain, clear it for structures, and sell it to private developers for construction of new residential buildings.

Emerging as it did out of the public housing-slum clearance movement, urban redevelopment as expressed in the 1949 Act was aimed at providing more and better housing through the spot removal of residential slums.

Yet unlike the slum clearance formula which replaced each demolished structure with a new low-cost unit, there was no necessary link in the redevelopment program between the dwellings torn down and the units that went up in their place. Indeed, this dichotomy was sufficient to enable one congressman to say of the Housing Act of 1949, "I am in favor of the slum elimination section. I am opposed to the public housing section."[74] To calm those bothered by the absence of connection, the classic and much criticized theory of the filtering process was put forward, a theory which enables its supporters to argue that "for each good new home built, one less family will have to live herded into an overcrowded slum tenement,"[75] because with each new occupied unit an old unit is vacated, thus setting off a residential upgrading process. With this general upward movement within the housing stock, it is not necessary, so the theory holds, that homes built on cleared sites be occupied by former residents of those sites.[76]

Whatever its debatable relationship to low rent housing the redevelopment program itself was not a success, as Charles Abrams makes clear:

> Up to 1954, urban renewal lay in the dumps. Some 211 localities were interested, but only 60 had reached the land acquisition stage. . . . The passage of five years with almost nothing to show for all the fanfare was hardly progress.[77]

The few cities that did take advantage of the redevelopment program were criticized for displacing the poor without providing them with alternative residential locations. Experience demonstrated that clearance was not a sufficient mechanism for dealing with the complexities of central city housing.

In response to the deficiencies of the 1949 Act, amendments were offered in 1954 which transformed the program from one aimed at bulldozing residential slums to one concerned with conserving and rehabilitating the existing stock of housing within the broad framework of the Workable Program. "Urban redevelopment" became "urban renewal." Since 1954, the urban renewal program has branched out in two directions: one aimed at revitalization of downtown, the other at upgrading the city's residential districts.

Residential Rehabilitation--Renewal began as an effort to replace the worst slums with standard residential units while relocating the slum dwellers into public housing or private stock made available through the filtering generated by the newly erected units. The residential side of the renewal program has gradually evolved into an approach in which "the maintenance and improvement of existing housing stock is a basic aim. . . And since substandard houses tend to cluster by area, substandard areas are the focus of efforts at rehabilitation and conservation."[78] From the project-planning basis of the 1949 Housing Act to the Workable Program of 1954 to the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan of 1956 to the Community Renewal Program of 1959, the trend has been to expand the geographic scope of the renewal project from a plot of land chosen for its reuse value after clearance to a total neighborhood in which preservation of that area's physical fabric is the basic concern.

The assumption underyling the area rehabilitation program is that the old residential neighborhoods of the central city can be successfully

revitalized by a combination of public and private investment, the one to root out the worst housing and to provide new public facilities, and the other to shore up aged dwellings and to build new housing, shopping facilities, and similar institutions.

In an area rehabilitation program the percentage of residential buildings cleared varies with each neighborhood. However, according to a June 1966 survey of the 187 predominantly residential urban renewal projects in the United States, "the average clearance section represents 19.5 percent of the total gross project area."[79]

The significance of citizen participation in the renewal process has emerged as a direct result of the increased emphasis on rehabilitation and the expansion of the size of the area considered optimum for renewal treatment. While point six of the 1954 Workable Program does require a "citizens' advisory committee to examine constructively the workable program goals,"[80] the committee, a city-wide organization, was seen by some as serving" only a limited role in satisfying the basic need to involve people in government"[81] and by others as an effective means of legitimatizing the redevelopment process at the total city level but having no impact on involvement at the neighborhood level.[82] So long as demolition in spot project was the basis of urban renewal, there was probably universal truth to Kaplan's comment on the Newark program that "limited participation and low visibility seem to be necessary to the system's survival."[83] The strategy for successful demolition in Boston and New York included keeping the inhabitants of the proposed clearance area in the

dark as long as possible in order to minimize their certain opposition to a program that was committed to tearing down their homes and their neighborhood.[84]

However, as soon as one starts talking about rehabilitation and revitalization of the total neighborhood, the active support and involvement of local residents in determining the shape of physical plans for their area become a necessity. Since rehabilitation requires that local owners bring their property up to the standard imposed by the renewal program, those owners must have confidence in the plan proposed for their area. Without the participation of such people and their commitment to the restoration of their neighborhood, rehabilitation has little future. Moreover, the fact that each residential renewal program contains a significant amount of clearance means that some citizens will be as directly threatened by the program as are residents of total clearance areas. Thus, the extent and location of clearance must be negotiated to secure at least the acquiescence of the majority of those in the neighborhood. While some opposition from groups and individuals is inevitable, there must be majority support.

The area chosen for residential rehabilitation generally includes institutions of the urban neighborhood--small stores, large businesses, churches, hospitals, settlement houses, and so on. These interests, like the resident owners and renters, are being asked to commit themselves to a revitalized community. The extent to which they become involve is determined by how they see residential renewal--as a threat to or as an

enhancement of their position in the neighborhood. Furthermore, the leadership capacity of spokesmen for many of these institutions makes them potentially influential supporters or critics of a renewal effort.

In his seminal article "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," Norton Long makes the point that:

> The structured group activities that coexist in a particular territorial system can be looked at as games. These games provide the players with a set of goals that give them a sense of success or failure. They provide them determinate roles and calculable strategies and tactics. In addition they provide the players with an elite and general public that is in varying degrees able to tell the score.[85]

The evolution of renewal from a real estate operation is cleared land, which did little to benefit anyone living in the area before demolition, to a program emphasizing the significance of existing neighborhoods changes the rules of what one might call "The urban renewal game." In the clearance approach, "successful" playing on the part of the LPA calls for strategy which excludes the residents of the project area from knowledge of the planning process and emphasizes negotiation with prospective developers of vacant land.[86]

The rehabilitation game introduces neighborhood people as the players with whom the redevelopment authority must negotiate. A successful rehabilitation project requires the involvement of enough residents to ensure that public investment in the renewal area will be matched by significant investment from the local community. Moreover, the federal requirement that a public hearing be held by the LPA to enable citizens to express their views on the merits of the proposed renewal plan distates that there be people in

the neighborhood sufficiently sold on the plan to stand up and support it at that hearing. The ritualistic and highly manipulated public hearings that were possible in the early days of urban redevelopment have become politically infeasible in the 1960's as both neighborhood citizens and public officials have become increasingly sophisticated about the implications of the urban renewal program. While federal rules do not go beyond the requirements to hold the hearing, a negative response from the majority of neighborhood residents would clearly be an inauspicious start for a program dependent on local concern and involvement for its ultimate success. At bare minimum, a neighborhood rehabilitation program presupposes the involvement and approval of the majority of those elements in the local community who are the greatest potential source of support and, conversely, of opposition--were they to go into opposition.

Viewed as a game, neighborhood rehabilitation pits residents and institutions of the local community against the LPA. In simplified terms, the game is one in which the LPA guarantees certain forms of public expenditure--schools, community facilities, new roads, easily accessible improvement loans and mortgages--in exchange for private investment in rehabilitation of residences, businesses, and institutions, and for support of clearance and willingness to express that support at a public hearing. The game presupposes that each side--the local community and the LPA--has or can obtain the resources to carry out its end of the bargain. The extent to which this mutual expectation is realized will not be evident until a renewal plan is actually put into operation.

The neighborhood rehabilitation planning game is basically a political one in which the LPA bargains with the project area citizens over the nature of the proposal to be developed for their neighborhood. Yet the structure of the game says nothing about the ease or roughness with which it will be played. One can envisage situations in which local interests and individuals--churches, settlement houses, and so forth--are enthusiastic about the rehabilitation in their area. In such a case renewal negotiations may be nothing more than an amicable discussion. One can also picture residents less than pleased at having to rehabilitate their homes, tenants fearful of rising rents, and institutions hostile to what they see as a threat to them and their clientele. To win majority support the LPA will then have to sell its program by hard bargaining and perhaps by promising additional public expenditures.

The renewal planning process is currently structured so that the comprehensive plan for neighborhood improvement has to be accepted or rejected in its entirety at the public hearing. There is no provision for approving part of the plan and sending the rest back for further discussion. The "either-or" quality of the process places great pressure on both teams, while providing each with powerful leverage. Because of the enormous investment in time, money, and labor involved in the process of delineating rehabilitation areas, acquiring survey and planning funds, and negotiating the plan at the neighborhood level, there is little likelihood that the LPA will permit a situation to arise in which a negative vote at a public hearing dissuades it entirely from its mission. Further-

more, if the LPA has prepared carefully, by the time of the public hearing opposition has been neutralized; the hearing becomes a democratic ritual expressing the results of negotiation in the community rather than a spontaneous outburst of neighborhood sentiments.

Since residential rehabilitation necessitates communication between renewal authority and local community, the characteristics of the interested groups who do or do not participate on the local team must be considered. Observers have suggested that, in general, "middle class persons who are beneficiaries of rehabilitation will be planned with; lower class persons who are disadvantaged by renewal will be planned without." [87]

The middle class orientation of the rehabilitation game is argued in both sociopolitical and economic terms. The economic view points out that low income home owners will be hard hit by spot demolition in a neighborhood rehabilitation project because their property will be in poor condition, given their inability to finance repairs. Furthermore, the costs of rehabilitating to code standard make impossible demands on low income owners, whose mortgage payments will increase, and on low income tenants, whose rents will rise. As Staughton Lynd tersely says:

> When Urban Renewal means merely kicking out the poor little by little rather than all at once, it brings dim consolation to the low income site tenants.[88]

The federal government has not been oblivious to the argument that only those with substantial incomes can meaningfully engage in rehabilitation. Robert Weaver, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), has stated that "under current conditions many of the low income

residents see in. . .(rehabilitation) dislocation or economic problems." Urban renewal legislation has slowly focused on this issue as seen in Section 312 of the Housing Act of 1964, which provides for loans granted directly from HUD to certain owners at 3 percent interest, and Section 115 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, which authorizes the LPA to make grants of up to $1,500 to hardship low income homeowners for purposes of rehabilitation. And the Rent Supplement program is, in part, an effort to help the site tenant deal with the increased rents produced by the rehabilitation process.

The other argument that demonstrates the middle class bias of neighborhood renewal concentrates on the sociopolitical characteristics of the low income residents. Here, the focus is not on the quality of the individual's home or amount of his income but on his inability to comprehend or accept the sacrifices and time perspective inherent in the renewal process. James Q. Wilson makes perhaps the most categorical statement on this point when he asserts that "public regarding" residents will support urban renewal while "private regarding" residents will accept it, if at all, only after "protracted, subtle, and assiduous wooing of neighborhood sentiment."89 "Public regarding" people, to be equated with middle class attitudes and incomes,

> have a high sense of personal efficacy, a longtime perspective, a general familiarity with and confidence in city-wide institutions, and a cosmopolitan orientation towards life. In addition they are likely to possess a disproportionate share of organizational skills and resources. . . precisely those attributes which are likely to produce citizen participation in urban renewal that planners and community organizers

> will consider "positive and constructive"--that is, participation which will influence many of the general goals of renewal and modify a few of its details, but allow renewal to proceed.[90]

"Private regarding" people are lower class individuals who "are more likely to have a limited time-perspective, a greater difficulty in abstracting from concrete experience and unfamiliarity with and lack of confidence in city-wide institutions, a preoccupation with the personal and the immediate."[91]

As the economic arguments imply, one reason middle class people can appear more enlightened is that they incur less of the burden of clearance, as they can afford to keep their homes from falling into disrepair, and of rehabilitation because what repairs their homes do require are less of a drain on their total income. Moreover, critics of Wilson have pointed out that "in general the middle class has not docilely accepted the high 'costs' of renewal as the price of a 'better world.';[92] when personal costs become too severe, the middle class also will object to the urban renewal process.

While Wilson attributes the reluctance of the lower class to mobilize for urban renewal to disagreement with the goals of the program, others have argued that the critical point is not the conscious unwillingness of members of the lower class to accept renewal but their inability to articulate their opinions when bargaining is going on between the neighborhood and the LPA. The dual problem of mobilizing the poor and then making them heard in renewal negotiations has been the focus of numerous studies.[93]

As partial solutions to the economic problems of neighborhood renewal have filtered their way into legislation, so have recommendations for overcoming the sociopolitical barriers to involvement of the poor been injected into the renewal process. The Community Action Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity represents an organized effort in this direction, with its much discussed goal of "maximum feasible involvement of the poor" in decision making.[94] Another method for engaging lower class people is represented by the advocacy planning concept, which involves taking on the lower income residents of a neighborhood as clients and gearing planning solutions to their needs.[95]

The Problem of Definition--Up to this point aspects of residential rehabilitation has been described as a middle class game. However, to talk of the middle class and the lower class and of the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other in the business of planning neighborhood revitalization obscures as many issues as it clarifies.

Does the low income neighborhood have no way of making its needs felt in renewal negotiations?[96] Or is the key issue the fact that the poor within a neighborhood do not find their way to the negotiating table?[97] Both views ignore the possibility that some of the poor may participate in negotiations some of the time; consequently, proponents of both views fail to seek in renewal situations and in the characteristics of the poor themselves the critical differences that may determine whether or not the poor are involved in renewal and the extent of their involvement.

To discover the reasons for exclusion from or limited participation in the rehabilitation is not an easy task. One must first consider the nature of the sociopolitical and economic limitations of those who lack representation. Economic handicaps are generally more easily identifiable, but even here there are problems. There may be situations, for example, in which low income residents participate in the planning process and voice their approval of the plan at a public hearing with the understanding that they will be able to carry out the economic demands placed on them by rehabilitation. Then, during plan execution, they discover that bringing their property up to code standards may be a far more costly operation than had originally been envisaged. Such a situation may not result from deception on the part of the LPA but simply from changes in the cost of labor and building materials, from more rigorous application of the building codes than the LPA had anticipated, or from a host of other factors that raise rehabilitation costs. The economic problems facing the poor as a result of the rehabilitation game are, then, not necessarily correlated to the political exclusion of the poor from planning for their neighborhood. Likewise, the moves necessary to correct the economic problem are categorically different from those steps necessary to get the poor into the negotiation in the first instance.

As soon as one tries to define the sociopolitical characteristics of the poor the characteristics that cause exclusion from the renewal game during its planning stages--the problems become even more complex. All one has to do to get some idea of the difficulty is to look at the current

stack of literature discussing the salient characteristics of the poor.[98]

The most significant alternative to Wilson's dichotomy between middle class and lower class is that of sociologists like Gans who see the lower income population divided into two distinct camps, the "working class" and the "lower class":

> The former consists of semiskilled and skilled blue collar workers, who hold steady jobs and are thus able to live under stable, if not affluent conditions. Their way of life differs in many respects from those of the middle class; for example, in the greater role of relatives in sociability and mutual aid, in the lesser concern for self-improvement and education and in their lack of interest in a good address, cultivation and the kinds of status that are important to middle class people. Although their ways are culturally different from the dominant middle class norms, these are not pathological, for rates of crime, mental illness, and other social ills are not significantly higher than in the middle class. . . .
>
> The lower class, on the other hand, consists of people who perform the unskilled labor and service functions in the society. Many of them lack stable jobs. They are often unemployed. . . . Partly because of occupational instability their lives are beset with social and emotional instability as well and it is among them that one finds the majority of the emotional problems and social evils associated with the low income population.[99]

While Gans posits a wider range of class structure than Wilson, he concludes that not only are lower class people unable to engage actively in renewal planning but working class people have an inability to participate in formal organizations and in general community activity, with the result that during the process of negotiating the redevelopment of Boston's West End, "the West Enders could not defend their interests and the redevelopment agency was unable to understand their needs."[100] On the other hand,

Wilson for all his emphasis on the unwillingness of "private regarding" residents to go along with the sacrifices called for by the renewal process maintains that while an enormous amount of negotiation is involved, "there are many stable working class neighborhoods where indigenous leadership can be developed and involved in urban renewal."101 Gans and Wilson are far more concise in their definitions than most critics of the renwal program, for whom "the poor" is a generic term that seems to include anyone who is adversely affected by clearance or rehabilitation. Obviously, many of those relocated from a residential project do have low incomes, but "the poor" and "those who have to relocate" are not synonymous.

The Diversity of Neighborhood--Definitional problems aside, generalized description of the rehabilitation planning game usually fails to consider the diversity of neighborhoods within which the game can take place. While the basic purpose of the game--negotiation between neighborhood people and the LPA of a plan for the area's physical future--remains the same, the characteristics of the players and the strategy employed by each team vary from match to match. Ultimately, the extent to which the local team represents a cross section of the project area is a function of the socio economic structure and political dynamics of the neighborhood for which planning is being negotiated. In every case, however, the local team is composed of the neighborhood powerful; those local people who are able to negotiate for the future of their neighborhood. One can structure the concept of neighborhood diversity and neighborhood power around the following hypotheses. The ecology of a large city provides residential districts

that contain diverse socioeconomic interest groups, the kind, number, and compatibility of which vary from area to area.[102] The inauguration of an urban neighborhood's powerful people is a function of the socioeconomic dynamics of the area,[103] and the local renewal team is then a vehicle for the powerful in the residential rehabilitation planning area.

If one assumes that, regardless of the social complexity of the district undergoing renewal planning, the "middle class people" constitute the only interest taking part in the planning process and benefiting from the rehabilitation game, then one can posit that, for the purposes of the game, the configuration of power in the community is the same as the distribution of middle class individuals. On the other hand, if, as is maintained here, one argues that areas picked for residential rehabilitation are complex social units in which communication, activity, and interest group identity often cut across income, education, and occupation lines, then the interests likely to take part in the renewal game involve more than the middle class. Thus an understanding of those included and excluded from representation on the local renewal team can come only from an examination of the sociopolitical and economic dynamics of the individual area in which renewal negotiations are taking place.

The social complexity of neighborhoods has been the focal point of several studies, all of which emphasize the impact of local environment on individual attitudes and behavior. Bell and Force maintain that a person's participation in formal associations is a function not only of his social status as measured by income, education, and occupation but also of the

socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood in which that individual lives. These neighborhood characteristics may "define a set of general societal expectations"[104] which significantly influence the extent of individual involvement in local organizations. Thus, under certain neighborhood conditions an individual whose class rank alone would indicate low participation in organizations may be deeply involved in local affairs.

Several studies have demonstrated the importance of recognizing individual neighborhood characteristics in determining the involvement of local residents in matters affecting the area. A survey in San Francisco, for example, of neighborhood attitudes toward urban renewal underlined the significance of clusterings of socioeconomic traits for explaining the variation, among different areas of the city, in questionnaire responses. In another study, Carle Zimmerman found it necessary to establish a distinction between "nominal" communities, in which the "chief form of integration. . . is largely mechanical proximity,"[105] and the "realistic" community, in which integration is not a geographic phenomenon but rather a sense of belonging to "one community. . . that stands out by itself as a clearly defined integrating factor."[106] Thus, when anticipating the composition of the local planning team, the type of neighborhood becomes an independent variable which must be considered equally with class and population characteristics.

Moreover, the capacity of local teams to marshal resources, organize and allocate tasks among team members may differ significantly. These capabilities are not necessarily tied to middle class characteristics

but are equally dependent upon relationships among the neighborhood powerful and between the neighborhood and the rest of the city.

In focusing on the diversity of power and interest groups in urban neighborhoods, one might hypothesize two limited types of local teams. The first is a team whose members represent only one interest group within the planning area, an interest powerful enough to control the renewal game and to produce a positive turnout at the LPA public hearing. In such a case, residential groups living within the project district might be excluded from the renewal game because their presence is not deemed necessary for political affirmation or because they themselves have little or no capacity to demand a place on the local team. The second, and opposite, situation focuses on an area with such homogeneity of population that the local team must reflect such homogeneity if it is to function at all. A variation of this extreme is a residential district with a number of interest groups, each so capable of mobilization that each would demand and receive a place on the neighborhood renewal team.

On the assumption that people who are involved in the rehabilitation planning game will fight to preserve their own property as well as that owned by the interest group they represent, the logical outcome of a renewal planning game in which the entire community is vociferously represented would be one involving little residential clearance. On the other hand, in the planning game in which one interest group is able to dominate the proceedings, a far greater latitude for demolition would exist.

The Planners and the Rehabilitation Game--Up to this point, little attention has been given to the characteristics of the other team involved in the rehabilitation planning game: the Local Public Agency. Here, the critical focus is not on the complex of factors which determines who is on the team but on the assumptions that can be made about the attitudes, goals, and strategy that the LPA planners employ in their efforts to evolve a physical plan for a residential neighborhood.

The planner's role--historical and potential--is open to a variety of interpretations and descriptions. In The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs employs the image of the city planner as a middle class bureaucrat who wants to sterilize the city by eliminating its diversity and by rooting out any buildings which fail to meet the local housing code standard.[107] Her description is a caricature of what can be called the objective planning style--a style in which aggregate physical characteristics, standards, and relationships constitute the basis for determining the characteristics of a renewal plan.

In contrast to the image of the bulldozing planner making decisions while sheltered in City Hall is the picture (currently drawn by the liberal wing of the planning profession) of the advocate planner, who seeks out the people of the neighborhood with which he is dealing and helps to design a plan that is in keeping with local wishes for the district's future. The advocate planner is basically a mobilizer of public opinion. He may provide advice and technical information, but the contours of the plan are essentially the product of negotiation at the neighborhood level, expressive of neighbor-

hood goals and needs as seen by local residents.[108]

These two portraits can be said to represent the two end positions along a spectrum of roles which the planner can conceivably play. While the planner working directly for a local neighborhood organization is, by definition, far closer to the advocate end of the spectrum than the planner employed by the LPA, wide latitude may exist within the organizational constraints of an LPA. Where along the objective-advocate spectrum the individual LPA planner settles will be the result of the interaction of three pressures: the professional norms of the planner and his agency, the city-wide political and bureaucratic forces, and the demands imposed upon the planner by the neighborhood team with which he is negotiating.[109]

Those who observe planners engaged in the urban renewal process tend to concentrate on one source of pressure while excluding the other two. For instance, Gans and Paul Davidoff criticize the middle class value system of the "planning and care taking professions."[110] Davidoff states:

> Planning agencies are likely to reflect the dominant values of their society. In general, planning has supported the status quo, and this is particularly evident in situations where planning agencies have supported regulations which exclude income groups and racial groups from gaining access to a community and where agencies have dislocated low income families in order to help families in lesser need.[111]

On the other hand, Scott Greer, quoting a harried renewal administrator, focuses on the pressures generated toward the LPA at the city level:

> Look, your community is whatever your political structure will let you get done. The community makes up its mind. . . and you have to work with it.[112]

Greer concludes that planners have little leeway to consider neighborhood demands, with the result that:

> the residents of declining areas have very little weight in . ... decisions. These are usually neighborhoods of the bottom dogs: they lack expertise, organizational skills and association with the powerful.[113]

Concentrating on the position emphasized by Davidoff, one sees the planner in the rehabilitation game imposing on neighborhood discussions his middle class view of the "good city," which may or may not reflect the attitude of the neighborhood team with whom he is negotiating. In Greer's view, the planner is the captive of city wide political forces that circumscribe the opportunity area within which he can operate and thus make neighborhood values or goals of little significance in deriving a plan for the area.

Others view negotiations at the neighborhood level as the critical force acting on the planner. They believe the neighborhood plan has no absolute worth as a "planning solution" unless related to the needs and desires of the people living in the area.[114] Such a solution may or may not be related to sound middle class planning principles or the demands of the city wide political forces that allow renewal to operate in the first instance.

The last two points of view are not necessarily incompatible. One can conceive of a neighborhood planner, bound by certain city wide

pressures not in the opportunity area afforded him, free to bargain with the neighborhood team.

The critical question here is: Does the LPA team, within the latitude allowed a bureaucratic agency by its city wide political support, financial constraints, and the dictates of HUD's urban renewal guidelines try to impose its middle class values and "good planning principles" on the local community regardless of local desires or needs? Or does the overriding goal of the LPA at the neighborhood project level become a successful plan as measured by local political approval? We have argued that the structure of the residential rehabilitation game requires a plan that not only can withstand a public hearing but also can enlist support during the execution stage. One might transfer Greer's description of political feasibility from the city to the local level and hypothesize that the LPA's neighborhood plan is a manifestation of "whatever your political structure will let you get done."[115] Thus, a successful plan becomes one approved by the political forces in the neighborhood, within the limits prescribed by the coalition supporting renewal at the city wide level.

In order to assure local support, the planners will be intent on cultivating "local power" representatives of different interest groups within the project area. As one author puts it, the LPA team will attempt to counter opposition by preventing its effective mobilization; to co-opt community leaders. . . to negate opposition before it arises.[116]

To do this, the LPA team must gain a clear understanding of the socioeconomic structure of the area in which it is operating, must pinpoint the politically significant interests in the district, and must adapt its

style and plan to the demands of those interests. Failure to deal effectively with the sources of power in the renewal district will result in conflict and the possible breakdown of the rehabilitation planning game.

The concept of residential renewal as a game in which two teams negotiate over the expenditure of public and private resources has been derived from general consideration of the rehabilitation process and the planning structure that seems logically to flow from that process. Yet it would be incorrect to assume that every rehabilitation project automatically produces such a game. For example, if one turned to the 187 rehabilitation projects on the federal books at the end of June 1966, one would find that many are small "pocket" projects involving only a city block or two. In such cases public investment is minimal, and the need for local support is restricted to families on a few streets. In other rehabilitation situations an LPA might be so unwilling to accommodate the demands of the local area that it would hold back a renewal project rather than bargain over its contents. The bitter deadlock over a plan for Cooper Square on Manhattan's Lower East Side is an example of this unwillingness on the part of the LPA to shape its plan to the political demands of the local neighborhood.[117]

Thus, what would seem to be the internal logic of the rehabilitation process may not always result in a planning game. However, there are enough renewal situations reflecting that logic to justify a study of residential rehabilitation planning as a game situation in which the unique characteristics of individual neighborhood dynamics determine the composition of the local team, the course of planning negotiations, and the content

of the renewal plan.

In this section it has been argued that the composition and thus the goals and attitudes of the citizen team is a function of the socioeconomic dynamics of the area delineated for revitalization and that the goal of the LPA team becomes of necessity that of plan approval at the local level within the opportunity area afforded by city wide political and planning considerations as well as by the rules and resources of the federal government. As a result of this process, the plan which emerges at the neighborhood level is, in Banfield's terms, a matter of "political influence" in which "resultant solutions" and "decision choices"[118] reflect the demands of the local power system, tempered with limitations imposed by the LPA's city wide environment.

The composition of the renewal team, based on the socioeconomic dynamics of the community, determines which groups are excluded from the bargaining process and, consequently, most severely penalized by the effects of renewal. A local renewal team, if structured on a narrow social or physical base, is responsible to only a limited part of the community, and the neighborhood interest groups that are absent from the bargaining tables suffer the penalities always incidential to exclusion from the political process.

3. NAACP

The behavior of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had paralleled that of its national headquarters. It moved into the forefront of activity on the

racial scene during the fifties and early sixties, culminating with its activities in the Barksdale case and then retreating with the advent of new, more militant demands and methods--a casualty of the trend from "status" to welfare sub-community goal orientation. The local chapter is just beginning to reassert itself on the patterns of race relations in Springfield, but in a confusing manner as will be subsequently shown.

The Fifties--As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Springfield NAACP came into existence in 1915. Its beliefs and goals became known on a wider scale with its attack on the Dunbar League and Rev. DeBerry in 1947, an early illustration of one of the persistent problems of black organizations--their inability to cooperate and coordinate activities except in unusual periods of crisis. The chapter accused the League of opposing integration because of its involvement and investment in ghetto enterprises, a commercial venture under the guise of being a social agency. They demanded that the Community Chest stop supporting the League. The attack came from the youth council of the NAACP controlled by Rev. Cleage, an indication of the future thrust of the group and the beginning of a potential generational cleavage that would have destructive consequences for the chapter at a later time.

One of the themes of the NAACP was the campaign to destroy the racial stereotypes of blacks in the minds of many white Springfield citizens. The chapter protested the visit of Aunt Jemima to Springfield to demonstrate kitchen ranges at the Greater Springfield Homes Sports Show. They also attempted to pressure School Superintendent to ban Huckleberry

Finn and Little Black Sambo.

In 1956, a major integration effort involving the NAACP was the protest organized in conjunction with the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Veteran's Committee, Beth El Temple, the Council of Churches, and the Social Action Committee in support of Lindsay Johnson, the then 41 year old black civic leader and city official who wanted to build a home in an all-white suburban neighborhood called "Sixteen Acres." The predominance of white groups was typical of race relations activity in the "fifties." The incident dragged on for three years without any resolution. Pressure was applied to Mayor O'Connor in 1959 by the local chapter to force him to make the community comply with Massachusetts' Open Housing requirements. His response to the charge of apathy casts some light on the nature of the membership of the organization and the state of race relations in the city at that time. Mayor O'Connor said in effect that he was a member of the NAACP, that Springfield had always enjoyed harmonious racial relations, and that the publicity given the incident was not in keeping with the best interests of the black community.

The Early Sixties--The big racial issue of 1960 was the picketing of chain stores in Springfield, part of a coordinated national effort to force stores with southern outlets to end discriminating practices in services and hiring. The local NAACP was in the forefront of the efforts, at one point forcing the city to retreat from its ban on handbills and placards by the initiation of court action--a typical NAACP tactic.

Other issues and actions of the organization in the early sixties included a 1963 attack on the city for its plan to place a swimming pool in the Hill area, arguing that it would be de facto segregation. They not only objected to its location, but also to its small size, which would discourage use by white children from outside the neighborhood. But their supreme moment came in conjunction with the "racial imbalance" issue, for a long period the total monopoly of the NAACP. The initiated action of the school subcommittee in 1963 continuously publicized the issue and activated support, and finally initiated, with the reluctant aid of the national organization, the federal court suit enjoining the School Department from continuing its de facto segregation school policies.

Their involvement throughout the period was consistent with the ideals and goals of the organization--integration as quickly and as painlessly as possible. This consistency of purpose involved even organizations catering primarily to the black community. One example has already been discussed, the Dunbar League incident; another involved the Harmony Elks Lodge, a local black fraternity accused by the local NAACP of having a "racial exclusion" policy, deploring the club's selection of membership on the basis of race. The charge was denied by the Elk's President, but the NAACP refused to be mollified.

Another example occurred more recently and involved the establishment of the Micah Corporation by the Human Relations Commission. The NAACP attacked the HRC's decision and the corporation, established to improve living conditions in deteriorating areas, for ostensibly helping

to perpetuate slums and strengthening "the generally accepted view among white Americans of the desirability of black ghettos." Rather it should concentrate its efforts, said the NAACP, on removing the ghettos through the encouragement of integration efforts.

The Nature of the Membership--The thrust of the NAACP, both locally and nationally, was and still is related to the character of its membership, who in turn are attracted to the organization because of its goals and methods. Consequently, the local chapter has been dominated ever since its founding by essentially middle and upper class elements of the black sub-community in the city, along with what have been called "white liberals," also primarily middle class. The Board of Directors of the chapter in 1953 included three doctors and ministers among its 27 members, a very typical breakdown. A large number of women are in responsible positions in the organization, usually composing over 20 percent of the executive committee. Since 1952, Mrs. Dorothy Boyleston, Mrs. Ruth Loving, and Mrs. Jewell Hodges, Dr. Mary McClean, Mrs. Peggy Ann Clinton, Mrs. Rebecca Johnson, Mrs. Lucille Parks, and Mrs. Catherine Johnson have all occupied offices ranging from secretary to first vice-president. Doctors, ministers, and their wives, along with a sprinkling of school teachers, businessmen, and minor governmental officials have dominated the organization from its founding. Persons with this kind of background usually are more committed to the elimination of legal barriers to integration since they are in a more advantageous position than the lower class citizen to take advantage of such changes. The elimination of racial imbalance in the schools, the

integration of swimming pools and other public facilities, the opening of quality housing in middle class white areas all have direct and immediate consequences for these groups. Thus, the composition of the membership and the policies and programs of the organization reinforce one another.

The Middle Sixties--On the other hand, the local chapter has not been immune to the rising pressures and more militant tone of demands that have developed in the past five years in Springfield. Even before the 1965 school activity and the Octagon Lounge incident, criticism of the group had developed from both internal and external sources. Roger Williams, Chairman of the NAACP committee on Labor and Industry and a member of the executive board in 1960 and 1961, accused the organization of "foot dragging" on housing descrimination. Williams was reported to have said that the organization knew of the situation but was slow to act. The list of members of the Executive Committee the next year did not include Williams. Obviously, at that point tensions and cleavages were developing within the organization. At the end of 1963, the NAACP found it impossible to elect a President for 1964. A power struggle seems to have been taking place during this period. At the end of January 1964, Jacob Daniels, public accountant, member of the Board of the Council of Churches, and an active member of the Springfield chorus, was unanimously elected by the Executive Board--a possible compromise response, although it is difficult to be sure.

In March, 1964, the NAACP decided to defer action on endorsing sit-ins to protest School Committee inactivity on de facto segregation arguing that the issue could be settled without such a dramatic disruptive demon-

stration. This position was opposed by Frank Buntin, then chairman of the NAACP Educational Committee, who argued for a more aggressive attitude. By May, Buntin's views had temporarily won out. The organization began to support and, in fact, participate in sit-ins and other disruptive forms of protest.

By the end of 1964, the organization declared that even if the injunction preventing school construction failed, the NAACP would still persist with peaceful non-violent methods to impede construction. On December 28, Frank Buntin was elected President of the local NAACP chapter by a close 33 to 27 vote, reflecting the growing split in the chapter and the emergence of a more militant leadership. It must be remembered, though, that the goal of integration was still the movtivating factor on both sides. The other officers, however, included many former office holders, such as Dr. McClean, Mrs. Lucille Parks, and Mrs. Catherine Johnson, all part of the traditional establishment.

At the inauguration, Buntin promised closer coordination with other civil rights groups and increased activities to better mirror the national NAACP, whom he felt was being pressured to be more aggressive by other organizations. He went on to pledge a more aggressive posture.

Buntin's stress on cooperation with other civil rights groups was significant in the light of the growing external criticisms toward the NAACP, much of it from other civil rights organizations and not always related to tactics. One incident in particular illustrates this problem. At the beginning of 1965, the NAACP demanded more representation on the

Springfield Action Commission, the overhead coordinating poverty agency in the city, claiming that they had been slighted. Representatives of the chapter were invited to a meeting where Morris Jones, himself a member of both groups, expressed puzzlement at the request, arguing that Chester Gibbs and William Mitchell, also members of both groups, meant three out of the eleven commission members were active members of the NAACP. Soon after that meeting, Henry Weissman, lawyer in the Barksdale case and long time active member of the NAACP, made a statement accusing the NAACP members of the SAC Board of lukewarm support for NAACP interests. At the next SAC meeting, an attempt was made to change the agency by giving the NAACP official status in the direction of poverty work. The bid was turned down by a unanimous vote along with a motion to name Buntin to the SAC Board.

Rather than a conflict over policies or methods, the dispute with SAC seemed to involve the question of power control. An attempt was made by Buntin, representing components in the chapter, to expand the influence and activities of the group in order to solidify their position as the most prominent and important race organization in the city. Whatever the purpose, by the end of the year Buntin resumed his teaching position and the presidency of the NAACP, claiming he had received an offer for a Federal Housing Authority job in New York City. He was replaced by the Rev. Joseph Samuels.

During this period, the NAACP discouraged affiliation with other groups involved in the same activities. During the school crisis, the

Committee on Civil Rights (COCR) asked the NAACP to join. The chapter refused but pledged its cooperation. However, in 1966, this policy was modified when CRISIS was named to deal with the school problem. CRISIS was an amalgamation of the NAACP and CORE with Rev. Samuels as the acting Chairman; but it did not last beyond the final school plan, nor, in fact, did CORE, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

After the school crisis had passed and the sub-community's energies were transferred to other things such as Model Cities, the chapter began to disintegrate. As the demands became more community-centered with less emphasis on integration and the importance of legal action, the chapter became disoriented and began losing members and prestige. The Rev. Talbert Swan, chapter President, seemed to be more concerned about his political prospects and using the organization as a platform for his own views than reinvigorating the organization. Many of the younger sub-community residents perceived the organization as a relic, running cotillions, tea parties, and fashion shows.

On the other hand, the possibilities for an upsurge in activities did exist. On January 13, 1969, Andrew Griffin was sworn in as chapter President, the youngest in the history of the branch. He brought with him a tremendous amount of prestige and was considered by many of those interviewed to be the most important and influential black in the city. Mr. Griffin was also noted as an aggressive spokesman for welfare goals. He also directed Northern Educational Services, the most successful tutorial program in the area. The change in top leadership was reflected in an

unusual event--a salute to the local Urban League by Mr. Griffin, who on the occasion of the appointment of a new executive director of the Urban League said that the NAACP would pledge its support to help make the organization viable in the community. Griffin's comments were in sharp contrast to the NAACP's attitude in 1947 and may have offered a new beginning for the organization.

Unfortunately for the chapter and Springfield as well, Griffin has left both the presidency of the NAACP and Springfield to attend graduate school. His loss is part of a phenomenon of the constant movement of key black leaders out of the city that will be discussed in a later chapter.

4. The Springfield Urban League

Early Phase--From its formation in 1931, as the Dunbar Community League, an outgrowth of the social service efforts of St. John's Congregational Church, the League has concerned itself with the physical and economic well-being of the non-white population, devoting much of its effort to improve the standard of living in non-white areas rather than in political or legal attempts to break down segregation barriers. The League's philosophy is that the best way to integration is in raising the economic level of the Black.

An early effort at internal upgrading occurred shortly before 1940 when the Dunbar League responded to what it terms "the great exodus of blacks from the South to the North." One of the most acute and difficult of all problems found was that of adequate housing facilities within the

areas that the migrants were settling at that time--primarily the North End and some sections of the "Hill." The response of the League was to purchase several tenement houses in the North End and Hill areas and turn them into "housing projects" for the blacks. Both areas still included a large portion of whites, although the percentage was declining. These apartments were rented at a modest sum. The results were seen as aiding the social needs of the black and to this end it was judged successful by the League. Later observers argued that although the program provided living quarters of decent conditions to the incoming blacks, new immigrants were channeled directly into those areas of previous black concentrations, causing an increase in segregated housing.

As we have already mentioned, these criticisms were not unusual, especially from the local NAACP chapter, and they were rooted in the conflicting strategies of short-term demands rather than long-term goals of the two organizations. In 1934, William DeBerry, who became executive director of the League in 1939, argued the need for separate institutions for whites and non-whites until integration would come and advocated the building up of black economic and social institutions. This was anathema to persons associated with the NAACP.

The Sixties--In recent years, the Urban League of Springfield has become more involved in fighting discrimination practices primarily in the economic and housing areas. In 1966, it initiated "Housing Unlimited," a program created to assist black families facing discrimination when they attempted to rent or buy decent housing. "Housing Unlimited" provided a

list of apartments available on an open occupancy basis, prepared applications for public housing, and provided advice on filing complaints on discrimination. It has also expanded its job placement program by initiating efforts to bring together business executives and potential black employees.

The nature of membership and the relationship to organizational behavior, has become important because of its emphasis on economic improvements, the Urban League has always had a substantial number of white businessmen on its executive committee, representing banks, insurance companies, commercial enterprises, and the major manufacturing industries in the city. The elected President of the local League has many times been a white man, while the executive secretary, who handles the actual operation of the organization, has been black. A white president and white Board members give the League access to the economic power structure of the city. But it also inhibits the organization's access into a communication with large sections of the black sub-community, reaching and working essentially the middle class. For a long period of time, the local chapter as well as the national organization has been of greatest value for opening avenues of economic advancement for the black middle class. Consequently, the posture of the Urban League has been conservative, especially with regard to methods of achieving social change.

On the other hand, since 1966 the Urban League of Springfield has gone through some extraordinary changes, partly because of the increased race activity in the city and partly because of the changes in black demands and strategies locally and nationally. In November, 1966, Tom

Lawrence was brought from Boston where he worked for OEO to serve as executive director of the local chapter. Since his arrival, he has been called "contradictory, volatile, a militant, an 'Uncle Tom,' a 'toe stamper,' a pest, over confident, and vacillating." These conflicting descriptions make it difficult to draw an accurate picture of the man, but one fact about his presence all observers agree upon: since his coming, the Urban League has become more well-known, more aggressive, and more involved in the activities and needs of the lower class population in the sub-community.

Lawrence's contacts with governmental agencies through OEO, plus the reorientation to a welfare goal emphasis, brought the organization into prominence. Job training programs for the unemployed, summer placement for black youth, and accelerated job placement programs with Springfield industry have been developed. The Urban League has been handling sub-contract work for the Comprehensive Program and is requesting funds from the Model Cities Agency for a further expansion of its programs.

5. Model Cities

The Model Cities program was another social action program that reinforced the apathetic political behavior of Springfield's black population. The program expressed a desire to deal with the various problems of that area of the city which had the greatest number of social problems, physical decay, and educational problems.

The planning stages of this program enlisted the help of the NAACP, the Urban League's Pastor Council, and various other blacks identifying

those problems that were not pressing to the various groups. Each group, along with city agencies and interested groups, was asked to submit their conclusions in writing to the Planning Department Director, Mr. William Toole.

The next stage after the identifying proposal was submitted and approved by the Housing and Urban Development Commission (HUD) was the planning stage. The planning stage was to be a combined effort of Model City residents, minority group agencies, community agencies, and those departments that were directly related to the identified problems of the Model Cities area.

The Redevelopment Authority became the city agency concerned with physical improvement. Task forces were formed to address the problem of housing and relocation, demolition, and rebuilding. The Springfield School Department was designated as the city agency to coordinate educational programs, and the Springfield Community Council was designated as the agency to handle social welfare programs related to Model Cities.

As can be noted, the three major areas that most affected black people's lives were still under the direction and control of city agencies that had demonstrated their lack of empathy and concern for minority group problems. The Redevelopment Department had relocated 95 percent of the black people into the Winchester Square, Hill-McKnight (Model Cities) area. The Community Council was directly related to City Hall as a city agency; and the School Department, although faced with a court order to racially balance the schools, had not made any legally acceptable attempt to comply. These previous indications of lack of concern for minority

group people coupled with a Plan A, no ward representation form of city government made obvious the outcome of the Model Cities program.

A few black people in the Model Cities area and its surroundings recognized the failures of Model Cities and attempted to salvage its efforts by developing a program which did have possibilities in assisting those who were in need. The first attempt came through the earnest efforts of those black people who had worked in various housing, social, and educational agencies. They submitted proposals that would involve neighborhood people in an attempt to solve their own problems. They tried to link this program to agencies that they felt would deliver the desired affect.

Next they sought to hire a director that would have the concern of the people of the Model Cities area in mind when he planned programs and also one who had knowledge of city planning and government.

In reaction to this, the city agencies systematically began to take over control of the programs. Housing programs were stalled because the corporations that proposed them had no previous success record in guiding and managing housing. However, if one checks the record of public housing nationally, they will see that public housing has the poorest record for housing maintenance and rent collecting in comparison to other private housing venture. The community council and obscure agencies are situated in the downtown area of Springfield, and their main function is the dispensing of funds from philanthropic groups in the Western Massachusetts area. The Board of Directors are the same Board members of the United Fund (Red Feather Agency). The point to be made is that the agency that

was assigned the responsibility to render social service to the Model Cities area residents was not very likely to understand the problem of the Model Cities residents, consequently being ineffective.

The Springfield School Department never made public its findings concerning educational problems in the Model Cities area, and, consequently, the Northern Educational Service took leadership in this area, submitting three proposals--an Early Childhood program, a Suspendees Program, and a study center proposal. The proposals were allowed to be reviewed by the area residents and submitted to HUD; however, difficulties occurred when the funds came. The School Department claimed that they were the only agencies in the city that could implement educational programs and that they were the only ones to coordinate and dispense educational funds. Compromises were made because the School Department wanted a teacher from its system to head the program. An experienced, tenured, black teacher from the School Department was hired on a year's leave of absence until such time as the program became operational. The Suspendees Program would be staffed by School Department personnel, with aides selected by a representative group from the School Department and the Model Cities residents.

The study center and the Suspendees Program would share the same facilities because of the non-conflicting operating time (Suspendees Program during the day and the study center during the evening).

The matter of who became director of Model Cities was quickly determined by the mayor. His first choice of director was a black man whose background resembled the background of the traditional City Hall

black appointee--educated at those schools which are nationally prestigious (Harvard), membership in those organizations that adhere to gradualism on racial issues, past President of the Springfield NAACP, and a history of working with black people at one of the local universities. However, the most appealing criteria for selection was the consistency of his past work experience. It appeared to appease black efforts for improvement and perpetuated the status quo.

The further insure this "stability," the director hired a white assistant director who had no experience or knowledge of the Model Cities area or its people. After a year of numerous attempts to develop Model Cities programs that would satisfy HUD, the first director resigned. He was replaced by a black director from out of state, who had no previous knowledge of Springfield or its problems. Nevertheless, he too was typical of City Hall appointments. He had been a member of the Peace Corp, attended Yale, and was middle class in values and believed in the strong mayor-majority rule system of government that Plan A form of government exemplifies.

His appointments were those of people he had previously worked with in other cities. Consistently, no major staff positions were assigned to local people. These appointments of local people were usually to positions of no power, or they were to people who rarely, if ever, had been involved in social issues, political controversy, or community concern.

A pattern of disrespect evolved with the first appointment of the director of Model Cities. The mayor clearly intimated that the choice of director would not come from the people because the confidence evidenced by the people would increase that person's independence from City Hall. The

probability of meaningful programs would cast aspirations on the existing agencies' inability to function to meet the needs of a changing society. The dependence of the two Model Cities directors on the mayor's office kept the power and the decision-making process in the hands of city government. Although the Model Cities policy board could vote and make policy, the final decision rested in the hands of the City Council, which was elected at large and represented the attitude of the white city majority.

Under the first two Model Cities directors, the mayor's office had lost the confidence of the black community; the Model Cities residents and the majority of the black community had seen the influx of "poverty pimps," those persons who made their livelihood from exploiting poverty programs, and many community folk had begun to doubt the sincerity of Model Cities. They took over all the leadership positions in the poverty programs through appointment by City Hall or through the promises of pay-offs of one kind or another. So, when the time came to appoint a third director for Model Cities, the mayor chose a woman to lead the agency. The appointment of a woman would satisfy the major contingent that had taken over the Model Cities fight for community control of the program.

Nevertheless, the mayor seemed to make sure that his choice of a female candidate was politically conscious of the control that the mayor's office had over the program and would remain dependent on certain key white personnel on the staff. So, the pattern of status quo was continued even though the directors changed and personnel shifted. Control of the Model Cities program remained the same, and the original program thrust

dissipated to a mere job-holding action for aspiring entrepreneurs.

Model Cities in Springfield developed out of the office of Mayor Ryan and the Planning Department, headed by William Toole. At the end of 1966, the federal government had announced that it was proceeding with the selection of certain cities to take part in its experimental program of rehabilitation or urban slum areas. The unique programs promised a total attack on all facets of dysfunctional ghetto life--slum removal and housing rehabilitation, employment, training programs, health centers, educational reform, youth drop-out center, programs dealing with policy-community relations, and many more. An effort encompassing such aims would require large sums of money, money from the federal government, money the city could use to improve many services in these areas without expending its own funds, money to placate a black sub-community grown progressively more disenchanted with the mayor's behavior in regard to the school problem.

On February 8, 1967, Mayor Ryan announced that the city would submit a Model Cities application by May 1 (later changed to April 15). The most important requirement regarding the application was proof of need. This task was made easier by the detailed and intensive surveys completed by William Toole and his associates in preparing the Community Renewal Program reports defining the social, economic, and physical problems of the city, neighborhood by neighborhood. Much of the report was incorporated into the application. To assist Mr. Toole in the preparation of the proposal, a committee was formed consisting of Allen R. Andrews, Deputy Administrator of the Springfield Redevelopment Authority, Chester Gibbs,

City Intergroup Relations Director and the only black on the committee, and Ray Asselin, Associate Director of the Community Council of Greater Springfield.

The area originally selected, measuring three and a half square miles and containing 13,000 dwellings and 38,000 persons, was reduced to 1.8 square miles containing 19,000 people before submission of the final proposal. Much of the Old Hill and parts of the Bay and McKnight section surrounding Winchester Square and the center of the black sub-community were included in the proposal.

In November, Springfield was chosen as one of the nation's first 63 communities selected as candidates in the one billion dollar Model Cities renewal program. Allocation of the funds depended on the city's developing a detailed program describing projects and their implementation. The federal government allotted the city $147,000 for this phase of the program.

The first order of business was the selection of a director to oversee the planning of the program and the budget. At this point, the program takes on the controversial nature that would inhibit its progress to the point of complete paralysis and possible failure.

The controversy involved three major points: the failure of William Toole's attempt to become director of the Model Cities project, the appointment of Jim White to the position; and permeating and bridging both of these, the debate over the sub-community role in the formation and the operation of the program.

Although William Toole was considered to be the most dynamic city planner in the history of Springfield and had been responsible for the Model Cities application proposal which was accepted and approved by the federal government, he was not well-liked by most top officials at City Hall. Many considered him too "pushy" and loud; others felt threatened by what they considered his radical demands and proposals regarding poverty programs, and some, especially in the mayor's office, were unhappy about the mayor's inability to control him. He was not what one would call a "company man."

At City Council hearings in both April and July, 1967, Councilmen Sullivan and Banforth subjected Toole to severe and harsh questioning regarding what Sullivan considered extraordinarily high expenses for the proposal preparation. Banforth was skeptical about the total Community Renewal Program. Mayor Ryan, who did not run for re-election in 1967, made no secret about his dislike for the hot-tempered and often outspoken Toole. Yet most of the public, including the black community, were either unaware of or unimpressed by this hostility and consequently were stunned when Mayor-elect Frank Freedman, on December 12, appointed James S. White, a black, to the $13,000 position.

Black spokesmen were especially angered by the decision, since they had been vocally supporting Toole's candidacy since April. Toole, although a white man, had tremendous support in the black community, possible because of his "militant" statements on race issues and the quality of the Comprehensive Renewal Program. He had strong personal ties with many of

the black spokesmen and leaders of race organizations. Jim White, on the other hand, although a black, a resident of the Hill, and former local NAACP President, did not seem to have the respect and support of the sub-community. Many considered him an "Uncle Tom" and a lackey of the mayor, and felt he would prove an inept spokesman and defender of sub-community interests. Others questioned his organizational abilities, referring to his resignation as Director of the Upward Bound program at the University of Massachusetts (where he was also an instructor in the School of Education). Whatever the reasons, that an issue widening gap between black and white in Springfield involved black demands for a white director of a black-oriented program is ironic.

For many black leaders the appointment of Mr. White was only the latest indication of the city's unwillingness to include community people in the planning and operation of the program in a meaningful manner. Alienation and anger had set in even before the appointment was known.

The frustration was further intensified by what many Blacks considered a take-over by the city of a program whose guidelines specified community control. Wasn't that what made the program unique? Unfortunately, representatives of the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) were not sure themselves. Citizens were told on one hand by HUD to "participate" and on the other hand were ignored by the city. HUD refused to intervene to decide whether City Hall or the sub-community were to be in control. Some cities were told by HUD that the neighborhood residents must have clear and direct access to the decision-making process of the city Demonstration

Agency so that neighborhood views could influence policy, planning, and program decisions. But who was to choose the director?

Toole and White had become symbols of the issue of control--an issue that was finally settled in the mayor's favor but not without endangering the future of the program. A group of black leaders had submitted a list of new candidates after it was obvious that Toole would not get get the position, but the mayor-elect was unimpressed and resolved to resist community pressures in order to maintain his legally defined authority. Unfortunately, this was Freedman's first major decision, and he, along with most new chief executives, was sensitive about any possible diminution of power and was eager to establish himself as a firm leader. He also believed that the appointment of Jim White, a black with impressive credentials (Harvard Graduate School of Education, University teacher, poverty program head), would neutralize most of the opposition from the sub-community. That assumption was his key miscalculation. If he had consulted closely with black spokesmen and the author did, the antipathy toward White could not have been missed. Much of the hostility was related to the "control" issue, but some was directly related to White's capabilities and past record. A program on the scale of Model Cities, said many blacks, should be entrusted to a person who is closer to the needs and desires of the program's constituency. White could not meet those qualifications at least in the eyes of many black spokesmen.

On December 14, 1967, at a meeting of the Springfield Action Commission, the local poverty agency, Mason made a motion to "endorse and

support the Model Cities program, the director, and anyone else involved in making the program a success." Roger Williams, Henry Twiggs, Talbert Swan, Andrew Griffin, and other black spokesmen objected vigorously, so Mason withdrew the motion. The Commission finally voted not to endorse the program, although it did organize a Model Cities subcommittee and advisory team.

On December 18, a raucous meeting at the Dunbar Community Center, attended by over 500 people, the largest turnout on record, voted to request half of the funds until issue of community control was settled. Mason opposed the request, but it was supported by Swan Griffin, and Hamer.

The Role of the Policy Board--The meeting was the high point of the struggle with regard to "control" and the director's appointment. The mayor remained firm, and the sub-community remained in disagreement on the question, causing the conflict to move to a new battlefield involving the power of the Policy Board, made up of elected community residents, and the institutional relationship between the program and the city government.

On January 6, 1968, Talbert Swan, then President of the NAACP, and other area residents met with the mayor. A list of six demands were submitted to Freedman, among them the power of the veto for the Policy Board and the removal of Jim White. At the next meeting, the mayor accepted the veto demand and most of the others, but rejected the request for White's removal. At that time, the residents present dropped their opposition to White.

The Policy Board had developed out of an ad hoc committee of community residents headed by Talbert Swan, who had helped Bill Toole compose the city's Model Cities application. The Policy Board, consisting of 15 members comprising residents from each of the 15 precincts in the area, tried to insure citizen participation. The ad hoc committee, including many of the black spokesmen opposed to White, hoped that the Policy Board, its legal successor, would dominate White and City Hall. Their plans and hopes backfired.

Soon after the date of elections for the Policy Board position were announced, it became clear that the response from area residents would not be overwhelming. The filing date for candidates had to be extended in order to fill all the contest positions. On March 15, 1968, the election was held--983 voted out of 10,000 eligibles, and six seats were uncontested. The low turnout was not unexpected, although attempts by ad hoc committee Chairman Harold Holmes to call it a success were disregarded. What was surprising was the defeat of the nine militant leaders who had been most vigorous in their opposition to White--among them Roger Williams and Oscar Bright. Three successful candidates were white: Mrs. Nancy Larson, a housewife in her early twenties, the youngest member of the Board; James O'Donnell, a school teachers; and John J. Sullivan, Jr., who recently resigned. Of the elected black candidates, most were middle aged. Five worked for industry, two in banks, one was a school teacher, and one was a timekeeper. The Board's chairman, elected unanimously, was a dentist. He recently resigned the chairmanship and was succeeded by John H. Thomas,

Jr., a gardener-chauffer. Although some candidates were under 21, none was elected.

The ad hoc committee had apparently forgotten that more than half the residents of the Model Cities area are white. The results indicate that most of those who voted were either white or were blacks concerned with preventing more militant leadership from taking over the program.

During the same period, the mayor was also strengthening his legal position over the program. On March 4, he asked the City Council to make him the legal agent for the Community Demonstration Agency, arguing that under Plan A the mayor cannot delegate contract-making power to any other body. Opposition to the mayor's request came from a white councilman, Paul Sears, and not from black Councilman Mason, who spent most of the meeting time attacking the ad hoc committee.

Several months later the final stage in the city sub-community control contoversy was reached. An ordinance was introduced into the City Council, Ordinance 9E, to bring Model Cities into the bureaucratic structure of city government by making it a city department. The Policy Board, who saw the last of the program's autonomy and their remaining power disappearing, vigorously opposed the ordinance. The Board supported a plan making Model Cities a neighborhood corporation, or, if that was unfeasible, having social action organizations act as the Model Cities Agency. Both of these ideas were turned down by the City Council, who on August 19 unanimously passed the ordinance.

The reaction among most black leaders was predictable. During the preceding several months, black opposition to the program had organized into a group called the Black Coalition. Made up of a cross section of black city residents from all walks of life, its purpose was to present a unified front in dealing with city, something unheard of in recent Springfield history, and it exhibited an aggressiveness never seen in the city by black organizations. But its influence on the issue proved meaningless, partly because many residents of the black community felt that Coalition's members were self-appointed with no true following among the majority of blacks. Consequently, much of their verbal anger went unheeded by City Hall. At the August 19 City Council meeting at which the ordinance was passed, a dispute broke out over whether members of the Black Coalition should speak. Paul Mason said, "No," arguing that the rules of the City Council did not provide for hearings in such matters. He was overruled by five to four, but the incident does not reflect any overwhelming degree of influence on the part of the Coalition.

The Community Action Program--The last semblance of black community involvement in Springfield was the Community Action Program. The Executive Board of the Program was a diversified group of people from various areas of the community, two thirds of whom represented city agencies and city officials. As a consequence, this composition of people would rarely issue or support community action programs that were not in keeping with City Hall.

The majority of the employees in the Community Action Program were locked into the system through economic dependence as a result of minimal

educational backgrounds, and few demanded technical backgrounds. Therefore, even though the Community Action Program may have been representative of the poorly educated and unskilled, it did not act in defense or in the behalf of those it was assumed to represent. No records were made to substantiate these facts other than interviews with people in the program.

# CHAPTER V

## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Educational Summary

Public education, once deemed the "social equalizer," has not lived up to those expectations. Many alternatives have been offered as substitutes for the pathway to success and a better life. Nevertheless, before these changes can be made and put into motion, evaluation and introspection of the present educational system and its problems must be dealt with.

The "blame" for our educational crisis, as stated by some authors such as Paul Goodman's book, Compulsory Miseducation and The Community of Scholars should be leveled at the institutionalized educational system and the people who perpetuate it. His reference to them as "educational monks who have attained documents that license them to practice educational medicine without benefit of internship" is most accurate, for they have left us, the people, literally crippled in a society that demands that only the strongest, healthiest and most functional survive in this relatively sick society and is an indictment of the schools of education.

But we must ask the question, is survival what we envision as an ultimate goal, or is it the highest level of functionality that we seek? Education must address itself to this question before programmatic changes are pursued.

The "blame" can also be attributed to the parents of the "culturally deprived." Daniel P. Moynihan, the great "black understander," dealt with education as a numbers game. He felt that if the right proportion of blacks and whites came together under the most ideal surroundings intellectual growth would spring forth. This, of course, is paraphrased, but if one recognizes the approach he makes in attempting to understand the problem of education, he will see that it is one taken most by "well-intentioned" people, one of non-directed action, predicated on assumption rather than on a systematic, well thought out, step by step plan. Some educators have stressed that the lives of the poor are structureless and therefore valueless. The problem arises as to whether or not those making the determination of the pros and cons within a society are not using the same value system as the people they are evaluating.

The "blame" can conceivably be placed on the students, which seems to be the most acceptable point of view taken by school administrators and parents. No particular author or person can be credited singularly with this popular concept. However, as long as educational systems tend to deal with the dropout problem by trying to convince dropouts to return to the same situation that caused them to leave,

students will never accept the "blame" as totally theirs.

We must begin to recognize that placing the "blame" is a cop out rather than a realistic address to the problem. The important problems of where, when and how we begin to deal with improving the quality of education have to be considered.

At the risk of becoming analytical, might I suggest that the where of the problem exists in the educational system and its rudiments, with the inclusion of parents and their blind acceptance of compulsory education, and students who allow themselves to become the receptacles and victims of society's indifference to the "powerless" life style we live.

The when is now. We have waited too long for the natural maturity of educational systems to become a reality.

The how is a true and honest recognition that there are variations in the attitudes of people, whether they be black or white, and that we must overcome our attitudinal shortcomings, discovering and systematically developing a "new me" in the process.

As previously mentioned, there have been many stands taken on the educational issue and countless numbers of plans presented to change educational systems. However, the need to address the underlying and fundamental problems of education must begin with all persons involved in the educational process: schools of education, public educators, teachers, students, and parents.

The attitude and the respect that these bodies of people have for each other are reflected in their daily operation and administering of education. The beginning of this long determinating process started when America established its Creed. The American Creed talked of equality and justice, and supported a liberal approach as a guideline for a growing new nation. It was referred to as the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Equally supportive of the American Creed was the European philosophy of Christianity in the form of colonialism. From this rigid, authoritarian religion came the various Protestant sects, split off from the Anglican Church. Religion became the battlefield for expression of one's rights. However, more deeply rooted than the Church, and basic to the American Creed, was English Law. English Law tended not to deal with men, but rather to deal with a concept of government of laws which made men both equal and free. This incorporation of the American Creed and English Law was theoretically sound, but cultural traits prevented it from becoming a reality because of the American disregard for law and order. Americans become conscious of the need for law and order only when they are personally disfranchised. However, the most relevant attitude toward law and order in America is in the common belief that there is a higher law, one superior to the specific laws inscribed in the Constitution, God.

The duality becomes apparent when the choice has to be made between civic responsibility and moral obligation. Most often Americans tend to absolve themselves of their civic resonsibility just as easily

as they do their moral obligation. First, they pretend that they are not responsible for past injustices, and second, they assume that they will be forgiven for their sins by attending church and maintaining a God-fearing posture. I do not wish to belabor this point; however, I do wish to emphasize that an attitude of indifference and irresponsibility permeates the very core of our society, and that this attitude, in turn, moves us to point the finger of blame in the hope of relieving ourselves of our individual guilt.

The following discussion will not blame, but rather will endeavor to seek out and identify the shortcomings of our educational system, as well as its participants, and will make recommendations.

If an urban child is one who is culturally deprived, poor, needy, a slum dweller and welfare recipient, an urban city child is one who has not had much experience with organized group behavior. His experience with tasks which stimulate verbal development is limited. He has few enriching experiences at home. His range of experiences is rarely greater than the boundaries of his neighborhood. He has been described by many as lacking such attributes as care for personal property, respect for authority, punctuality, and accepted levels of hygiene. He has few material possessions of his own to explore and little value is placed on them.

Then in teaching the urban child we must first know what he is about, i.e., who he is, where he is coming from, and how we must deal with his physical, emotional, and intellectual and social beginnings if we are

ever to make this child truly a part of America. To achieve this, however, we need the backing of a committed society desiring change, and aware that education is the means of publicly attaining that goal. "Integration of black and white children could be the first step. Segregation will give a child a false image of the world in which he lives." (Wendell Jones, 1970). "A city cannot rise above its school system." "Racial balance and integration are synonymous." It is this type of confusion that has clouded the entire problem of school integration.[120]

Educational Recommendations

Springfield, like many other cities of its size, has been the victim of urban renewal and social upheaval; the phrases are interchangeable depending on how the movement of families is viewed by the reader. I'm sure everyone is in agreement that progress is necessary. Therefore, we build through improvements and upgrading of living conditions. Nevertheless, urban planners who usually address themselves only to physical rehabilitation are not cognizant of the traumatic psychological damage they cause families. The parents' self-concept as a stable or "rooted" part of that society is shaken by these moves. When Clement Evontress states that criticism of apparent indifference of black parents toward education and the public schools is demoralizing to blacks, he may be one of the very few urban planners who understands that educational priorities are last on the list of considerations of most urban renewal projects. Springfield parents, like countless numbers of

parents throughout the country, are faced with the major problem of economic survival and often feel they have little if any time to address themselves to the issue of education. Also, many black parents are subject to the same stereotyped thinking as most people, in that they think the public educational system is providing the best possible education for their child, and therefore they will entrust this part of their children's lives to it. This is evidenced by the reluctance during the 1970-71 school disturbance when the majority of "non-white" parents allowed the school department to determine how the public education is a reflection of middle class America's society and culture. Therefore, public education is structured to meet the fundamental needs of the national values, which primarily mean capitalism. It can be further concluded that one of the major reasons that public schools are in existence is to prepare people to become a part of the working force of this country. The axillary gain of this approach is that in this process of "employment preparation" only some will reach their maximum functioning potential. Men such as Vice Admiral Rickover feel that this full potential means becoming the most highly technical country in the world. Others understand this as being eloquently astute. I make this point to indicate that the objective purposes and goals of education are left to the system and persons least capable of making these decisions because of vested interests in other areas. As a result, each section of the country, each state, each city and each school district is allowed

to determine the role that public education will play. It is no wonder that the disparities of our public school systems are so numerous. Many speak of the accountability of teachers, and I do believe that teacher accountability is essential. However, if the objectives, purposes, and goals are not specifically spelled out, what do we hold them accountable to? This "nebulous educational approach" has perpetuated public education and produced a directionless educational system.

The attitude of public education toward teachers is two-fold: one is an attitude of the employer, who uses them as instruments to do his bidding; the other is one of ally, who protects its own regardless of the problems they might be responsible for. The first is more complex because there are no identifiable goals or directions to follow; therefore teachers are allowed to project themselves in the classroom. If a teacher has a strong interest in reading, math, music, or art, his individual preferences will be reflected in the development of the student in his class. Teachers will most often do the things they do well and tax them the least. This unbending attitude creates a situation reinforcing the teacher-centered (or therapist-centered) rather than student-centered approach. In addition, because of the vagueness of goals, the teachers are not accountable to the system, and this allows the system both the option of supporting the teacher and the controlling of the limits of support.

Secondly, within a non-directional school system, the public school can never be taken to task for what it has not done because clearly established goals have never been revealed. The parental, protective

approach can be employed when the system is threatened, making the teacher more receptive to the system regardless of its shortcomings, i.e., teaching situations, materials, supportive services. In short, it creates a dependence.

Teachers are forced to work under some of the most unfavorable conditions but expected to deliver the most favorable results. The quandry they find themselves in is a result of their dependency on the public school system and their failure to align themselves with the parents.

The attitude of the school system toward the parent is part of the "pecking system" employed by the public educational system. The school board looks down on the superintendent, the superintendent looks down on his administrative staff, his administrative staff looks down on the principals, the principals look down on the teachers, and the teachers look down on the parents. The action of this "pecking system" is experienced by children whose parents show concern for their children's welfare. As a result the children are less threatening. Their sullenness is evident, however, in careless, haphazard, and often pointless exercises and homework.

This brings us to the area of teacher attitude toward student, which can be a reflection of the teacher's attitude toward himself. If a person feels he can learn from another, he will be receptive to that person's past experiences. However if a person feels that he will not learn from another person or their experiences, he will not be receptive

to those learning experiences whether they be from another teacher or a student. What is being described is the first stages of conditional regard which, with continual reinforcement, can progress to unconditioned regard and then ultimately respect.

Once the feeling of powerlessness is reinforced sufficiently either through non-directed, poorly oriented, or improperly funded poverty programs, the perpetrators of this hoax can predict the responses and create the effect desired by charging a few reinforcements.

Some choosing to deal with the shortcomings of education in the urban schools may take the position that home and unstructured family relationships are the causes of not only our educational ills but our social ills as well. This can not be totally discounted, but there is some difficulty accepting that cause and effect relationship. In terms of survival, every parent prepares a way for his young instinctively. Therefore to accept the idea that home life is the cause of educational and social problems is to accept the criticism that parents from urban areas do not care about the futures of their young. True, nature has built into animals a keener instinct, but man has the ability to reason and can improve on the instinctual through reason. There are a number of ways this can be done: appealing to his intellect through behavioral modification through client-centered therapy, and through other modes of treatment.

The following is a conceptualization of an approach to the subject of educational involvement in the schools. As mentioned earlier, the

primary approach to solving problems is to bring them fully to a conscious level for all the educational participants before attempting to act on these problems.

In discussing the student's attitude toward education, it must be understood that a learning process has taken place prior to his entrance to school. The mere fact that he is toilet trained, can identify different people and objects by name, and most often can dress himself is evidence that he has the ability to maintain self control, use reason, and follow directions. The environment that most urban youngsters come from does develop a consciousness within them, one which is self-reliant and, although it may give the illusion of individualism, has strong ethnocentric ramifications. These ramifications in themselves are the positiveness that black youngsters bring to the traditional school system.

However, there are some reinforcing aspects of the urban family that do cause anxiety and frustration in urban city children when they are forced to act in contradiction to "self-dynamism," a combination of ego and super-ego. On the one hand, the student is told by his parents that education will propel him into the mainstream of prosperity and on the other hand the middle class educational system makes it difficult to obtain the necessary tools. The traditional teacher teaches from a book that does not take into account where the student is coming from emotionally, intellectually or physically. The student is forced to conform to the permieters of an educational system that has not sought to determine his level of consciousness before the process begins.

If I may interject, this is the foundation for the questioning of the misused term, "equality education." There can only be "equality education" when the recipient of that education comes equally prepared, and if predetermined that he is not adequately prepared, an established program is employed to raise him to functional level so he can start off equally. Most black youngsters are conscious of the lack of sensitivity of the traditional public school system toward them. Therefore they are suspicious of it. Some may say that they come into the system with an air of paranoia, but could not paranoia be described in this instance as a heightened awareness? If this assumption has any validity, it is no wonder that urban, city, and black students are at a disadvantage when they enter school. An additional negative reinforcement that most inner city students experience is that there are few, if any, models that they can relate to in the urban community.

But setting these points aside as dealing with that of our urban schools, one recognizes that the more potentially disadvantaged children can be identified in the early grades. If this be the case, it would seem that teachers with the best educational and emotional backgrounds should be in the primary grades. If not, then the probability of natural selection takes place, and the upper grades of the urban school lose the "problem student" of the middle grades. Most educational systems label these students as failures or dropouts, which in effect is a negative quality measurement of success. This reaction could be interpreted as an acknowledgement to the feeling of "powerlessness" which prevented them from becoming conscious of the problem facing them. For

had they been problem conscious, they would clearly have dealt with it. However, the "level of consciousness" is not restricted to only non-white parents. White parents of Springfield allowed the school department to determine approaches to deal with the school problem. If white parents had once dealt with the true causes of the school disturbances they would have had to recognize that they too were victims of Springfield's educational system and would have had to align themselves with the black people and whomever else was being educationally disenfrancised. Nevertheless I do feel that some white people recognized the true reality, and this realization that the two groups were oppressed caused them to seek refuge under their last blanket of hope which is white racism.

As mentioned previously, only once, during all the pronouncements, was the true problem of the disparity of Springfield's educational system ever squarely addressed: that was by Dr. Griffin, a black leader, and one spokesman of the white community. As can be documented by various news articles of the period, Dr. Griffin and the white spokesman agreed that the issue at hand was the quality of the educational system; even though these participants taking issue may have had racial biases, they were both profoundly conscious of the main problem.

I cite this incident to indicate that before parental involvement can become a viable force in the scheme of improved education, the true issues and problems must be identified and the conscious level of the people raised. Then they can confront the issues. Since it costs more

to improve education in those urban schools that have been allowed to deteriorate, increased taxes could be used as a ploy to kindle white racism and a smoke screening of the true issues. Since parents are usually caught up in the daily struggle for survival and in providing a home, food, and enjoyment for their children, they must be made aware and educated to the dynamics of urban politics. But without the hard work of community organizers, these issues shall forever be obscured, and we shall remain "powerless." Every effort should be made to expose those entrepreneurs, both black and white, who seize the opportunity to capitalize on the surface issues.

Many of our poverty programs today address issues that are established not by the community but by the nation; as a result, there is very little benefit to the minorities. The priorities established nationally will never be in the best interests of those against whom racism is practiced. However, as mentioned before, racism serves a double purpose; first, it polarizes white against black, and secondly, it serves as a means of confusing the major problems of the impoverished. Employment, housing and recreation are important goals. But establishing them as goals and then eliminating or restricting the attainment of these goals produces frustration and ultimately a feeling of powerlessness.

"No efforts to combat racism in America can succeed without greatly building up the capabilities of the presently subordinated minorities and actually transferring significant power to them, since prevention of such outcomes is the essence of racism."[121]

The misjudgements of black parents has been a cop-out for education. According to M. Lee Montgomery, Black Educators Speech, parents want to be partners with teachers in the education of their children.

There must be a genuine involvement developed in the community between parents, teachers, and students. He continues saying that is has long been whispered that teachers and administrators should be aware of the community. However, teachers and administrators have placed a limit on human resourcefulness of parents and consider them ignorant, stupid, harassing, illtempered, and without information about education and children. But we find that they are no different from other parents.

Urban black-Americans solidly supported the goal of desegregation according to an October-November, 1967 poll conducted by Fortune Magazine. Over 300 blacks in 13 cities responded to black interviewers as follows when asked to rank their own objectives:

| | |
|---|---|
| More education for my children | 97% |
| More desegregation | 93% |
| A better job | 87% |
| Some kind of special training | 77% |
| Better police protection | 69% |
| More education for myself | 62% |
| Making neighborhood a better place to live | 60% |
| More money to spend | 53% |
| Moving out of the neighborhood | 20% |

In South and East Harlem, where most of the people are black and Puerto Rican families on public welfare, the most frequently stated concern of parents is not their economic status, not their housing, not their family problems, but the inefficient educating of their children.[122]

The community controlled school came about when black people continually watched the school systems apparently fail. It then became a move out of desperation. "Poor school situations cannot be righted by black control" (Wendell Jones, 1970); however, if the conditions previously stated can be implemented, parent involvement is a most necessary part of their children's education. Knowing that many of the parents are sensitive about their lack of schooling, we should make each "livingroom a classroom."

In January, 1968, issue of Phi Delta Kappan, James Kent made the following statement: "Whatever divergent views men like Coleman, Moynihan, and Bowles may have relative to the means by which equality of education is to be achieved, they would all stress the unique importance of people, students, teachers, parents, community. Educators who continue to think of equality in terms of such things as buildings, books, and curriculum, do so at their peril."

Teachers and school administrators disavow responsibility for low academic achievements of pupils from the ghetto, attributing it to negative influences at home and in the community. They are quite ready, however, to take credit for the higher achievement of pupils from affluent backgrounds even though much of their academic performance reflects educational

advantages afforded by the home.[123]

"Teachers are as primitive and as barbaric in their racial knowledge and attitude as the average American." [124]

According to Harvard University child psychiatrist, Robert Coles in a report of teachers and the children of poverty, teachers have been prepared exclusively to teach middle-class urban and suburban children. Teachers see little hope for most of their students in the inner city schools. The results of his study seem to indicate that teachers respond to the social and political facts of life. They pick up those facts, those conditions with unerring accuracy and translate them into goals or standards for particular children. In the school where some progress is being made, teachers have been persuaded that their job can be done and that they will get every possible bit of help, financial, educational, and psychological.

Teacher and counselor need not be black to relate effectively to black children and establish a rapport so essential to good teaching. It is felt that the inner city teacher should have specialized orientation including knowledge of the area and life style before beginning his teaching experience (Wendell Jones, 1970).

The Kerner Report states that teachers in the ghetto should be an intricate part of the educational experience of the child they are serving. Rewards, advancement, and incentives should be offered to attract highly qualified persons.

Paraprofessionals, tutors, and community residents, according to Preston R. Wilcox, Radical School Reform, "The Community Center School" should perform citizen roles being employed and trained to operate outside of school in storefronts and should be available to parents and others during non-school hours. They can train parents to support the education of their children, putting them in contact with needed resources and finding ways for them to relate to community activities and the life of the school.

They can become "teachers" outside the school and "foster parents" inside the school thus bridging the gap between home and school, making their main purpose to carry out community-parent functions, being advocates on behalf of the community not the school.

The results of Wilcox's proposed program of a community-centered school reconstructed the relationship between the school and the community addressing the parents as adults and produced a school where education became important to all involved.

There seems to be a definite need for a change in our educational system. Not a little tuck here and there, but a complex overhaul. White middle-class children may have a few years left in which they can still become productive adults, but the problems stated are the ones dealing with the disadvantaged child.

The communication gap between the administration and parents, the parents and teachers, the teachers and students, are causing non-productive people. The community centered school can possibly be the place where

the gaps are filled. That now black parents and poor parents are made responsible with the help of educators and the community can develop community education. Unless the parents and the community examine, analyze, and then develop comprehensive educational programs, the relevance of education will lose its "social equalizer" significance. This is especially important for the black urban city child for he is subjected to the realities of the educational desparities. The black community must begin to reassess the educational improvements that have benefited the black child over the past 20 years. If the past experiences indicate a non-apathetic, non-committal, and non-directional approach to educational improvement of urban city schools, new priorities and strategies to produce the desired change must be explored. The cry for community controlled schools may not be a realistic approach to improving the quality of education in urban city schools and therefore a greater input in the educational decision is the total system may be needed at this time. The means to achieving this may be a more politically astute community, through the political socialization process of the black community.

## Political Socialization

However, before Springfield's black population can emerge as an identifiable major political force, a number of steps must be taken.

1. They must learn to be partisan. In one's life time positions are taken and, to one extent or another, made consistent with one another on issues and are related to candidates running for office.

2. They must learn the meaning of participating in politics. To participate in politics one must learn to take sides. A person develops a proclivity to participate in politics in certain ways--voting, wearing buttons, giving money, etc.--along with this goes a certain frequency and intensity of commitment.
3. They must learn to be optimistic about politics, and this does not mean that each political encounter will be effective. They must learn political information. A large part of political socialization is accumulation of facts about the structure of government, the avenues actively open, the position candidates and parties take on issues.
4. They must learn to participate with skill in politics. Given a potential effectiveness in politics, how skillfully does a person use his resources to approach his fullest potential.

Growth of Political Capabilities--Partisanship, participation, optimism, information, and skills are things that are learned over a number of years. They are not political tools that are acquired when it is expedient for a political aspirant. For the most part, white America develops this political awareness at a very early age through the use of literature made available to their youngsters and through conversation at family gatherings such as breakfast, dinner, and family outings with family and friends. The impressions made by these group meetings are very important in the development of the "assumptive world" of the individual. He feels that he can

become a part of the decision-making processes either through his vote or actual participation through running for public office. However, political aspirants emerge during their early school years by seeking offices of authority in their peer groups, social clubs, and school programs.

In regard to the learning of partisanship, as a black child proceeds toward adulthood, his interests are channeled more toward survival rather than changing a system that controls his life. His education is directed toward the world of employment and earning a living. The world of politics has very little if any relevance to his daily life as he sees it. It is an event that occurs every two years locally and every four years nationally, which affects the balance of power at a level he is generally not a part of.

His political opinion decreases and so does his involvement as he finds that the political knowledge he possesses gives him little in understanding the politics of today. A good indicator to determine whether the black community understands the political structure of a particular city can be measured by the proportionate number of groups--ethnic, social, religious, etc.--that vote in various elections, and specific attention should be paid to the referenda question that affects these individual groups.

Herbert Hyman cites definite evidence that class differentials on political opinion do, in fact, increase over time as a student proceeds through his school years. The main reason for this is increased aware-

ness of class position and class interest, which leads to the clearer definition of interest translated into political stands.[125]

When one looks at participation, one hypothesizes that there should be a growing awareness of one's specific class, or other sub-group interest in the activities of a society would be coupled with a growing awareness of how the political process can have some effect on those interests. Consequently, one would assume that as one proceeds through the school years, greater interest in taking part in politics would accompany greater awareness of one's stake in society. But evidence to the contrary points to a peaking of interest in participation and optimism about the effectiveness of participating somewhere before the completion of high school, and the beginning thereafter of declining optimism about political efficacy.

The mounting cynicism, in turn, is alleged to dampen interest in participation itself. Finally, it must be pointed out that, as one would expect, over a period of time during the school years an increased differentiation develops in the amount of political information learned. Certain sub-groups of students--those from wealthy backgrounds for example--learn political facts at a greater rate than other subgroups.[126]

Among the very young, it is difficult to sort out fact learning from affective development of optimism about one's government. A number of political scientists have done work on the feeling and impression that the young have toward political leaders. They found that children in grades two through eight tend to have very favorable images of the

President and have very little knowledge or favorable feelings about other governmental officials. As they proceed from grades two through eight, their combined images of the President proceed from being extremely like feelings and impressions of their fathers to a position where father and President are quite distinct creatures. However, it was noted that increased differentiation came at the expense of the father, for the child remains impressed at how much a President knows but becomes increasingly unimpressed with what the father knows.[127]

In a study done by Easton in collaboration with Greenstein, Greenstein pointed out that his work in New Haven, Connecticut indicated that the mayor appeared quite prominent to young people and also had quite a favorable image. He attributed this to the fact that the mayor, at the time, Richard C. Lee, visited every classroom in the city during the year.[128]

Although these studies did not provide any insights into black students in those grades, they did raise questions as to whether black youngsters are more likely to have information about black office holders above and beyond their admiration for the President, or possibly instead of the President. However, one could conclude that because black officials in Springfield have not made overt moves, as did Mayor Lee of New Haven, to establish a means of identifying with the youngsters, this remains a gap between the two. The extent to which black youngsters identify with black athletes for attention and admiration is well known. It would seem that the same kind of excitement could be generated about political figures

of the black political office holder so desired.

There must be a new awakening, one which has as its central focus, a development of all the components constituting political socialization, such as participating, taking stands, accumulating information, and sharpening skills. But these efforts must have meaning for a person is not going to spend much time, energy, or money in politics if he is convinced no results will follow. The conspiratorial attitude that "You can't fight City Hall" and the negative self-image attitude, "I haven't got anything worth saying," are the traditional low sense of political efficacy discussed by Angus Campbell.129

It is not difficult to dispute the fact that black people in Springfield have experienced severe frustration in political life. The southern city's blacks have suffered from City Hall and the small country court houses' impenetrable barriers in trying to register their political preferences. However, in the North, the actual frustration experienced by black people is much more a function of social and economic disadvantage.

Presumably, the experience of political frustration is one of psychological mechanisms that ultimately account for low involvement of blacks in politics. This relationship is not a simple one, in that frustration is a state of mind resulting in destructive aggression, constructive aggression, and withdrawal. 130

There are different kinds of frustration, and the direction of the resultant behavior may be varied and can be characterized as follows:

1. Achievement drive smothered by paternalism--Black orientation toward political achievement has consciously or unconsciously usually been undermined through paternalistic guidance and assistance by whites. Examples of this can be cited in the adoption of "Plan A" form of government in Springfield, Northern Educational Services development, and Model Cities' struggling beginnings.
2. Frustration turned to constructive aggression--On rare occasions, political leadership among black people has been developed through encouragement without paternalism in a general context of political frustration.
3. The no help and no help intended form--The third form of fostered frustration, although typically associated with the southern form of politics, is also prevalent in the North and is designed to perpetuate demoralization.

The first and third forms are most prevalent in Springfield and tend to encourage political withdrawal for black people. In the first instance, paternalism, the objective is to maintain black passiveness even though some substantive concession in public policies are made. In fact, the concession are used as a means of obtaining "behavior control." The examples of this approach can be noted in the numerous social action programs and few black political appointments and elected officials that Springfield has made over the last few years. In the third instance, which has resulted in Springfield's black population's passiveness and

occasional timid aggressiveness, ultimately maintaining its objective of perpetuating the status quo, the city's black population is rendered at a disadvantage. We have seen that regardless of whether the black population of Springfield exhibits aggressive or passive behavior, it has not altered their ability to change their status, resulting in "fate control" by whites.

Even though the fate control situation exists, this does not mean that everything is the same; if black people should choose to be aggressive, they might encounter more violence than if they remained passive, and therefore, we can say that this in itself constitutes a condition of behavior control which encourages passiveness.[131]

With the existence of overwhelming forces in Springfield, one would expect black people to have to shrink into political withdrawal. However, a few did not correspond to the traditional observation of social psychologists about the correlation of frustration with aggressive behavior as suggested by John Dollard.[132] The Springfield Model Cities controversy concerning directorship of the program and its control was more closely linked to the traditional model of frustration than to aggression. It is further instructive to note the type of blacks who were most aggressive in pressing for Civil Rights. They tended to be relatively safe from economic and social sanctions, they were young and relatively free from decades of repeated rebuff and infury physically and emotionally, concerned parents and relatively secure childhoods.

Under controlled conditions, frustration can be a constructive step to achievement. However, dependence on whites to achieve one's goals cannot be a presupposition. Nevertheless, the condition may exist without the whites knowing or wanting it. Many "Black Leaders" in Springfield find themselves trying desperately to avoid falling into the trap of paternalism while in the process of escaping the total frustration of "no help, no help intended" forms of frustration, and therefore, choose the alternative open to them, "controlled frustration."

Programs such as Northern Educational Services was an attempt to operate under controlled frustration with the hope of overturning well-meaning white take-over. Similarly, analogous to this was the 1963 march on Washington, which Malcolm X claims did fall into the hands of white liberals.

The effects of controlled frustration can produce increased black interest, participation, and accomplishment. The sports world is a prime example of controlled frustration. The disproportionate success of blacks in sports must be attributed to a greater achievement drive in this area rather than to unusual physical characteristics and with no particular white encouragement of black athletes. However, once the admiration and approval was gained, economic and social rewards followed.

The question must be asked, why has there not been a greater rise in politicians on the national or local scene? Because political accomplishments by black politicians or political activists is not followed by white admiration, approval, and rewards. To the black masses who might be

attracted to the black political aspirant, the rewards from political idols are far less obvious than their sports idols. To be truthful, they are not only less obvious, they may be less substantial in reality.

For black people eager to improve their image in the eyes of black people, political activity is not a clear cut means to an end. Educators must seize the responsibility to demonstrate more clearly the relevance of politics as a means to reaching the black man's ends.

However, the most serious consequence of Springfield's black population's frustration and noninvolvement in politics is the possible effect of its own evaluation of itself. Many black people in Springfield who see politics as a conspiracy against them may or may not have a low political self-image. Therefore, the black person who traces his political insignificance to his own shortcomings does assume a non-participating political attitude, for he feels the political system sees him as worthless and consequently refuses to care about politics. One may feel that this awareness may represent a tremendous leap psychologically for the individual, but experience has shown that the link between cynicism concerning politics and low self-image is strong.

When one looks at the fact that northern black people have had more opportunity to exercise their voting privilege and do not, one must begin to address questions such as, which has the greater number of black people with low self-images, the North or the South? Is the northern political system less responsive to black people or is political cynicism independent of the way political systems work? Is it simply a minor

segment of an overall pressimism and low self-image caused by an informal social order which is not so strikingly variant from North to South as is the political system? These questions and many more must be dealt with and answered before any meaningful attack on the way black people can begin to use politics for their own political socialization can be made.

Earlier mention was made that much of the political socialization process or political awareness occurs during the school years. One could add to that and include the family years. Because the two periods occur at the same time, one could distinguish between the two by saying education is the formal form of political socialization, and the family is the informal form. Weighing the magnitude of two forms is in all probability the important issue if black political thrust is to be redirected in Springfield. Unfortunately, the school contributes very little from most available evidence; however, by contrast it is noted that the family effect is evident. The figures that Martin L. Levin presents are the results of white data. He found that there was an extraordinary perseverance of loyalty to a given political party preference of parents and children.[133] Martin Levin found that party loyalty was strongest when it was threatened by conflict. He demonstrated that when a family's political party preference is in conflict with the social and occupational status of the family, it is the family tradition rather than the occupational class that wins out.

Party politics is not the only carry over from parent to children. Hyman indicates that there is a strong correlation between the ideological

position of children and parents. Therefore, it is not surprising that the amount of political participation may be thought to be similar within families. Neveretheless, one cannot expect both parents to vote the same way even if there is often a great deal of consistency within the family unit. Usually the father is the primary director of political position in the family circle.[134]

Following this thinking and relating it to the black family, one must recognize that the black family traditionally has been matriarchal. If the matriarchal position be valid, one expects greater political influence to be exhibited by the mother. This does not mean to imply that because women until recently have assumed a less visible political profile, as a consequence they would be less interested, active, or informed about political matters.[135] For if the black woman has assumed male roles in the family in general, it would seem that she would also assume a typical male political role in the family. However, Bradbury Seaholes study of black political participation in Durham and Winston-Salem, N.C., observed a smaller difference in participation between black males and females than white males and females. He concluded that the difference was due to the decline in male involvement rather than increased female political activity.[136] The major finding of his study was that black females do not develop a political role in the family. Therefore, it could be assumed that if black women play a greater part in the political socialization of their children, as white women do, the effects on the children would be the obtaining of higher levels of information, interest, participation, and skill in politics.

Reflecting back to the findings of Greenstein, Easton, and Hess, the absences of males in the household may make it more difficult to develop images of what political figures are like. This line of thinking assumes that the relationship between an image of one's father and of the President or other office holder noted earlier is not an example of generalized reaction to prominent males, but rather a specific projection of feelings about one type of male, the father, toward one who seems similar to a child.

Harry L. Moon has described black people as a political balance of power.[137] Yet, it is quite clear that no balance of power is operative when there is considerable lack of political participation, and party preference is overwhelmingly predictable. In fact, it would seem that black people seem to be operating at far less than their potential. Springfield's black population typifies this predictably.

In calling Springfield's black political immobility "bad strategy" it would seem that the greatest contribution an educator could make to improve the condition is a reorientation of their thinking about the development and use of political strategy. Educators must begin to identify out the various techniques of bargaining, demands, concessions, and even occasional retreat that are used to gain political success for subgroups in our society. It means that reappraisal of the utility of strong party preference must move from blind preference to intelligent partisanship. It means being candid about the probably maximum political techniques that are being used presently or in the future.

The relevance of politics and political socialization has bearing on the development and nature of black people's self-image and that positive self-images can be developed within Springfield's black population only if black people become an integral part of city government. Through the increased numbers of young black people who had vested interest in the 1950's and 1960's desire to change a system of government that renders then powerless, will come new black leaders. The mid-south until now has made the most dramatic strides in obtaining welfare goals. The large proportion of black people is part of the equation. The deep south, like the north, has been powerless because of numbers and voting freedom.

Terms such as "bloc voting" and "bullet voting" have to become a part of our political consciences. School and civic agencies must recycle their thinking so that they begin to address, support,and encourage young inspiring black political candidates. Realistic approaches to the study of politics should demonstrate how the principle of minority rights is won through the construction of majorities in a society whose interest in the principle can never be identical to that of the minority. Beyond these basic rights, it is to strive for effectiveness which is an alternate societal objective. The shift from "Am I successful?" must go to "Am I effective?" This shift in emphasis increases the possibility of a more favorable self-image. It should be stressed that politics is not a win or lose proposition, but rather a process of bargaining and compromise whose end result reflects the varied political interests, resources, and skills in the end.

Politics is the process from which law emerges. Not only the enforcement of law, but the mystique of the law can have substantial consequences on black self-images. The enforcement of law, in improving economic and social positions and removing racial segregation, has an obvious effect on self-image. One of the sustainining forces for black America throughout their struggle for equality has been their undying faith that American law and justice were on their side, and that theirs was not simply one more set of self-interested claims by one of many pressure groups.

With this thought, many have accepted and have been satisfied with "idealistic" legislation, which often had no chance of real enforcement, but seemed sensible at first. The black community must stop letting the press do our political research and then slant the findings we so religiously follow. The black community must reduce the cost of our political participation by making every vote count.

If it is recognized that the public education system is a major vehicle by which political information can be obtained at relatively low cost, then it must utilize to our advantage. It must be assured that students become "politically socialized" at those tender years when learning is easier and mental rigidity not so severe. Plato and Aristotle were the first philosophers to point out that the formation of citizens for any type of commonwealth is a task which begins in the cradle and extends to adulthood. Much is to be learned about political socialization; however, the patterns of political behavior, like other aspects of

acculturation, are acquired from the total environment of the child.[139] Attitudes toward authority and specifically toward political authority, identification with groups and symbols, and participation in politics are determinants of the quality of citizenship. This is why it appears our hope for developing a more stable and effective black politically astute citizen lies with the youth, before set patterns of thought and action have become too well entrenched.

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# APPENDICES

Table I. Grade-Equivalent Mean Scores of the Iowa Test of Basic Skills in Grades 3, 5, and 6.

| Grade 3 | Arithmetic | Reading | No. Tested |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brookings | 3.12 | 3.12 | 115 |
| DeBerry | 2.73 | 2.65 | 78 |
| Homer | 3.11 | 3.04 | 86 |
| City-Wide | 3.51 | 3.43 | 2399 |
| Expected Mean 3.7 | | | |
| **Grade 5** | | | |
| Brookings | 4.69 | 4.74 | 94 |
| DeBerry | 4.28 | 4.37 | 74 |
| Homer | 4.73 | 4.81 | 78 |
| City-Wide | 5.35 | 5.32 | 2295 |
| Expected Mean 5.6 | | | |
| **Grade 6** | | | |
| Brookings | 5.42 | 5.31 | 86 |
| DeBerry | 5.17 | 5.25 | 64 |
| Homer | 5.52 | 5.74 | 79 |
| City-Wide | 6.31 | 6.11 | 2215 |
| Expected Mean 6.5 | | | |

Pupil Membership as of October 2, 1968

Table II presents data related to school enrollment. These figures are taken from the official school enrollment figures of October 2, 1968. In all of the city's elementary schools, a total of 18,066 pupils were enrolled. Of these, 1,965 pupils are enrolled in the elementary schools located in the Model Cities Area. This reflects a decrease from the previous year and, thus, elimination of the problem of overcrowding. All these schools now operate below their rated capacity.

Table II. Pupil Membership as of October 2, 1968

| School | No. of Pupils | Capacity |
|---|---|---|
| Brookings | 827 | 960 |
| DeBerry | 570 | 630 |
| Hommer | 568 | 900 |
| All other elementary schools | 16,101 | - |
| | 18,066 | |

It should be noted that pupils in grades five and six no longer attend Homer Street School. They are in attendance at Harris, North Branch, Warner, Washington and White Street Schools.

Secondary school figures are not included in the above table.

# PROFILE CHART FOR AVERAGES

IOWA TESTS OF BASIC SKILLS

LEGEND
- City-wide - All Schools
- Brothers
- Fr. Berry

Springfield Public Schools — NAME OF BUILDING OR SYSTEM

February, 1969 — DATE

GRADE 5

PERCENTILE SCALE FOR AVERAGES

| TEST V: VOCAB-ULARY V | TEST R: READ-ING R | TEST L: LANGUAGE SKILLS | | | | | TEST W: WORK-STUDY SKILLS | | | | TEST A: ARITHMETIC SKILLS | | | COM-POSITE C |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | SPELLING L-1 | CAPITAL-IZATION L-2 | PUNC-TUATION L-3 | USAGE L-4 | TOTAL L | MAPS W-1 | GRAPHS W-2 | REFER-ENCES W-3 | TOTAL W | CONCEPTS A-1 | PROBLEMS A-2 | TOTAL A | |

99 98 97 96 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 M 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 4 3 2 1

# PROFILE CHART FOR AVERAGES

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY · TESTS ·

IOWA TESTS OF BASIC SKILLS

LEGEND
- City-wide - All Schools
- Brookings
- Lee Berry

187 Springfield Public Schools — NAME OF BUILDING OR SYSTEM

January, 1964 — DATE

GRADE 6

PERCENTILE SCALE FOR AVERAGES

| TEST V: VOCAB-ULARY V | TEST R: READ-ING R | TEST L: LANGUAGE SKILLS | | | | | TEST W: WORK-STUDY SKILLS | | | | TEST A: ARITHMETIC SKILLS | | | COM-POSITE C |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | SPELLING L-1 | CAPITAL-IZATION L-2 | PUNC-TUATION L-3 | USAGE L-4 | TOTAL L | MAPS W-1 | GRAPHS W-2 | REFER-ENCES W-3 | TOTAL W | CONCEPTS A-1 | PROBLEMS A-2 | TOTAL A | |

99 98 97 96 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 M 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 4 3 2 1

77350

# PROFILE CHART FOR AVERAGES

IOWA TESTS OF BASIC SKILLS

188

Springfield Public Schools
NAME OF BUILDING OR SYSTEM

February, 1969
DATE

LEGEND
- City wide - all Schools
- Brookings
- E. C. Berry
- Homer
- Sapplemy

GRADE 3

| TEST V: VOCAB-ULARY V | TEST R: READ-ING R | TEST L: LANGUAGE SKILLS | | | | | TEST W: WORK-STUDY SKILLS | | | | TEST A: ARITHMETIC SKILLS | | | COM-POSITE C |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | SPELLING L-1 | CAPITAL-IZATION L-2 | PUNC-TUATION L-3 | USAGE L-4 | TOTAL L | MAPS W-1 | GRAPHS W-2 | REFER-ENCES W-3 | TOTAL W | CONCEPTS A-1 | PROBLEMS A-2 | TOTAL A | |

PERCENTILE SCALE FOR AVERAGES

99 98 97 96 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 M 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 4 3 2 1

# APPENDIX A

## Social Group

The Social Area Analysis is a system of reducing the mass of complex social, economic, and family data to a few easily grasped facts, and provides a ready appreciation of the similarities and differences between census tract populations. The Appendix contains a full description of the method used in the Social Area Analysis.

Briefly, the method is as follows: the Social Area Analysis assigned the population of each tract a rank which showed its position relative to all other tracts in the city as regards social status, family status and ethnicity. A tract population with many high-income families and many persons in managerial and professional positions received a high rank in the social status ranking. A tract population with many large and intact families ranked high in the family status ranking. A tract population with low proportions of non-whites and persons of ethnic origin ranked high in the ethnicity index. As there are 33 census tracts in the city, there are 33 rank positions in each of these three systems (of social status, family status, and ethnicity); for compactness, the Social Area Analysis reduces the ranks to quartile rankings, each containing 8 or 9 ranks. The rank positions only have relevance in the context of the City of Springfield. A tract with a high rank in the city might have a lower rank if the analysis included the entire metropolitan area.

The grouping of social areas is shown in the following page.

This chart of relationships between social status and family status illustrates that the rank positions often go together: a low social status may accompany a low family status (for example, the elderly, where incomes are low, households small); high social status usually goes with high family status (for example, the typical suburban family has a moderately high income and a large intact family).

CENSUS TRACT GROUPED ACCORDING TO SOCIAL STATUS, FAMILY STATUS, AND ETHNICITY

| FAMILY STATUS | low | | high | high | ETHNICITY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| high | | | 2, 15B, 15C | 16A, 16B, 16C, 16D, 16E, 24, 25 | 16A, 16B, 16D, 16E, 21, 24, 25, 26 — low concentration |
| | | 1, 4, 7 | 3, 5, 15A | 26 | 2, 4, 11A, 12, 15A, 15B, 16C, 17, 22, 23 |
| | 18 | 9, 13, 14, 17 | 21, 22, 23 | | 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 15C, 19 |
| low | 6, 8, 10, 11A, 11B, 12, 20 | 19 | | | 6, 8, 10, 11B, 13, 14, 18, 20 — high concentration |

SOCIAL STATUS

In certain cases the rank positions of social and family status do not coincide; in the above chart, these tracts fall in the squares above and below the main diagonal. Tracts with a higher family status than social status (above the diagonal) carry the suggestion of a working class area, in which the family is stable and large, and the occupation of the father is that of a craftsman, foreman, or operative. Tracts with a higher social status than family status (below the diagonal) are often apartment areas, where households are small and atypical, but the income and educational level of the household members may be high.

There is also a degree of correspondence between the amount of the ethnic concentration and the social and family status. Areas of high ethnic concentration have many low-income and disrupted families (for example, the Negro areas of the city).

# SOCIAL AREA ANALYSIS

## I. PURPOSE OF THE ANALYSIS

Social area analysis is an attempt to describe the social and economic characteristics of different subareas of the city. A comprehensive decennial census of population provides abundant published data on the social and economic characteristics of residents living in these subareas. This published information is available for area units called census tracts.[1] One of the problems in using such data is that the variables describing the population are numerous. The technique of social area analysis attempts to achieve some economy in handling large amounts of data by selecting and analyzing a few indicators that are believed to be representative of trends and rankings in a number of other variables.

The kinds of social and economic variables chosen for analysis depends upon the purposes of the study and the relationships that exist among the different variables. There are two general requirements for such a description within the framework of the Community Renewal Program. First, the social and economic description of subareas should be structured so that it relates to subarea physical characteristics and planning problems. Second, the profile should provide a broad basis for developing social and economic programs for different groups of subareas of the city. Such programs could be phased in with physical planning efforts. In order to successfully meet this second requirement, the description should lead to the identification of social and economic resources, needs and problems.

The profile also provides a basis for comparing various subareas of the city in regard to social and economic characteristics. Implicit in any such comparison are differences as well as similarities. Similarities among subareas provide another kind of economy by reducing the number of discrete areas that have to be analysed. Subareas that have similar characteristics may have similar resources, needs and problems and can be treated together as one unit for the purpose of developing programs. Differences among groups of census tracts may indicate the degree of urgency or priority that must be given to the development of programs for certain areas. They may also give some indication of the different kinds of programs that may have to be applied to different groups of subareas.

It should be stressed that statements in this report are based on actual census data. Many of the terms that are necessarily found in a social analysis of this type - blight, working class, status, prestige, etc. - have pre-acquired connotations of false values involving personal judgment or prejudice. However, in this report they are used in reference to statistical data only, in order to present an objective picture of social and economic

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[1] For a detailed discussion of how a census tract is defined and the types of data available see Community Renewal Program, Technical Report, Data Bank Deck V, March 1964. Hereafter, census tracts will be referred to in short as tracts.

conditions in the city. The analysis can then be used as a guide in developing a realistic and effective Comprehensive Planning Program.

## II. OVERVIEW OF GENERAL METHOD

The social area analysis has combined a number of related social and economic variables into three general indices that have been used to classify and describe census tracts: social status index, family status index, and ethnicity index. The social status index attempts to describe the level of social and economic resources of residents living in the various tracts. The family status index attempts to describe the residents' family composition or family orientation. The ethnic-racial index attempts to describe the degree of concentration in various tracts of certain population groups according to race, country of origin, or country of origin of parents. Two general indices, the social status and family status index, were the result of a combined ranking of several component variables that were found to be related to each other. These two general indices were ultimately used to determine a census tract's social area classification. The third general index, the ethnicity index, was then related along with other variables to the basic social area classification. The basis for this method of classification was derived from E. Shevky and W. Bell's Social Area Analysis.[1] Although the method as applied in this study is somewhat different in computational procedure from Shevky and Bell, the theory is essentially the same.

## III. SOCIAL STATUS INDEX

### A. Definition and Choice of Variables

The purpose of the social status index was to determine a tract's relative position in the city in regard to the social and economic resources of its residents. The social status index is a combined ranking and quarter grouping of six kinds of census data thought to be most representative of the social and economic level of a tract's inhabitants: median school years completed, median income of families and unrelated individuals, per cent males fourteen years and over in the labor force, per cent owner-occupied housing units, median housing value of single-family housing units, and per cent managerial, professional and kindred workers in the labor force. Using Shevky and Bell as a guide, these variables were chosen from a number of social and economic variables that were thought to be important indicators of the characteristics of residents in various tracts throughout the city. The basis for the selection was the generally high rank correlation of each of the variables with one another and the similarity of some of the variables to those used by Shevky and Bell.

#### 1. Raw Score

Among thirty-three census tracts in the city, each variable was ranked from low to high so that a low value of a particular variable for a

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[1] Shevky, Eshref and Bell, Wendell, Social Area Analysis, Theory, Illustrative Application and Computational Procedures, Stanford University (Stanford, California, 1955).

tract indicated a low level of achievement, contributing to a low level of social status. For the thirty-three census tracts in the city, the rankings of each variable were then correlated with each other in order to find the degree of interrelationship among them. For example, if the relative rankings of the tracts in regard to median number of school years completed agreed very closely with rankings of tracts in regard to median income of families and unrelated individuals, then the coefficient of rank correlation would approach 1.0 and it could be assumed that there was some relationship between average educational level of the residents of a tract and their average income level. As indicated in Table A-1, the six variables chosen to comprise the social status index generally showed a close interrelationship in regard to rank. The rank correlation of these variables with each other ranged from a low of .608 to a high of .912. Median number of school years completed and median income of families and unrelated individuals showed the closest interrelationship with other variables used in the index, while per cent managerial, professional and kindred workers and median housing value showed the lowest interrelationship with other variables. Thus, the composition of the social status index was such that residents in tracts with a high educational level also had a higher median income, a larger proportion of males over fourteen years old working, a larger proportion of owner-occupied housing units, a higher average value of single-family housing units, and a larger proportion of higher-paid managerial, professional and kindred workers. A high ranking tract in regard to the single composite social status index would generally indicate a high ranking in most of these six variables.

In order to facilitate combining the six variables into a single index of social status, the ranking system was simplified. For each variable, the overall ranking by tract from low to high was further divided into four quarter groupings comprised of 8 or 9 tracts each. The lowest or first quarter grouping consisted of those tracts with the lowest level of achievement in regard to a particular variable. A tract was given a score based upon the rank of the quarter grouping for each variable. For example, if a given tract fell in the second quarter grouping in regard to educational level it received a score of two in regard to that variable. The total of all such scores for each of the six variables could represent the tract's combined social status ranking. However, a weight or score was also given to variables based on the degree of correlation or interrelationship with all other variables. In this case, median school years was assigned a weight of 6, while the variable showing the next highest correlation with all other variables was assigned a weight of 5 and the variable showing the lowest correlation with all other variables, -- managerial and professional as a per cent of total employment -- received a weight of one. A combined social status score for each tract was then calculated by multiplying the assigned weight by the tract's quarter group standing in regard to each variable and totaling each of the products. The following data shows the computation procedure for Tract 15c:

# SOCIAL STATUS INDEX 1960




| Quarter Groupings | Standardized Score |
|---|---|
| Low | 21 |
| Lower Middle | 52 |
| Upper Middle | 75 |
| High | 100 |

# MALE LABOR FORCE

## (% OF ALL MALES AGE 14 AND OVER)




Quarter Groupings

Range: 67.9% – 93.5%

| | |
|---|---|
| Low | 75.1 |
| Lower Middle | 78.9 |
| Upper Middle | 84.4 |
| High | 93.5 |

## OWNER-OCCUPIED UNITS
## (% OF ALL OCCUPIED UNITS)




**Quarter Groupings**

**Range: 0.4% – 98.5%**

| | |
|---|---|
| Low | 26.1 |
| Lower Middle | 52.7 |
| Upper Middle | 81.2 |
| High | 98.5 |

## MANAGERIAL
## (% OF TOTAL EMPLOYED)




**Quarter Groupings**

| | |
|---|---|
| Low | 11.2 |
| Lower Middle | 16.7 |
| Upper Middle | 26.8 |
| High | 37.6 |

**Range: 2.3% – 37.6%**

| Social Area Types | Rank | Census Tracts |
|---|---|---|
| 1A | Low | 6, 8, 10, 11A, 11B, 12, 20 |
| 2B | Lower Middle | 9, 13, 14, 17 |
| 3C | Upper Middle | 3, 5, 15A |
| 4D | High | 16A, 16B, 16C, 16D, 16E, 24, 25 |

Tracts grouped under social area type 1A have the lowest level of social and economic well-being and the lowest family orientation of any of the tracts in the city. As shown in Figures 11 and 12, these tracts generally comprise the older areas of multifamily housing around the central business district. The high rank correlation of social area groups with other data on social and economic problems would indicate that social disorganization is greatest in these areas, and that these areas should have the highest priority in regard to economic and social programs. In contrast, tracts grouped under social area type 4D have the highest level of social and economic well-being and the highest family orientation of any of the tracts in the city. As shown in Figures 11 and 12, these tracts largely comprise the outer portions of the South Sector of the city. These tracts show the least apparent evidence of social and economic problems, indicating a relatively low priority in regard to city social and economic programs. In between the two extreme social area types are the middle ranking social areas, which are located geographically between the tracts around downtown and the outer tracts in the South Sector. Problems may be evident in these social areas, to an intermediate degree. Ameliorative social and economic programs are indicated for the lower middle group, with some possibility for urban rehabilitation in regard to urban renewal. The upper middle group probably shows more definite potential for rehabilitation and conservation; social and economic programs could be of a more preventive nature, rather than directly ameliorative.

2. Family-Oriented Social Areas

Seven of the city census tracts group themselves into social areas in which the family status rank is higher than respective social status. The three social area types, (1B, 2C, 3D), in this category are above the diagonal in the diagram in Figure 11. Thus, tracts in these social areas show varying degrees of family orientation, but in comparison their level of economic and social well-being is somewhat low. Census tracts group themselves into the three types of family-oriented social areas according to social status rank as follows:

| Social Area Types | Social Status Rank | Census Tracts |
|---|---|---|
| 1B | Low | 18 |
| 2C | Lower Middle | 1, 4, 7 |
| 3D | Upper Middle | 2, 15B, 15C |

# SOCIAL AREAS 1960




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1D | 2D | 3D | 4D |
| 1C | 2C | 3C | 4C |
| 1B | 2B | 3B | 4B |
| 1A | 2A | 3A | 4A |

Family Index: High … Low

Social Status Index: Low … High

# SOCIAL AREAS 1950




| Family Index | Social Status Index: Low | | | Social Status Index: High |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 1D | 2D | 3D | 4D |
| | 1C | 2C | 3C | 4C |
| | 1B | 2B | 3B | 4B |
| Low | 1A | 2A | 3A | 4A |

# CHANGE IN SOCIAL AREAS 1950-1960


| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Status Change | − | 0 | − | − | 0 | + | 0 |
| Family Index Change | − | − | 0 | + | + | 0 | 0 |

OLD HILL CENSUS TRACTS 18 AND 19

## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. Description (See Map A)

The Old Hill lies on high ground between downtown and Winchester Square, south of State Street. The two census tracts that make up the Old Hill have firm boundaries on all sides: the busy thoroughfare of State Street; the Highland Branch of the NY, NH & H Railroad; the Mill River; and change in topography between Maple and Main Streets. State Street has several public and semi-public institutions along it between Maple and Main Streets. State Street has several public and semi-public institutions along it between Maple and Walnut Streets, but towards Winchester Square it becomes a commercial strip. There is a narrow industrial strip alongside the railroad. The Watershops of the Armory is on the Mill River at its east and in the Old Hill; between Mill Street and the Mill River there is some old industrial development. The north-west corner of the Old Hill, bounded roughly by State Street, the Cemetery, and Maple Street, is adjacent to downtown, and contains apartments, professional offices (mainly doctors), a nursing home, and hospital. Apartments are concentrated on sloping streets which lead from the downtown and the South End: there are apartment buildings on High, Union, and Mulberry Streets in the "medical area"; on Central Street; and on Belmont Avenue, Fort Pleasant Avenue, and Longhill Street, towards Forest Park. Institutions use several of the large houses on Maple Street between Central and Pine Streets. Elsewhere the Old Hill is a residential area, with associated schools, stores, and playgrounds.

Main Streets cut across the Old Hill at all angles. Five of these streets meet State Street at right angles (Maple, Walnut, Oak, Hancock, and Eastern Avenue), but because of the bend in State Street, some of these streets intersect with one another at a distance from State Street, and there are awkward intersections at Oak and Walnut Streets, and Hancock and Walnut Streets. Pine and Central Streets do not conform to the rectangular pattern, and their intersections with Hancock Street, Walnut Street, and Maple Street, and with each other, also create difficult intersections. The street pattern between Walnut and Maple Street is very irregular, due to the changes in topography as well as to the pattern of main streets. The main streets of the area converge towards bridges over the Mill River at Walnut Street, Mill Street, and Locust Street.

Winchester Square and State Street are important locations for stores. Neighborhood stores extend along Eastern Avenue, Hancock Street, and Walnut Street, and there are local shopping clusters at the intersections of some of the main streets.

### B. Relationship to the Rest of the City

History At the end of the 18th century the Hill was beyond

the confines of the town. The Bay Path, which led from the south, stayed close to the east bank of the Connecticut River, then after crossing the Mill River, it swung northeast to higher ground on the line of the present Mill Street, Pine Street, and Oak Street, and took an easterly direction towards Boston along the present Bay Street. The Springfield Armory was established in 1794, and a powder mill was built on the Mill River, the site of the Watershops. The road joining the Armory and the mill became Walnut Street Central Avenue provided a link between the town center and the Watershops. The area between the Armory and its Watershops became a residential area for laborers working at the two sites; they established Baptist and Methodist churches in contrast to the Congregational churches of the old center. Thus, from early on, there was a difference between residents of the town center and the Hill. Chestnut Street and Maple Street, towards the town, were the streets where the well-to-do of Springfield built their homes; several of these old mansions still stand on Maple Street. Around 1870 there was already a considerable colony of non-whites living on the Hill. In the 1880's a few industrialists built factories at Winchester Square, probably attracted by the skilled labor force and rail connections. Watches, bicycles, and arms were made there. Later on, Winchester Square lost its function as an industrial center, and a discount department store now occupies one of the old factories.

Topography The situation of the Old Hill on the plateau above the river gives the area its name. Maple Street roughly marks the front of the second ledge above the river. The terrain slopes up from here to Walnut Street, east of which the land is flat. The most irregular part of the slope is within the Springfield Cemetery. Maple Street, beyond Central Street, climbs the rise to an elevation above the town. A cooler situation in summer, a view, and safety from floods, made it a desired area for the wealthy. The southern boundary of the tracts is the Watershops Pond and the Mill River, and the ground dips down towards them.

Development The Old Hill is in the eastern sector of the city. (For a full explanation of sectors and zones, see the Introduction to Neighborhood Analysis). The eastern sector of the city stretches from downtown through the Hill and out to Sixteen Acres. Wilbraham Road and Allen Street are the main arteries in this direction. An increasing proportion of the city's population has been living in this sector in the past two decades, due mainly to the increase in suburban development at the outer end of the sector.

Tract 19 is in the inner zone of census tracts, and has the declining population, high density, old houses and apartments, mixed uses, and busy traffic that are found in other tracts at this distance from downtown in Springfield. It also contains certain specialized uses which serve the whole city, such as high schools, doctor's offices, nursing homes, a hospital, and the cemetery.

Tract 18, in the intermediate zone of tracts, also has a population that is declining in number, but its rate of decline is smaller than in Tract 19. The primary land use is residence, in the form of single, two, and three family houses, with stores, schools, and playgrounds to serve the residents. The population density is moderately high, and traffic is fairly heavy.

Winchester Square, first as a nucleus of manufacturing plants, is the main focus in this part of the city. State Street is an arterial commercial strip, with major concentrations of stores nearest Winchester Square. There is a narrow strip of industrial development alongside the NY, NH & H Railroad, but the influence of the railroad has been limited. Development on the ground sloping towards the Watershops Pond must have occurred slowly, with a resulting mixture of types and density of housing.

Apart from the decline in the number of residents, Maple Street and the adjacent blocks has been the section to experience the most change recently. This street has a favorable location and character: it is near downtown and near public transportation, and it contains large elaborate old houses on pleasant streets. As it once was the finest residential area of Springfield, an address in this area carries a certain amount of prestige. Institutions, professionals, and firms have noticed the advantages of the area and have moved into what was once a residential area. Several of the old houses have been converted into offices, mainly for doctors, and even for extensions to a nursing home; in other cases, new construction for offices has replaced the former houses. The concentration of doctors and medical services in the area of Maple Street makes it an important center for medical services in the city and even the region.

For many of the same reasons that draw firms and professionals to the area its closeness to downtown, its address and attractiveness--the Maple and Mill Street area also appeals to certain apartment-dwellers: young professionals and persons with careers who are single or married but without children, and elderly persons with moderate means. At least two new apartment buildings catering to these groups have been built in the last few years.

Social Group Compared to the rest of the city the population of the Old Hill has a fairly low social or family status, which is different in the two census tracts. (The Indtroduction to Neighborhood Analysis gives a full explanation of the terms and methods used in describing social and family status in the city). The following chart illustrates the position of the population of these tracts in relation to the city generally.




Tract 18: Family and social status are both low. Family status is in a higher quartile than social status, giving a suggestion of a working class family area, though with many disrupted families. The concentration of ethnic and non-white population is high.




Tract 19: In contrast to Tract 18, social status is in a higher quartile than family status, carrying the suggestion of an apartment house district in which some individuals may be in a fairly high socio-economic group, but the households are not typical. There is some ethnic concentration but not nearly as much as in Tract 18.


DIAGRAM OF CENSUS TRACT STRUCTURE

RESIDENTIAL
COMMERCIAL
SCHOOL
OFFICES

N

SCALE IN FEET




MAP A
DESCRIPTION

OLD HILL
CENSUS TRACTS 18.19

## Comparison of Present Charter - Plan "A"

| | Present Charter | Plan "A" |
|---|---|---|
| Form of Government | Mayor-Council (bi-carmeral - two boards - Alderman and Common Councilman. | Mayor - Council (unicarmeral - one board - City Council). |
| Elections | Biennial Partisan (official ballot designates party affiliations) Nominations at partisan primaries. | Biennial Non-Partisan (no party designation on official ballot) Non-partisan run off election. |
| Persons Elected By Ballot | 38 Mayor, 8 Aldermen, 18 Councilmen, 9 School Committeemen, City Clerk, City Treasurer. | 16 on first election under plan - thereafter 13, Mayor, 9 Councilmen, 6 School Committeemen members on first election, thereafter 3 every two years. |
| Terms of Office | 2 yrs. - Mayor, Alderman, Councilmen.<br>4 yrs. - School Committee, City Clerk, and City Treasurer. | 2 yrs. - Mayor, Councilmen.<br>4 yrs. - School Committee members. |
| How Elected | Mayor, Aldermen, City Clerk and City Treasurer by plurality vote at large except that no two aldermen may be residents of the same ward. Common Councilmen by plurality vote by wards. | All at large by plurality vote. |
| Executive | Mayor (limited administrator and ceremonial head of city). | Mayor - Chief executive Chairman of School Committee. Ceremonial head of City. |
| Powers of Executive | Mayor is Chief Financial Officer of city and only official who can introduce financial orders. He may, with consent of appointing authority, remove from office any department head over whose appointment he has power of nomination. Mayor appoints some or all members of 13 Boards or Commissions, subject to confirmation by Board of Aldermen or City Council. | Mayor is responsible for administration of all departments except that of City Clerk. Full power of appointment and removal of all department heads, board members, and commissions except City Clerk and appointments by the Governor without council approval. Chief financial officer. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Duties of City Council | Enacts ordinances (may override mayor's veto). Adopts city budget. Authorizes sale of bonds. Lay out, establishes and orders construction of streets, bridges, etc. Makes assessment for cost improvements. Selects all members of 4 boards or Commissions, and appoints majority or fewer on 3 others. Elects departments heads of 3 major departments. Establishes voting precincts. Confirms most of mayor's appoints, etc. | Enacts ordinances. Adopts city budget. Authorizes sale of bonds, lays out streets, bridges, etc. Establishes voting precincts. Elects City Clerk. |
| Powers and Duties of School Committee | Chooses Superintendent of Schools. General management and conduct of the schools. Prepares school budget. Establishes teachers salaries and appoints teachers. Approval of school sites and new construction. Control of school buildings and grounds. Only difference, not elected by wards. | Same duties and powers as present charter except that Committee may take full charge of all school properties unless otherwise provided for. Under present ordinances, all repairs shall be made in such a manner and by such board as the City Council of said city may by ordinance direct. (Now Public Buildings Department.) |
| Budget | Mayor submits to City Council | Mayor submits to City Council. |
| Salaries | Mayor - $15,000<br>Council - none<br>School Committee - none | Mayor and City Council members - set by ordinance and any change must be by referendum vote.<br>School Committee - none. |
| Departmental Organization | | |
| City Clerk | Elected by people. | Elected by City Council. |
| City Auditor | Appointed by mayor, confirmed by Board of Aldermen. | Appointed by mayor. |
| City Treasurer | Elected by people. | Appointed by mayor. |
| City Solicitor | Appointed by mayor. | Appointed by mayor. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| City Collector | Elected by City Council. | Appointed by mayor. |
| Supt. of Public Buildings | Elected by City Council. | Appointed by mayor. |
| Supt. of Streets & Engineering | Elected by City Council. | Appointed by mayor. |
| Purchasing Agent | Appointed by mayor, confirmed by Board of Aldermen. | Appointed by mayor. |
| Personnel Director | Appointed by mayor, approved by Personnel Comm., confirmed by City Council. | Appointed by mayor. |
| Commissioner of Public Health | Appointed by mayor, confirmed by City Council. | Appointed by mayor. |
| City Physician | Appointed by mayor, approved by Medical Advisory Council, confirmed by Board of Aldermen. | Appointed by mayor. |
| Smoke Inspector | Appointed by mayor. | Appointed by mayor. |
| Forest Warden | Appointed by mayor, confirmed by State Forester. | Appointed by mayor, confirmed by State Forester. |
| Board of Assessors | 3 Elected by City Council. | 3 Appointed by mayor. |
| Board of License Commissioners | 3 Appointed by mayor, confirmed by City Council. | 3 Appointed by mayor. |
| Board of Trustees of G.A.R. | 5 Sons of G.A.R. or other Veterans appointed by mayor, confirmed by City Council. | 5 Sons of G.A.R. or other Veterans appointed by mayor. |
| Building Commissioner | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Fire Chief | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Police Chief | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Part Supt. | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Welfare Agent | Civil Service | Civil Service |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Infirmary Supt. | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Water Supt. | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Chief Water Engineer | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Sealer Weights and Measures | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Veterans Service Director | Civil Service | Civil Service |
| Retirement Board | 3--Auditor ex-officio, 1 member Retirement System elected by City employees, 1 citizen appointed by mayor. | 3--Auditor ex-officio, 1 member Retirement System elected by City employees, 1 citizen appointed by mayor. |
| Board of Trustees City Library Association | 17 - Mayor, Pres. Common Council Supt. Schools, 14 members elected by Library Assoc. | 16 - Mayor, Supt. Schools, 14 members elected by Library Assoc. |
| City Librarian | Selected by Board of Trustees City Library Assoc. | Selected by Board of Trustees, City Library Assoc. |
| Supt. of Schools | Selected by School Committee | Selected by School Committee |

All other administrative Boards, Commissions, and Committees of the City are transferred to the mayor pending reorganization by the City Council.

Principal changes and advantages are: 1) the separation of administrative from legislative functions to place in the hands of the chief executive or administrator proper authority to discharge his responsibilities, 2) non-partisan elections make party responsibility possible to discharge in runoff primary which is not feasible presently under partisan primary, 3) by election at-large rather than sectional, long range planning of the community as a whole becomes more realistic rather than back scratching, log rolling, and upsetting tactics presently engaged in, 4) present administrative pressures and the complexity of governmental problems makes retention of the bicameral form of local legislature with its checks and balances designed to protect against hasty action in matters of political philosophy too costly and ineffective to meet current requirements.'

However, it explains that the revision in the governmental structure in no way was directly beneficial to the black community.

# APPENDIX C

The Social Area Analysis Matrix is a graphic representation of the combination of several social statistics into three indices. The selected variables include:

1. Social Status Index
   a. Median school years
   b. Median income
   c. Males in the labor force
   d. Owner occupied units
   e. Median housing values
   f. Managerial and professional persons

2. Family Status Index
   a. Husband-wife households
   b. One and two family houses
   c. Average household size

3. Ethnic - Racial Index
   a. Non-white
   b. Puerto-Rican extraction
   c. Canadian extraction
   d. Italian extraction
   e. Polish extraction

A standard score was developed for each index. In the cases of the Social and Family Status Indices, each variable was ranked from low to high value. In the case of the Ethnic-Racial Index, the order was reversed to read from high to low concentration. After dividing the ranked scores into quarter groupings, it becomes possible to combine the indices into descriptive categories which can be compared. The purpose of the analysis is to provide a simplified means for describing the social characteristics of the population in each census tract. The Ethnic-Racial Index was utilized separately from the Social and Family Status Indices.

# THE CHAPTER

(Chapter 43, General Laws, as Amended)

## General Provisions

### Sec. 1. Certain Terms Defined

The following words as used in this chapter shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the following meanings:

"Officer," "Officers" and "administrative officers," when used without further qualification or description, any person or persons in charge of any department or division of the city. The said words when used in contrast with a board or members of a board, or with division heads, shall mean any of the persons in sole charge of a department of the city.

"Ordinance," a vote or order of the city council entitled "Ordinance" and designed for the permanent regulation of any matter within the jurisdiction of the city council as laid down in this chapter.

"Plan A," a city government and legislative body composed of the mayor and a city council, the councillors being elected at large.

"Plan B," a city government and legislative body composed of a mayor and city council, the councillors being elected partly at large and partly from districts or wards of the city.

"Plan C," a city government and legislative body composed of mayor and commissioners as hereinafter specified.

"Plan D," a city government and legislative body, to be known as the city council, composed of seven or nine members, one of whom shall be mayor and shall be the official head of the city, and an administrative officer called the city manager.

"Plan E," a city government and legislative body, to be known as the city council, composed of seven or nine members, one of whom shall be elected as mayor by and from such members and shall be the official head of the city, and an administrative officer, called the city manager; the members of the city council and the elective members of the school committee to be elected at large by proportional representation.

"Plan F," a city government and legislative body composed of a mayor and a city council, the councillors being elected partly at large and partly from wards of the city, with the mayor and city councillors to be nominated in party primaries.

"Elected at large," elected by and from all the voters of the city.